Research in the Jury Room.

• Author: Kiefer, Ariel Monroe
• Position: Missouri

Smotherman v. Cass Reg'l Med. Ctr., 499 S.W.3d 709 (Mo.) (en banc), reh'g denied, (Nov. 22, 2016)

1. INTRODUCTION

   Jury trials are fundamental to the American justice system. Yet they are not perfect. One serious problem arises when a juror performs independent research about the case. This is unfair to the parties because the information the juror finds may be inadmissible under the rules of evidence and the party does not have a chance to explain or rebut the evidence. (1) However, granting a new trial due to this misconduct is costly. Trials are estimated to cost between approximately $20,000 and $70,000, depending on the subject matter of the case. (2) It is difficult to determine how often juror misconduct occurs because jurors deliberate in secret and have limited contact with non-jurors. (3) When juror misconduct occurs, courts must determine if there should be a new trial by considering aspects like how much weight should be given to a juror's testimony stating that extraneous information did not influence the juror's decision.

   Part II of this Note discusses the facts surrounding the Supreme Court of Missouri's decision not to grant a new trial due to juror misconduct in Smotherman v. Cass Regional Medical Center. Part III analyzes the approaches the Supreme Court of Missouri and Missouri appellate courts have taken when dealing with juror misconduct. Part IV explains the Supreme Court of Missouri's rationale for denying a new trial. Finally, Part V discusses why the Smotherman court should have granted a new trial and the techniques courts can use in the future to reduce the frequency of juror misconduct.

2. FACTS AND HOLDING

   Kathrine Smotherman filed a lawsuit seeking damages against Cass Regional Medical Center ("the Medical Center") after she slipped and fell in the bathroom. (4) Smotherman claimed that the soap dispenser was placed in such a way that it dripped on the floor, so she slipped on the soap and fell. (5) The Medical Center argued that Smotherman's slip was caused either by water on the bathroom floor or her preexisting knee problem. (6) The jury returned a verdict for the Medical Center. (7)

   The controversy in this case arose after the initial trial. Smotherman's attorneys contacted several jurors after trial, and one of the jurors said that he researched the weather on the day of the accident. (8) The juror found that there was "significant snowfall" in the forecast for that day. (9) Therefore, Smotherman moved for a new trial on the basis of extraneous juror research. (10)

   The Cass County Circuit Court held a hearing to determine whether it should grant Smotherman's motion for a new trial. (11) At the hearing, nine of the twelve jurors testified in camera. (12) While Missouri follows the Mansfield Rule, which prevents jurors from giving testimony for the purpose of impeaching their verdict, an exception to the rule applies in this case. (13) The exception allows a juror to testify about whether a juror gathered extraneous information about the case. (14) In this case, the jurors were allowed to testify because they were testifying about another juror's independent research about the weather on the day of the accident. (15) One juror testified that the offending juror only made one comment about the weather on the date of Smotherman's accident during deliberations. (16) Several jurors testified that they did not remember hearing about the weather on the day of the accident, while other jurors did remember hearing about it. (17) All of the non-offending (18) jurors testified that it was immaterial to their decisions, but the trial court found that the offending juror's research did influence his decision. (19)

   The trial court stated that even if juror testimony proves that a juror committed misconduct, a party is not necessarily entitled to a new trial. (20) Establishing that a juror committed misconduct only raises a "presumption of prejudice, and the burden shifts to the opposing party to rebut that presumption." (21) Additionally, extraneous information only raises a presumption of prejudice if the extraneous information is "material" to the "consequential facts of the case." (22)

   The Medical Center first argued that the extraneous information the juror acquired was not material; therefore, Smotherman was not prejudiced and a new trial should not be granted. (23) It claimed the information was not material because it was not relevant to the central issue of whether Smotherman slipped on soap. (24) It also claimed that Smotherman presented so little evidence that she slipped on soap that it was unlikely she was prejudiced. (25) Finally, the Medical Center argued that the presumption of prejudice was rebutted because the jurors testified that the information did not impact their decisions. (26) Smotherman argued that the extraneous information was material because it supported the Medical Center's theory that something other than soap caused Smotherman to fall. (27)

