Germany's Army After Reunification: The Merging of the Notionale Volbame into theBundemehr, 1990-1994

• Author: Captain Kenneth S. Kilimnik
• Pages: 02

U you lay open and clear the past you make Mday truly free, and you can hope for a future no less happy than

It is necessary to take care tofry apamake on both sides.We Germans always cook it on one side only, which is why if alurays taSieSS0 burnt.

WilhelmRopke (1935)s

I. Introduction

1. The End of the Cold War

   For forty-four years following World War 11, Germany WBS the

   European flashpoint where United States and Soviet farces faced each other, the former Supported by the Federal Republic of Ger.

   'Judge Advocate GenerBI.5 Corps Lniled States Army Rereme. AttOrney at La>, Herfurth & Partner, Haonoier, Germany B A , 1973. Lnnernt) of PennQlv~. ma. J D 1980, Yonheastern Unli'emly LL hl , 1981, Columbia Kmverrlfy, 11 Iur 1986 Umverrlfkf Mer Member of the bars of the Diefnct of Columbm, Ner Pork and Pennqlvmla, licensed legal consultant on United States Ian 10 German) The author thanks Lleutenmf Colonel Reinhard Luxhen. headquMers offlcer for press relatlonl at the 11' Corps from July 1991 untd Jmuw 1. 1896, formerly hown a.3 Bundrsuehr Kams und Tm?fanoikomrnonda Os1 /Federal DeJmfense Cams and Tmtanol Com-mand East/, Potrdam. German>. for azcanglng indiiidual mtenwws with SIX Bun-drslrrhr officen (one captam m e mdor, two lieutenant colonels, and t-0 colanelr) in Pofrdm on February 4 and 5, 1983 The author also thank Leutenant Colanel Relnhard Fuseel then Chlef of the Second lnspecllon of the Offriwrschule des H#oes

   many (popularly called West Germany) and the latter by the German Democratic Republic (East Germany). Many scenarios existed for ending this stalemate. get none supposed that the .\'ationale Volksamee (HVA). the military of the former East Germany. could be absorbed peacefully into the Bundesuehr, the West German rnilnary.

   What occurred has been a classic merger not an integration of farces but rather a dissolution of one army. The recruits and a small segment of the officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the dissolved army were carried over into the surviving arm>.

   J

   The Bandeswehr officers who oversaw the mitiai transition had instructions to treat the farmer 4VA soldiers not as vanquished enemiez but as soldiers of a single army of a reunified cauntv This merger of two armies was possible only in a larger political context in which Easr Germans discarded their forty-year governing institutions including the UVA, and embraced the Bundeswehr with the same enthusiasm that they exhibited m adopting the West German currency and legal system

   This ne\% East German attitude 1s as remarkable as was the ideological collapse of the communist parties m eastern Europe and the Soviet rnion KO westerner was prepared for this occurrence. Reunification of East Germany and \Vest Germans was a faint prospect from the onset of the Cold \Var m 1947 through the East's erec~ion of The Berlin \Tail on August 12-13, 1061. and thereafter an even fainter prospect until November g, 1989, the day that the Ber-lm Wall came tumbling dawn without a shot bemg fired.

2. A .Vew Era

   How the KL4 merged into Its former opponent has yet to be

   The Gulf

   told in pnnt. apart from a few personal reminiscences

   U'ar, the breakup of the Soviet Linmn, and subsequent budget cuts for the Bundewehr buried its significance as m e of the first suc.cesses in integrating the new German states.6

   The Bundeswehr's experience in retraining soldiers from a totalitarian army can be applied to training the soldiers of emerging democratic countries It also can be applied to trammg soldiers to sene in peacekeeping missions around the globe.

   Furthermore, from a geopolitical perspective, the bun^ dewehrk experience of integrating formerly antagonistic armies may be of use in considering how to reshape. in the post-Cold War era. multilateral institutions and alliances so that they reflect democratic societies of eastern and western Europe and address the disintegrative tensions that have supplanted the Cold War.

   11 Background

1. Gorbaeha

   Germans generally credit Xikhail Gorbachev, who came to power in the Soviet Union after Andropov's death in 1986, with setting into motion the events that led to German reunification.' With the introduction of GloSmst (transparency) and Perestroika(transformation), Gorbachev unleashed long pent-up psychologm.1 forces in the Soviet Union and eastern Europe that he could not contain. One by one, the eastern European countries concluded that Soviet armed intervention--as had occurred m Hungary in 1966, in Czechoslovakia in 1968, and less successfully in Afghanistan begin-ning in 1979--no longer was likely.

