Reputations for Resolve and Higher-Order Beliefs in Crisis Bargaining

• Author: Allan Dafoe,Matthew Cebul,Remco Zwetsloot
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002721995549
• Published date: 01 August 2021
• Date: 01 August 2021
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Reputations for Resolve

and Higher-Order

Beliefs in Crisis

Bargaining

Allan Dafoe

1,2

, Remco Zwetsloot

1,2

, and Matthew Cebul

3

Abstract

Reputations for resolve are said to be one of the few things worth fighting for, yet

they remain inadequately understood. Discussions of reputation focus almost

exclusively on first-order belief change—Astands firm, Bupdates its beliefs about A’s

resolve. Such first-order reputational effects are important, but they are not the

whole story. Higher-order beliefs—what Abelieves about B’s beliefs, and so on—

matter a great deal as well. When Acomes to believe that Bis more resolved, this

may decrease A’s resolve, and this in turn may increase B’s resolve, and so on.

In other words, resolve is interdependent. We offer a framework for estimating

higher-order effects, and find evidence of such reasoning in a survey experiment on

quasi-elites. Our findings indicate both that states and leaders can develop potent

reputations for resolve, and that higher-order beliefs are often responsible for a

large proportion of these effects (40 percent to 70 percent in our experimental

setting). We conclude by complementing the survey with qualitative evidence and

laying the groundwork for future research.

Keywords

bargaining, belief structure, conflict, game theory, survey experiment

1

Centre for the Governance of AI, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

2

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, United Kingdom

3

Weiser Center for Emerging Democracies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Corresponding Author:

Remco Zwetsloot, Manor Rd, Oxford OX1 3UQ, United Kingdom.

Email: remcozwetsloot@gmail.com

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2021, Vol. 65(7-8) 1378-1404

ªThe Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002721995549

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

[In bargaining situations], each party’s strategy is guided mainly by what he expects the

other to accept or insist on; yet each knows that the other is guided by reciprocal

thoughts. The final outcome must be a point from which neither expects the other to

retreat; yet the main ingredient of this expectation is what one thinks the other expects

the first to expect, and so on. Somehow, out of this fluid and indeterminate situation

that seemingly provides no logical reason for anybody to expect anything except what

he expects to be expected to expect, a decision is reached.

—Thomas Schelling (Schelling 1960, 70)

Can both sides simultaneously have images of high resolve or is there a zero-sum

element involved?

—Robert Jervis (Jervis 1978, 199)

Introduction

Navigating an international crisis can require incredibly complex inferences. Even

seemingly straightforward strategies can backfire dramatically. Suppose that per-

sons Aand Bare playing Chicken, the game in which two cars race toward each

other and the goal is to get the opponent to swerve first. One popular strategem

says that Ashould throw her steering wheel out of the window in order to convince

Bthat she cannot swerve, thereby compelling Bto do so.

1

Yet suppose that B

incorrectly believes that Ahid a spare steering wheel under her seat. If Adoes not

know that Bbelieves this, she may surrender her ability to swerve without actually

becoming committed in B’s eyes, raising the chances of a tragic crash. Or suppose

that Aincorrectly believes that Bbelieves that Ahas a spare steering wheel. This

belief might prevent Afrom using a tactic that would have improved her odds of

victory.

Much of the complexity in international crisis bargaining is attributable to higher-

order beliefs—beliefs about beliefs (Schelling 1960; O’Neill 1999). While these

complications are perhaps most apparent in hypothetical games like Chicken, exam-

ples abound in real-world international crises as well. For instance, in the years prior

to the Berlin crisis, Premier Khrushchev had deliberately exaggerated the Soviet

Union’s capabilities, and widely-discussed American concerns about a “missile gap”

had convinced him that the Americans had fallen for the ruse. “[O]n the assumption

that the Americans believed the Soviets were ahead in the arms race,” Khrushchev

chose to escalate tensions over Berlin (Kaplan 1983, 304). Khrushchev was forced to

back down, however, when he learned that US policymakers did not believe this at

all—a fact that the Americans purposely signaled via intelligence leaks to NATO

units that the US knew to be compromised by Soviet agents (Schlosser 2014, 284).

Higher-order beliefs thus played a critical role in both the onset and resolution of one

of the most significant crises of the Cold War.

Dafoe et al. 1379