   The trial court agreed with the Medical Center's arguments and denied Smotherman's motion for a new trial. (28) The trial judge found the non-offending jurors' testimony to be credible. (29) The trial court also found that the extraneous information the juror looked up was "immaterial." (30) The trial court instructed the jurors to find the Medical Center responsible only if they believed there was soap on the floor and the information about the weather "was cumulative to inferences as to other possible causes of the fall suggested during trial." (31) The trial court denied the motion for a new trial because the weight of the evidence presented at trial supported a finding for the Medical Center and it was unlikely Smotherman was prejudiced. (32)

   The Missouri Court of Appeals, Western District, reversed the trial court's ruling. (33) The court of appeals found that the information was material because it went to the central issue of what substance, if any, caused Smotherman's fall. (34) The appellate court did not give any weight to the fact that the information about the weather was only mentioned once in passing because the court relied on a prior case (35) in which the Supreme Court of Missouri granted a motion for a new trial when one juror obtained extraneous information and did not share it with any other jurors. (36) Next, the court found that the "modest weight given to jurors' claims that they were not affected by extrinsic evidence" was not enough to overcome the presumption of prejudice that is present when there is juror misconduct. (37) Finally, the appellate court disagreed with the trial court's reasoning that because Smotherman presented little evidence, it was unlikely she was prejudiced. (38) The appellate court stated that because the trial court refused to grant the Medical Center's motion for a directed verdict, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to find for Smotherman. (39) Therefore, Smotherman may have been prejudiced by the extraneous information. (40) The case was then transferred to the Supreme Court of Missouri. (41) The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that the non-offending jurors' testimony that the extraneous information did not affect their deliberations rebutted the presumption of prejudice. (42)

3. LEGAL BACKGROUND

   In Missouri, jurors are generally not allowed to give testimony for the purpose of impeaching their verdict. (43) This is called the Mansfield Rule. (44) The rule was originally adopted by Lord Mansfield in 1785 in the English case Vaise v. Delaval. (45) The rule reflects the idea that litigants are entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one. (46) In fact, "[the Supreme] Court [of the United States] has long held that '[a litigant] is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one,' for there are no perfect trials." (47) Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61, regarding harmless error, prevents litigants from receiving a new trial when the court determines that the error did not affect their "substantial rights." (48)

   There are four main rationales for the Mansfield Rule. (49) The first is finality. (50) If verdicts could be challenged every time a juror misunderstood the law or made an error in considering the evidence, a case might never end. (51) Second, it is very difficult, if not impossible, to determine how a jury understood the law or thought about the evidence. (52) Third, frequently reviewing verdicts based on allegations of juror misconduct could erode the public's confidence in the jury system. (53) Last, impeaching jury verdicts might lead to harassment and threats against jurors by lawyers, the parties, or the public. (54)

   Initially, there was an exception to the Mansfield Rule in cases where life or liberty was at stake. (55) However, that exception did not last long. (56) State v. Branstetter eliminated that exception when the court held that jurors could not testify about whether they had reached a quotient verdict in regard to the number of years the defendant should serve. (57) Currently, there are two recognized situations where courts allow a juror to testify about juror misconduct for the purpose of impeaching the verdict. One exception is when there is an allegation that a juror showed severe racial bias during deliberations. (58) The other exception, the subject of this Note, arises when a juror gathers information outside the evidence presented at trial. (59) While the second exception is well established, it is still unclear what weight, if any, the court should give to juror testimony that the extraneous information did not influence their decisions.

   Many Missouri cases have considered what weight should be given to juror testimony about the effect of the extraneous information on their deliberations. The weight of the juror's testimony is important because it is an easy and common way for a party to rebut the presumption of prejudice that arises after juror...