Response is local, relief is not: the pervasive impact of agro terrorism.

AuthorGeorge, Asha M.

ABSTRACT

Agro terrorism is a threat facing the public today. National response systems are not yet able to perform efficiently and effectively to address this threat. Any locality can be targeted, and the immediate response will come from local entities, regardless of how adequately prepared they are to respond. Knowing that acts of agro terrorism are both expected and feasible today, we must alter our prevention, deterrence, preparedness, detection, response, attribution, recovery, and mitigation programs and base them on a better understanding of the threat. There are a number of things we can do in advance of agro terrorism, none of which is impossible or beyond our current means and abilities. Additionally, we must keep in mind that although our response to acts of agro terrorism will be local, these local efforts will take place in and be affected by the global agricultural context. The global community will, in fact, be the source of our relief. We must strive now to plan accordingly, and undertake the necessary diplomatic, political, and interpersonal activities well in advance of an act of agro terrorism.

TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION II. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT III. PREVENTION IV. DETERRENCE V. PREPAREDNESS VI. DETECTION VII. ATTRIBUTION VIII. RESPONSE IX. RECOVERY X. MITIGATION XI. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION I. INTRODUCTION

Today, a wide variety of threats face the public, including, but not limited to, infectious diseases for which there are no known treatments, weaponized biological agents, suicide terrorism, agro terrorism, natural disasters, human-generated catastrophic accidents, and runaway inflation. (1) Although we can name many of these potential, current, and recurring threats, the national response systems in every country across the globe (including the United States) are not yet able to perform efficiently and effectively enough to address them. (2) In the United States, huge amounts of funding have gone toward creating the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and supporting homeland security and defense programs in other agencies. (3) However, while non-federal governmental agencies, as well as nongovernmental and private-sector organizations collectively receive enormous sums of funding, these entities must split these allocations. (4) Consequently, they have not yet received nearly enough to fully secure the areas for which they are responsible. (5) These non-federal entities are acutely aware that events occur locally, in their jurisdictions, and that immediate responses must also come from local entities, regardless of how adequately prepared they are to respond. (6)

Any locality can be targeted. For example, terrorists could target the Jack Daniels distillery in Lynchberg, Tennessee, for any number of reasons, including destruction of the Jack Daniels brand as well as the liquor-oriented sector of the U.S. economy. (7) One potential agent that could be introduced is Acetobacter acetic, which is used to create vinegar and could throw off the taste of the liquor. (8) Additionally, certain mutations to Bacillus subtilis cause the organism to become alcohol-resistant, (9) and if introduced and ingested, will cause food poisoning. (10) The intentional introduction of these microorganisms into vats or bottles of Jack Daniels whiskey would be considered an act of agro terrorism--an act that would not require the weaponization of these organisms or advanced laboratory techniques. The distillery in the locality of Lynchberg could be targeted, and the cases of illness would occur in localities where the contaminated liquor, both here in the United States and throughout the world, was ingested. Comprehensive immediate federal response would be impossible.

A spectrum of actions can be taken against all terrorist threats (see Figure 1): prevention, deterrence, preparedness, detection, response (including attribution), recovery, and mitigation. (11) These activities can occur both simultaneously and consecutively. In the latter case, we seek to prevent a terrorist act; if we cannot prevent it, we seek to deter the use of agents and weapons that could be used to engage in terrorism. If we cannot deter their use, we prepare for the act; once we have prepared for it, we must detect its occurrence. And once detected, we must respond to an incident, recover from it, attribute its occurrence to a particular actor or group, and mitigate the circumstances in an effort to reduce the impact if another event were to occur--with mitigation feeding back into prevention. (12) Understanding the threat is an enabler critical for the successful execution of every other action in this spectrum.

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  1. UNDERSTANDING THE THREAT

    Al Qaeda (like many other groups) has knowledge of specific agents that could be used to contaminate the food supply. (13) It is also recruiting personnel that could use that knowledge to grow microorganisms, develop dissemination mechanisms, and prepare to contaminate the food supply in other ways. (14) Additionally, there are a number of food production methods and characteristics that render food vulnerable: mixing, short shelf-life, unrestricted access to production facilities, and the use of large batches. (15) Lastly, potential agents include naturally occurring, widely available, genetically modified, and resistance-induced organisms--as well as toxic and dangerous chemicals--that could infect, poison, and kill any element of the agricultural system (e.g., animals, food, and ingredients). (16)

  2. PREVENTION

    Preventing acts of agro terrorism from occurring begins with intelligence. However, the intelligence process is imperfect. Pieces of information are collected and added to others, then the information is analyzed periodically, and the products of these analyses are referred to as intelligence. (17) Clearly, the validity of these intelligence products is based entirely on the quality of the bits of information initially collected. Far less information has been collected regarding biological and agro threats, and the intelligence produced has been far less comprehensive for these threats than for other types of agents. (18) Additionally, the health and agricultural communities collect disease and outbreak information, and that information is poorly combined with intelligence generated by the intelligence community regarding the intent of U.S. enemies to engage in acts of biological or agro terrorism. (19) The United States does not possess a comprehensive domestic medical intelligence program, and the medical intelligence activities the Department of Defense conducts are not domestic by law, but rather focused on specific situations overseas. (20) Furthermore, most intelligence efforts conducted by US agencies are not linked with each other, let alone with those of our foreign colleagues. (21)

  3. DETERRENCE

    U.S. deterrence programs were designed to counter the proliferation of weapons that would be used for warfare--initially with countries that had created enormous stockpiles of weapons of catastrophic effect, and then later with smaller countries that were purchasing or otherwise obtaining smaller caches of weapons. (22) However, after the dissolution of the former Soviet Union (FSU), deterrence efforts experienced decreases in funding and now occur only intermittently. (23) The United States has not yet adequately modified its deterrence policies to address smaller (especially non-state) actors. (24)

  4. PREPAREDNESS

    Preparedness efforts for acts of agro terrorism in the United States vary according to (1) where diseases are endemic (such as brucellosis in locations such as Idaho, Texas, and Wyoming, where the disease occurs naturally), (25) (2) where outbreaks have occurred previously (such as the previous outbreak of tularemia in Martha's Vineyard), (26) and (3) where emergencies have arisen (like the recent Escherichia coli O517:H7 contamination of spinach in the United States). (27) It makes sense that the ongoing presence of a disease would cause a community to attain and maintain some minimum level of preparedness, and that the occasional outbreak or emergency would cause communities to become better prepared after weaknesses in responses are identified and strengthened. The preparedness described in each of these cases is generally not at the heightened level necessary for communities to respond adequately to acts of agro terrorism. (28) However, it is easier to build upon this preparedness than to have to start with nothing in place.

    An act of agro terrorism will immediately change how food is distributed to affected localities and throughout the country and world. Because of the way that food production and distribution systems have evolved, most...

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