Retaining Flexibility: Dag Hammarskjold, the 1958 Summary Study, and the History of UN Peacekeeping.

• Date: 01 April 2023
• Author: Drohan, Brian
• Published date: 01 April 2023
• Author: Drohan, Brian

1 Introduction

Although the United Nations authorized the use of military observers to monitor cease-fire agreements in the Middle East and South Asia in 1948, the first armed peacekeeping mission--the UN Emergency Force (UNEF)--began during the 1956 Suez crisis. The Anglo-French-Israeli invasion of Egyptian territory (including the Suez region and the Gaza Strip) in October 1956 provoked such international outrage that the idea of an armed international peace force quickly gained traction as a way to end the crisis. Recognizing UNEF's path-breaking nature as an armed peace force, then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold published the Summary Study of the Experience Derived from the Establishment and Operation of the United Nations Emergency Force in 1958. The Summary Study holds an almost legendary status in the origin story of UN peacekeeping. Scholars and practitioners see it as a foundational text that represents Hammarskjold's vision of peacekeeping built on impartiality, the nonuse of force, and consent--principles that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations espouses today. (1) In 2015, a group of eminent peacekeeping experts highlighted the study's importance by describing it as a "systematic analysis" in which "what had once been ad hoc was formalized into a distinct concept." (2) This origin story, however, has its omissions and inaccuracies. One omission is that the original study consisted of three reports, of which only the third--the document we know as the Summary Study--was released publicly. Perhaps the most obvious inaccuracy is that the study was not meant to provide a template or prescriptive guide for future missions. (3) Nor did the Summary Study "codify" an emergent "Hammarskjoldian model" that would be "tested" by new challenges in the early 1960s, as some scholars claim. (4)

Despite its prominent place in peacekeeping history, there is much that remains to be learned about the Summary Study. If it was not meant to provide a template for future missions, what was its purpose? Did it achieve that purpose? And if it did not codify peacekeeping as a distinct concept, what was its effect? To answer these questions, I present a two-fold argument. First, Hammarskjold's purpose changed between the time he initiated the study in September 1957 and the point at which results were made public in October 1958. Initially, he sought to achieve the technocratic goal of learning procedural and functional lessons from the UNEF operation, as well as the political objective of delaying public debate over the idea of a permanent UN military standby force. While the standby force initiative proved impractical for the organization in 1958, its political importance grew because of the 1958 Lebanon crisis. Second, the crisis convinced Hammarskjold of the need to bolster the UN's credibility by retaining the ability to apply peacekeeping flexibly--that is, in response to the needs of the moment. He used the study to assert the UN's independence from the United States' influence and eschew the application of a universal template that would apply to all peacekeeping operations. Far from overhauling "what had once been ad hoc" by formalizing peacekeeping as "a distinct concept," the Summary Study did the opposite--it ensured that future peacekeeping operations would continue to be designed and conducted on an ad hoc, flexible basis.

2 Toward the Summary Study

During the mid-1950s, rising tensions between Israel, Britain, and France, and Gamal Abdel Nasser's anticolonial, socialist Egyptian government resulted in the first three countries colluding in an assault on Egypt to seize the Suez Canal, Sinai Peninsula, and Gaza. Launched in October 1956, Operation Musketeer generated outcry around the world. The United States and the Soviet Union found themselves on the same side in the dispute, a first for the Cold War. The UN also played an important role in the diplomacy that led to a negotiated settlement of the crisis. One aspect of that settlement included the deployment of UNEF -- an armed, multinational military force under UN oversight. (5)

UNEF was intended to provide a temporary solution, operate with the consent of the host government (Egypt), and abide by the conditions of its mandate. The mandate directed UNEF to monitor the withdrawal of "non-Egyptian" troops, clear the Suez Canal, and "secure compliance" from the parties to the conflict. UNEF was not meant to engage in combat or influence the balance of power in the region. To provide broad oversight of the force, a General Assembly resolution established the UNEF Advisory Committee, which included UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold as well as representatives from Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway, and Pakistan. (6) This unprecedented mission was, by necessity, completed under emergency circumstances. UNEF's organization, financing, operational plans, and deployment were all conducted hurriedly and in an ad hoc manner. Despite the haste, Hammarskjold believed that arrangements had worked out well -- UNEF had established a good working relationship with Egyptian officials and the normally recalcitrant Israelis had privately acknowledged the benefits of UNEF's existence. (7) By the second half of 1957, UNEF was widely touted as a success. (8)

Throughout 1957, UNEF's perceived success, however, led to growing interest in the United States and Britain over the idea of a permanent UN military capability. Various ideas were floated, but the main idea was one of national contingents designated as standby forces permanently on call for UN military operations. (9) The US House of Representatives and Senate each passed resolutions calling for just such a force. (10) The British Parliament also debated the issue, although the prime minister was unwilling to take the lead in the creation of a permanent UN force and there were significant divisions within the government on how--or whether--to proceed. (11)

Hammarskjold was open to the idea of a military capability that would allow the UN to respond effectively to future emergencies, but in a different form. In September 1957, Hammarskjold told journalists that he did not envision a permanent military force, but he did hope to develop "master agreements, master legal texts, master plans for transportation arrangements" that were "completely flexible" to adjust to different circumstances. (12) Hammarskjold wanted to take advantage of the lessons learned through the UNEF experience to deploy troops faster in the event of future crises, yet also retain flexibility to adjust to the unique circumstances of the crisis.

By the end of September 1957, Hammarskjold had grown increasingly concerned that the United States might make "far-reaching" standby force proposals that would put the UN Secretariat in a bad position. Hammarskjold wanted the UN to serve as an independent actor with international interests at heart, yet he was also closely aligned with the United States. (13) The United States and many Western countries eagerly supported the UN at the time, but this support came at a cost. (14) At best, the Soviet bloc saw the UN as a forum useful for little more than lambasting the West, or at worst as an arm of Western interests. (15) Likewise, many newly independent African and Asian states looked skeptically at the potential neocolonial implications of a standing UN military force intervening around the world on a regular basis. (16) This emerging Afro-Asian bloc would play a key role in Hammarskjold's thinking throughout his time as Secretary-General. (17) Hammarskjold told the UNEF Advisory Committee on 21 September 1957 that he wanted to proceed cautiously, without turning the standby force topic into a political issue. He thought it best to delay discussion of permanent UN military forces until the controversy had died down. Initiating a study of the UNEF experience, he reasoned, would allow him to deflect the issue until a more opportune time. (18)

Hammarskjold therefore had technocratic and political reasons for commissioning the UNEF. The technocratic reason was to produce a comprehensive historical analysis that could be used to draw financial, legal, logistical, and military lessons. The political rationale was to delay talk about a permanent UN military force. (19) Toward these ends, Hammarskjold established a Secretariat Committee chaired by Under-Secretary-General Ralph Bunche. An American UN official, Bunche had played a significant role in negotiating the 1948-1949 Arab Israeli War armistice, for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize. Hammarskjold directed Bunche to prepare a study covering "the facts of the UNEF experience," an "analysis and a functional classification of those facts," and "the conclusions [and] principles" that "may provide fundamental guidance for any future plans or efforts related to a United Nations force." (20) Not in any particular hurry...