Response to James Svara and James Brunet Regarding Social Equity

• Author: Robert F. Durant,David H. Rosenbloom
• DOI: 10.1177/0275074020910511
• Date: 01 May 2020
• Published date: 01 May 2020
• Subject Matter: Commentary

https://doi.org/10.1177/0275074020910511

American Review of Public Administration

2020, Vol. 50(4-5) 358 –359

© The Author(s) 2020

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DOI: 10.1177/0275074020910511

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Commentary

In their commentary on “The Importance of Social Equity to

Prevent a Hollow Public Administration,” James Svara and

James Brunet comprehensively misinterpret and misconstrue

the section on “Social Equity” in our article on “The

Hollowing of American Public Administration.” We argue

that social equity is a normative value that can be and is

incorporated into “the U.S. Constitution, constitutional and

administrative case law, statutes, executive orders, and

agency policies.” Beyond these extensive legal mandates, we

ask, “what gives public administration practitioners a legiti-

mate collective right to use their official positions, public

money, and agency resources to advance a social equity

agenda?” We leave open the possibility that the superiority of

social equity over other and sometimes competing adminis-

trative values could be demonstrated by well-developed,

coherent philosophical, or moral analysis. Svara and Brunet

consider law too narrow to fulfill a robust social equity

agenda and certainly fail completely to provide anything

resembling a meaningful or even intelligible philosophical or

moral argument in its favor.

Instead, Svara and Brunet accept, as do we, that public

administrators should implement social equity policy when

mandated by law. Where law prohibits aspects of social

equity, they call on public administrators to advocate for

legal change. We see no reason why public administrators

should not do so, if they are so inclined and not coerced,

within the parameters of their First Amendment rights.

Neither do we see any reason why public administrators

should not be cognizant of the distributive aspects of their

discretionary actions. However, as we note, Svara and Brunet

call on public administrators to provide “compensatory

redistribution” of government resources and assurances that

“those who are less advantaged receive greater benefits.”

They attribute the legitimization of such aspects of social

equity to the Code of Ethics of the American Society for

Public Administration (ASPA) and the Social Equity Panel

of the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA).

The “hollowness” of social equity in this context is, of

course that (1) neither ASPA nor NAPA can mandate or legiti-

mize values for governmental action either for their own

members or public administrators generally, and (2) there are

a host of competing values advocated by other organizations

with strong connections to public administration, public pol-

icy, and public interests. Moreover, when our article appeared,

NAPA was reconvening a standing panel for 2019 to refine

what social equity actually meant (https://www.napawash.

org/events/february-social-equity-standing-panel-meeting)!

Meanwhile, the current U.S. president and his administration

(as have several predecessors) support multiple policies that

run counter to Svara and Brunet’s, ASPA’s, and the NAPA

panel’s general notions of social equity. If one has any doubts

that constitutional democracy can legitimately oppose social

equity, see Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,

Integration and Immigrant Rights and Fight for Equality by

Any Means Necessary (571 U.S. 291 [2014]). There, the

Supreme Court upheld Michigan voters’ constitutional action

to prohibit preferences based on “race, sex, color, ethnicity, or

national origin” in public education, public employment, and

public contracting. In short, we stand by our observation that

social equity is a normative value in need of democratic-con-

stitutional, legal, philosophical, or moral legitimation before

it can trump counter values in providing a solid rather than

hollow basis for administrative action.

A few lesser points in Svara and Brunet’s commentary

require attention. Svara and Brunet write, “Concern for

equity certainly extends to all who are economically disad-

vantaged and not just those who belong to particular social

groups, although there should be a recognition that economic

disadvantage is not randomly distributed across social

groups.” True enough, but if social equity is going to target

social groups, policymakers should no doubt be aware that

the number of whites living below the poverty line is almost

double that of blacks, whereas the proportion of blacks under

the poverty line is more than twice that of whites (https://

www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/poverty-rate-by-raceethnic

ity/?dataView=1&currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%2

2colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22

%7D; https://www.statista.com/statistics/200,476/us-poverty-

rate-by-ethnic-group/). So, if social equity is for all and

910511ARPXXX10.1177/0275074020910511The American Review of Public AdministrationDurant and Rosenbloom

article-commentary2020

1American University, Washington, DC, USA

Corresponding Author:

Robert F. Durant, American University, Washington, DC, USA.

Email: rfdurant@gmail.com

Response to James Svara and

James Brunet Regarding Social Equity

Robert F. Durant1 and David H. Rosenbloom1

Keywords

social equity, democratic governance