Resources for Security and Stability? The Politics of Regional Cooperation on the Mekong, 1957-2001

• Published date: 01 March 2002
• Author: Abigail Makim
• Date: 01 March 2002
• DOI: 10.1177/107049650201100102
• Subject Matter: Articles

JOURNALOF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENTMakim / REGIONALCOOPERATION ON THE MEKONG

Resources for Security and Stability?

The Politics of Regional Cooperation

on the Mekong, 1957-2001

ABIGAIL MAKIM

This article tells about the relationship between resource politics and security

in international relations. Using the Mekong River Basin as its case study,the

article examines the place of resource and development issues in attempts to

develop regional institutions. The question of whether a resourcedevelopment

regime with apparentlylow productivity in terms of technical output, but high

levels of resilience and longevity, should be considered a failureor not, is con-

sidered. This question is examined within the broader context of Southeast

Asian politics during the First, Second, and Third Indochina conflicts as well

as the post–cold war era. The article argues that survival and a capacity to

change to meet the challenges of extreme broader events are clear evidence of

regime success. From this standpoint, the article explores ways in which the

Mekong resource regime is linked to more general concerns for political secu-

rity and stability and may in fact reflect political concerns for subregional

neighborhood maintenance.

The idea that resource politics may contribute to and culminate in

open conflict at the intergovernmental level has gained considerable

currency in recent years, and both the theoretical and empirical litera-

tures are rich in explorations of this notion.1Such studies turn on inquiry

into the question of whether states that share a given resource can and

will cooperate in its use and management. They ask further whether

coordination of action and conflict management is possible in the trans-

national environment.

There is now considerable evidence to suggest that, in matters of

transboundary resourceuse, states are often able to establish and sustain

collective action.2Given this finding, it is worth considering how action

in the realm of resource use may affectother aspects of international life,

especially security,stability, and neighborhood maintenance. In consid-

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Journal of Environment & Development, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 2002 5-52

© 2002 Sage Publications

1.Hardin’s (1977) tragedy of the commons thesis is the conceptual and heuristic starting

point for exploring this idea. For various positions on the international politics of resources

and the environment, see Elliott (1996), Lowi (1999), Noorduyn and De Groot (1999), and

Tock (1998). See Falkenmark (1990, 1998) in the particular area of water scarcity and

security.

2. See, for example, Young (1977, 1982, 1989a, 1989b, 1991). See also Choucri (1993),

Elliott (1992), Haas (1989, 1990), Haas, Keohane, and Levy (1993), and Majone (1986).

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ering this, this article takes the Mekong River Basin as its case study and

examines the history of collective action in resource use there for the

years 1957 through 2001. In this examination, the relative successes and

failures of the Mekong regime in pursuing a mandate for joint resource

development are weighed up. It is argued that despite obvious disap-

pointments in terms of technical outcome, the regime has succeeded

where it has persisted and evolved. This argument is made with specific

reference to the many upheavals experienced throughout Southeast

Asia in the latter half of the 20th century and the tremendous strain these

have placed on any sense of regional accord.

The study of the history of the processes of shared resource use in the

Mekong, which is the empirical core of this article, is an interdisciplinary

undertaking that sits at an intersection of interests held by scholars of

environmental studies,3Asian studies,4international law (especially

riparian studies),5geography,6international relations, and other disci-

plines. This article is a political study most concerned with issues of

international relations, especially matters of cooperation, coordination,

and conflict. The article considers key actors involved in Mekong poli-

tics, exploring the dynamics of power relations in establishing, main-

taining, and changing the Mekong regime. Such action is considered an

ongoing political bargain that is concerned with resource development,

water resource management, development assistance, and, most impor-

tantly, local political concerns—less functional, less formal, “neigh-

borly” mutual interests linked to the common recognition of the long-

standing conditions of contiguity in the Lower Mekong River Basin. This

bargain is based on the balancing of sovereignty norms with norms of

interdependence and is an exercise in managing the many and increas-

ing conditions of complex interdependence in the Mekong. Where the

advantages of maintaining commitment to this bargain have outweighed

6 JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENT & DEVELOPMENT

3. See Hirsch and Cheong (1996) for an assessment of natural resources management in

the Mekong. Sluiter (1992) reported broadly on socioenvironmentalissues emerging in the

Mekong region. Jacobs (1995) traced the emergence of environmental management con-

cernsas linked to ways in which the Committee sought to develop the Mekong’s resources.