   (1893) (quanedp publicauon)

   "The Federal Republic created fire ne* Bundssidnder (federal stater) from Emf German> Sachsen, Saehsen .4nhalr. Thonngen \leehenburg-\ orpomrnern. and Brandenburp

   B Honecker

   Compared 10 Its neighbors to the east-Poland and southeast Hungaly-East Germany maintained an orthodox Communis[ Party line until late in 1989. The government and the pmy, over which Erich Honecker presided as president and general secretaly, respectively. ignored all reform stirrings Honecker's state of mind then was reflected m hie remark, "Why should I repaper my apanment just because someone else does his?"

   Hanecker invited Garbachev to East German) for the fortieth anniversary of East Germany on October 7. 1989 This war one day after Hungary and Czechaslovakla had allowed about 6000 East GQ~-man refugees-crowded m western embassies in Budapest and Prague-to leave for West Germany on special trains Because East Germany did not require its citizens to obtain \isas to visit its Warsaw Pact allies, Hungary or Czechoslovakia, their decisions concerning the refugees threatened to empty East Germany like a filled bathtub with the plug removed.

   Instead of Strengthening Honecker. Gorbachev warned him, "History punishes he who arrives late Hardly were Gorbachev's

   words in print when the small PL'OtQStS in Leipzig, Dresden, and other East German cities turned into marches by thousands, holding iighced candies and chanting, "We are the people, Germany IS one '

3. First Changes

   Typical for nondemocratic states was the lack of change in East Germany's political leadership, which remained the same from inception until dissaiunon After ten days of turbulent but peaceful demonstrations, Hanecker resigned both of his positions as president and party chief. Hanecker appointed Ego" Krenz as his succe~sor on

   October 18. 1989. but the demonstrations continued.

   On November 9, East Berliners breached the wail dividing Berlin m several piaces, without resistance from East German border guards, poiice, or soldiers Other breaches followed along the previously impenetrable border between East and West Germany

   Hans Hodrow replaced Egon Krenz on November 18. That large majorities in East Germany and West Germany favored reunification was becoming clear Helmut Kohl, West Germany's chancellor and head of the Christian Democratic party, pledged that he wouid only negotiate reunificacion with East Germany after its government had been leatimated by elections Modraw ushered m che first free elec-tions in East Germany. held an March 18, 1990, in which East Get-mans elected a parliament and a president, Lothar de Manere

4. nie Currency Union

   Negotiations on reunification began almost immediately The two ndes promptly reached an agreement on a currency union that took effect an July 1, 1900. The West German mark replaced the East German mark on a one-to-one basis for private savings. East Germans rushed to West Berlin and other western cities to buy goods that had been available in the East only for high ranking Communist Party officials and tourists in special, western currency stares.

   This initial euphoria contaned the seeds for later disappointment. By encourapg East Germans to select western goods over their own, the currency union placed East Germans' future jobs at risk. Psychologically, however, the currency union created the perception of unity between Germans in East and West, reduced migration from East to U'est by establishing financial panty, and enhanced sentiment In East Germany in favor of immediate integration into West Germany rather than coexistence or selective adaptation.

5. Infemtaoml lblh

   Kohl met Garbachev on the Crimean peninsula in July, 1000, and won Gorbachev's support for German reunification. Kohl pledged to reduce German military strength from nearly 500,000 to 370,0008soldiers by December 31, 1904, and Gorbachev agreed to withdraw the 400,000 Soviet soldiers in East Germany by the same date, a date that also marked the withdrawal of western allied forces from Berlin.

   In the summer of 1980, sensitive international negotiations occurred among East Germany, West Germany, and the four World War I1 allied powers-the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet Union These "two plus four'' talks were necessary because the four allied powers retained veto power over fundamental changes in the status of East Germany and West Germany. In Beriin, the four allied powers stili had military control.

   Poland, concerned about whether a reunified Germany would make clams to regain territories lost in World War 11, was admitted asan additional party. In September 1090, West Germany formally rec-

   ognized that the eastern border of Germany was the Oder-Neisse Rivers.

   Simultaneously with the "two plus four" negotiations, East Germany and West Germany negotiated an agreement for political and social union. to take effect on October 3, 1000. h r l d press coverage of German reunification subsided in the fail of 1000 with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and the start of the war in the former Yugoslavia in the spnng of 1001 The coverage resumed in 1002, with less intensity and more criticism than pram After a wave of fire-bomb attacks on residences for refugees,Q many asked whether reunification ivas creating a new German nationalism.

   111 The.\hlional.? Vdksannee Before Reunification

1. Psychological State--General

   East Germany kept the...