REPRESSION GROWS IN A DESENSITIZED WORLD: CASE STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL REPRESSION.

• Author: Vitale, Heather Marie

INTRODUCTION

What do you do when information from official sources can no longer be trusted? Or when that information is weaponized against your community? A poisoned information environment is not just toxic for a functioning civil society, but also for the personal safety and wellbeing of the global citizenry A desensitization from trust in facts most acutely harms vulnerable populations, particularly exile and diaspora communities targeted by their native country's governments. Poisoned information environments are largely driven by disinformation campaigns--malign efforts by individuals, institutions, or regimes to deliberately mislead the public to sow discord, distract from global scrutiny, or harm other countries or communities. Disinformation--a modern buzzword most recently gleaned from Russia's interference in the 2016 US presidential election--is not a new concept, but one that has increasingly become institutionalized as technology significantly lowers barriers to entry. More actors in the disinformation space implies greater amounts of deliberately false information in the world and directed at target audiences. With that much distortion, one can become alienated from the truth and from one's community.

The poisoning and desensitization of information environments also enables more sinister outcomes: wider passageways for regimes to commit acts of transnational repression against targeted communities. As detailed in Lawfare, transnational repression "describes instances in which authoritarian regimes expand their oppressive policies and practices beyond their borders and into the territory of other countries to silence, harass, or threaten dissidents and activists through various means." (1) Transnational repression is more than the brute force of physical assault, rendition and false imprisonment, or assassination; repression efforts can take the form of digital harassment, spyware, family intimidation, or mobility control, among others. These latter methods are enabled by technology. Transnational repression is likely to continue to broaden in scope and aggression as increasingly sophisticated technology allows for greater access to individuals. According to human rights organization Freedom House, transnational repression has spread widely due to technological advances lowering the overall costs and increasing regime perception of the threat of exiles, the erosion of international norms against extraterritorial violence, and the lack of stringent repercussions for crimes. (2) When these digital tools can be used to both mislead and repress targeted individuals or groups, the lower the cost and the greater the incentive for regimes to continue their efforts. Transnational repression can exist outside of disinformation environments, but disinformation more easily begets conditions ripe for repression. Repression grows in a desensitized world.

This paper will examine three examples of regimes--China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia--employing disinformation operations and transnational repression campaigns, to demonstrate the interconnection of technology-enabled disinformation and transnational repression.

CHINA

Based on available evidence, China is the most prolific transnational repression actor and is deeply invested in building a global image as a powerful, progressive nation flourishing under the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). China's disinformation operations are largely targeted against Western nations to engender more favorable policies, sustain economic ties, dodge international criticism for human rights violations, and meet the CCP's strategic goals. China uses its broad communication, media, and diplomatic networks to propagandize, obfuscate the truth, and deflect blame. Dissimilar to countries like Russia, Chinese disinformation is not necessarily about sowing discord in other states, but ultimately in bolstering itself. However, disinformation about and targeted to specific diaspora communities remains an important tool in cultivating China's global image ultimately leading to repression. (3)

Beijing employs a full range of coordinated tactics to repress any person or group that would tarnish its image, particularly ethnic and religious minorities, as the CCP views them as a threat to domestic control and the projected image of unity under communism. The CCP considers as threats mostly Muslim Uyghurs, Buddhist Tibetans, pro-independence Taiwanese, Hong Kong democracy activists, and members of the religious group Falun Gong, which Beijing denies is a religion and calls an anti-communist cult. (4) The diaspora communities of these groups are equally vulnerable to disinformation and repression and still susceptible to physical harm in their new countries. (5) Many dissidents, foreign-based Uyghurs, and other minorities report being harassed and threatened--both in-person and online--by CCP operatives, and in some cases have seen their China-based relatives kidnapped and used as a means of coercing silence. (6) Pro-democracy activists in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom have been threatened, harassed, and physically attacked as a means of coercion and preventing protest. (7) These repressive activities serve to push activists and critics out of the spotlight and isolate individuals from their communities, families, and support systems. This is important because a strong sense of community can help prevent desensitization to facts and to information environments.

The Chinese government holds an advantage over other repressive regimes for having access to advanced targeting and surveillance technology a monumental amount of exfiltrated personal data, and well-developed institutional systems of espionage and influence. (8) As such, Beijing is...