It's time to revise the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

AuthorCarpenter, Ted Galen

Critics long have charged that Washington's military commitments to wealthy allies in Western Europe and East Asia encourage those nations to "free ride" on the U.S. security guarantee. The accuracy of such allegations was demonstrated with unusual clarity in early 1995 when Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye unveiled his department's latest East Asia strategy report, which affirmed that the U.S. would keep approximately 100,000 troops in East Asia indefinitely. Five days later, Japan's Kyodo News Service announced that the Japanese government hoped to reduce its troop levels and weapons by approximately 20% and cut military spending over the next five years.

Given the threats in East Asia - North Korea's attempt to acquire nuclear weapons, China's increasingly assertive behavior, and the continuing political instability in Russia - it is unlikely that Tokyo would decide to cut its already modest military forces and budgets were it not for Washington's willingness to underwrite Japan's defense. The attitude expressed in an editorial in the influential Asahi Shimbun, that Japan should "aim at being a conscientious-objector nation," would be difficult to sustain if Japan had to be responsible for its own safety. Hisahiko Okazaki, Japan's former ambassador to Thailand, described a more probable reaction. If the U.S. alliance did not exist and Japan's survival were at stake, "because of a threat from the Russians, the North Koreans, or the Chinese," Japan would build a strong military force for itself. Just as domestic welfare expenditures foster an unhealthy dependent mentality and discourage initiative on the part of recipients, so, too, do international military welfare subsidies. Nye's announcement reassured Japanese officials that it was safe for their country to continue its free-riding habits.

Japanese policymakers, of course, vehemently deny that their nation is free riding. They point out that their government pays most of the costs of the U.S. military units stationed on Japanese territory and that the amount of that host-nation support has been rising steadily for several years - reaching more than $5,000,000,000 in 1995. They also note that Japan's actions are in marked contrast to the parsimonious behavior of Washington's other allies, including the NATO members and South Korea.

Although it is true that Japan's host-nation support is substantial, the subtle implication that the alliance is nearly cost-free to America is misleading on several counts. First, the Japanese contention that the financial support amounts to more than 70% of the cost of the forces stationed there is inaccurate. That percentage does not include the salaries of the military personnel - the largest single expense. Including salaries in the calculation reduces Japan's support to barely 50%.

Second, the $5,000,000,000 in host-nation contributions include such expenses as local labor and utility costs of maintaining U.S. forces as well as the construction of new facilities - approximately $1,000,000,000. Tokyo also funds the leases for land used by those forces and incurs what the Pentagon describes as "indirect costs," including waived land use fees, foregone taxes, tolls, customs, and payments to local communities affected by American bases.

Third, Tokyo hardly volunteered to increase its support payments out of a spirit of alliance solidarity, much less altruism. The Japanese acceded in January, 1991, only with great reluctance following a series of caustic Congressional hearings and reports on the "burden-sharing" issue. For example, a report issued by a special House burden-sharing panel chaired by Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D.-Colo.) suggested that trade sanctions be imposed on Japanese exports to the U.S. if Japan did not agree to pay more for the American troop presence, and an increasingly angry Congress seemed receptive to that proposal.

Finally, even if it is conceded that Japan's host-nation support is significant, that reimbursement represents just a small fraction of the over-all cost of America's East Asian security commitments, which primarily benefit Japan and South Korea. To measure the total cost, it is necessary to consider not just the expense of the forces stationed in those two countries, but that of the air, ground, and naval units that exist to reinforce the forward-deployed forces if trouble breaks out in the region. Measured in that way, the cost of Washington's East Asian obligations is nearly $40,000,000,000 a year.

The extent of Japanese free riding is even more apparent when one examines the defense budgets of the two countries. The U.S. military budget is nearly six times Japan's. It costs each American more than $1,000 a year to support the military; each Japanese, less than $360. Yet, America's population is barely twice that of Japan, and its economy is 30% larger.

The financial cost to American taxpayers of Japan's free riding is not the most troublesome consequence of...

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