Revisiting Iran?

• Position: The Gramercy Round

Chaired by Ian Bremmer and Fareed Zakaria, the Gramercy Round convenes over dinner in New York's historic Gramercy Tavern. Its task is to consider pressing issues that have received insufficient attention from the established foreign policy community. The round meets to discuss questions with an eye to promoting realistic assessments and innovative approaches for American policy. The round met late last year to consider innovative approaches to Iran. The situation has changed since that meeting, so several of the round's participants updated their thoughts for The National Interest.

Fareed Zakaria

An effective response to Iran's nuclear challenge requires our policymakers to answer three interrelated questions. First, is Iran's goal to achieve hegemony in the Persian Gulf and throughout the Middle East? Second, is that possibility sufficient cause for the United States to act, and to strike Iran militarily? And finally, should it be a guiding principle of U.S. foreign policy to militarily neuter countries inimical to our interests?

It makes a major difference if one concludes that Iran pursues nuclear weapons for a suicidal Gotterdammerung, in which Iran sacrifices its statehood to strike Israel and the United States. But if, despite the rhetoric, Iran is engaged in traditional statecraft (seeking hegemony and influence), it opens the door to a wider range of policies, among them containment, deterrence and negotiation.

But there are no "guaranteed solutions." A carrot-and-stick approach has led states like Brazil, Kazakhstan and Libya to either give up existing nuclear weapons or forego nuclear weapons programs. On the other hand, sanctions had no effect on India and Pakistan during the 1990s. After all, back in 1971, then-Pakistani Foreign Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto famously declared, "Even if Pakistanis have to eat grass, we will make the bomb." So the challenge is how to punish Iran if it continues its nuclear program.

U.S. policy needs to be much more deft and able to operate on a two-track approach, rather than defining different alternatives as "either/ors." There is no reason not to censure Iran while at the same time holding out the possibility of Tehran's rehabilitation as a full member of the international community. Negotiations can occur alongside sanctions for past and current indiscretions. We need to show Iran that its nuclear program can make it more of a pariah state--but we also have to allow a viable "way out."

Cliff Kupchan

Let's start with defining what "a nuclear Iran" means. This is a situation where Iran has installed 1,500 to 3,000 working P-1 centrifuges underground at the Natanz enrichment facility, making Iran able to obtain a working nuclear bomb within one year. Iran would not need to develop or explode an actual nuclear device; here, Iran would enjoy the benefits of "strategic ambiguity"--the world is aware that Iran could quickly obtain a weapon, but the country hasn't necessarily crossed any red lines. Many experts believe Iran could achieve this by late 2007 or early 2008.

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the vast majority of Iranian elites are committed to acquiring nuclear capabilities. There is no sign of significant upper-level disagreement on nuclear policy, though the electorate rebuked Ahmadinejad, the most vocal proponent of an aggressive nuclear policy, in municipal council elections on December 15, 2006. His supporters received no more than 25 percent of the seats in any major city.

The central challenge facing the United States is how to deal with all this. Neither the UN nor direct talks are likely to help in stopping Iran. Resolution 1737, passed December 23, imposed but mild sanctions. Another resolution is possible, but Russian and Chinese opposition to harsh sanctions means the UN process is grinding to a halt. And while the United States should talk to the Iranians, let's be realistic--major gulfs separate Tehran and Washington, gulfs exacerbated by President Bush's announcement on January 10 that the United States will actively disrupt Iranian activities in Iraq. The United States would insist on a long-term suspension and want an effective veto over Iran's ability to resume enrichment; Iran would at best agree to a technical pause of several months and would want a major non-U.S.-dominated forum to decide when it had regained the international community's trust.

So the United States will try to isolate Iran economically. The U.S. Treasury Department has sanctioned two Iranian banks allegedly involved in illicit activities, seeking to cut off the banks' access to dollars and dollar-based trading, and to adversely affect the interests of groups affiliated with them. Washington is successfully encouraging foreign banks to follow suit and will probably sanction more Iranian banks. The United States is applying diplomatic pressure to foreign governments, banks and companies to curtail business with Iran, with some success. Washington has especially targeted Iran's oil sector, which accounts for 80 percent of export earnings, and has succeeded in diminishing foreign oil companies' activity in Iran and foreign lenders' willingness to finance new projects. In extending these efforts, Washington will likely attempt to form multilateral coalitions of the willing with G-7, EU and allied Gulf nations to sanction Iran jointly.

These efforts, however, are unlikely to induce a fundamental change of course. The reach of U.S. sanctions and pressure is...