4. Osborne (2000) studies the Mekong in Southeast Asian history and politics. Nguyen

Thi Dieu (1999) is especially concerned with Indochina.

5. For detail on matters of international riparian law with regardto the Mekong, refer to

the following intergovernmental agreements: Committee for Coordination of Investiga-

tions of the Lower Mekong Basin, Statute 1957; Committee for the Coordination of Investi-

gations of the Lower Mekong Basin: Joint Declaration of Principles for Utilization of the

Watersof the Lower Mekong Basin (1975); Mekong River Commission: Agreement of the

Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (1995). Refer to

Bui Kim Chi (1996, 1997) and Vitit Muntarbhor (1994) for detailed discussions of the

Mekong’s legal regime.

6. See Hirsch (1996) for a study in the geography of the Mekong.

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defection from or dissolution of its formal arrangements for almost 50

years, a transnational Mekong political community is evolving.7

The Lower Mekong River Basin

The Mekong River rises in the TanggulaRange in the Tibetan Himala-

yas and flows for 4,200 km before emptying into the South China Sea.8

The river is ranked 8th largest in the world in terms of its annual flow of

475,000 million cubic meters. It is also considered 12th largest, with a

basin drainage area of 795,000 km.2

The entire basin is subdivided into an upper basin—China and

Burma9—and a lower basin—Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, and Vietnam.

This division is loosely topographical and hydrological, but it is also

shaped by subregional political factors.10 The concerns of this article are

largely contained within the lower basin (refer to map).

The lower basin represents more than 77% of the total basin area and

covers 555,000 km2(Secretariat, 1989, p. 4). The mainstream runs for

2,400 km (Secretariat, 1989, p. 4). About 82% of Laos, 86% of Cambodia,

35% of Thailand, and 20% of Vietnam lie within this area (Secretariat,

1989, p. 4).11 The climatic regime is monsoonal and tropical. Seasonal

variation is extreme, with 80% to 90% of precipitation occurring during

the southwestern monsoon (May through October). This characterizes

the basin in terms of use, with the need to even out seasonal flow lying at

the core of cooperation issues in the Mekong region.12

Makim / REGIONAL COOPERATION ON THE MEKONG 7

7. This story of the international relations of the Mekong for the period from 1957 to

2001 has not been told in the literature on the Mekong in this way before. See Browder

(2000) for analysis of the Mekong regime from the perspective of the evolution of legal

arrangements for a international water resources regime. See also Jacobs (1995) for a brief

history of the Mekong Committee and its work for the years 1957 to 1995.

8. The true sourceof the Mekong lies at 4,975 m in Tibet, latitude 33° N, longitude 93° E.

(“Expedition Discovers,” 1994).

9. In the interestsof simplicity of expression, Myanmar is referred to as Burma through-

out this article.

10. In the early 1950s, foundational investigators ECAFE and the U.S. Bureau of Recla-

mation held the view that “limited economic and social development possibilities” existed

in the upper reaches of the Mekong (Secretariat, 1989, p. 3). Both urged the hydrographic

and topographic surveying of the main Mekong river, its bed and banks, from the China

border to the South China Sea, with a view to joint development (U.S. Bureau of Reclama-

tion, 1956). At an organizational level, due to exclusion by other states, China was not at

this time a member of the UN nor,hence, ECAFE. This in turn precluded the possibility of

Chinese membership in the emerging Mekong Committee.

11. Of the total river flow in the lower basin, Laos typically contributes around 26%,

Thailand 12%, Cambodia 28%, and Vietnam 20% (Mekong Secretariat, 1990). For further

hydrological information, refer to The Mekong Committee’s Hydrologic Yearbook.

12. Prachoom Chomchai (1992) commented that “seasonal excess and deficiency of

moisture and, at the same time...theunequivocalpotential for evening out extreme sea-

sonal variations” lies at the heart of any efforts to develop the Mekong.

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