Rent seeking and economic growth: evidence from a panel of U.S. States.

JurisdictionUnited States
Date22 September 2002
AuthorCole, Ismail M.

Rent-seeking behavior would include all of the various ways by which individuals or groups lobby government for taxing, spending and regulatory policies that confer financial benefits or other specific advantages upon them at the expense of the taxpayers or of consumers or other groups or individuals with which the beneficiaries may be in economic competition.

--Leon Felkins

A copious body of theoretical literature has developed that maintains that rent-seeking activity (RSA) inhibits economic growth by diverting resources from productive uses (Buchanan 1980; Tollison 1982; Olson 1982; Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny 1991). Direct empirical investigation to substantiate this traditional view, however, has been neglected by many researchers. A recent exception is Harold Brumm's use of cross-sectional data from the 48 contiguous United States to indicate that RSA activity is indeed harmful to economic growth (Brumm 1999). His single-equation growth model assumes that RSA is exogenous to the growth process, yet there are plausible theoretical arguments suggesting that RSA and economic growth may be mutually causal (Murphy et al. 1991). Ignoring that possibility may lead to biased estimates of the growth effects. Also, RSA may influence some of the determinants of growth such as physical and human capital investment, implying that RSA affects economic growth through multiple channels. Those indirect effects are not captured by a single-equation approach. Furthermore, the effects of changes in the variables under study may occur with a time lag, while the approach based on cross-sectional data cannot consider the lag structure of the variables. As a result, important questions about certain intertemporal issues are left unanswered. For example, is RSA self-perpetuating over time as suggested by Garfield (1996)? Finally, the single-equation, cross-sectional approach is unable to effectively remove unobserved state-specific factors that explain differences in RSA across states and time periods (for example, differences in the strictness of enforcement of lobbying regulations). The omission of those factors may lead to an omitted-variable bias.

The purpose of our study is to extend Brumm's analysis by using an approach that avoids all of the deficiencies cited above. We accomplish this through the use of panel data vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis which, unlike a correlation-based single-equation growth model, permits inferences to be made about causality. (1) We find that RSA does indeed impair economic growth and that RSA is exogenous--that is, there is no significant feedback from economic growth to RSA. Moreover, we find that RSA can indirectly impair economic growth by affecting public physical investment and public services. We conclude that past empirical studies, by ignoring the indirect effects, may have underestimated the impact of RSA on, economic growth.

The Empirical Literature: A Brief Review

Besides Brumm (1999), a number of other studies have offered supporting evidence for the traditional view alluded to above, while a few studies have offered evidence for a dissenting view. Murphy et al. (1991) examined the effect of the allocation of human talent between entrepreneurship and rent seeking on economic growth using data from 91 countries. Data on college enrollment in engineering were used as a measure of talent allocated to entrepreneurship, and those on lawyers as a measure of talent allocated to rent seeking. Their results indicate that when talented people become entrepreneurs, it is good for economic growth; but when the same resources are allocated to RSA, it is harmful for economic growth. Similarly, Laband and Sophocleus (1988), using U.S. time series data (1947-83) on the number of lawyers as a proxy of RSA and cross-sectional data on the number of state law firms per capita, found such activity to have a negative impact on both the growth in GNP and state per capita income.

Rama (1993) tested the relationship between RSA and growth by introducing distributional activities in an endogenous growth model. In this model, firms incur investment and lobbying expenditure that affect the capital stock and the number of restrictive regulations in force, respectively. It is presumed that capital accumulation is likely to increase the output in the same year, but the effect of restrictive regulations may take a long time to decrease competition and to slow down economic growth. Rama's results on Uruguay for the 1925-83 period show a positive immediate impact of restrictive regulations on sectoral output, but the long-run impact on aggregate output is negative.

A couple of studies assuming that rent seeking is proportional to the size of government in a given area have also provided evidence supportive of the traditional view. Grossman (1988) found that the growth in national output over the 1929-82 period is affected negatively by the relative size of government, and attributes this to rent seeking and other inefficiencies of the government sector. Durden (1990), using 1980 census data, examined the impact of the proportion of workers employed in federal and state government (rent seeking) on the level of family income across congressional districts. His results suggest that a relatively large federal workforce has a negative impact on family income in districts outside the South, while state employment has a negative impact on such income in both South and non-South districts.

Finally, a few empirical studies have begun to present results that are supportive of a dissenting view. These studies take advantage of an endogenous growth framework that emphasizes the differences in human capital, technology, and public policy as determinants of long-term growth across countries, to highlight the role of political economy. One such study, Mork (1993), shows that rent seeking, as proxied by lobbying activity, may increase economic growth. Another study, Mohtadi and Toe (1998: 453), suggests that rent seeking in the form of lobbying activity by self-interested individuals produces "significant spillovers to other citizens that exceed the social cost of lobbying," and that an increase in such activities may improve economic growth and welfare. Also, Gray and Lowery (1996) have shown that rent seeking, as proxied by lobbying activity (the number of interest organizations), has a strong positive effect on state economic growth.

Empirical Model Specification and Description of the Data

The Model

To investigate the relationship between state economic growth and RSA, we selected a wide set of control and rent-seeking variables for the VAR model, guided by previous literature and mindful of state-level data availability problems. The general form of the model can be expressed as the following unrestricted reduced-form system of equations:

[M.sub.t] = b(L)[M.sub.t] + a + n + [e.sub.t],

where a, n, and [e.sub.t] are 11 x 1 vectors of constants, state-specific effects, and white noise error terms, respectively; b(L) is an 11 x 11 matrix of lagged polynomial coefficients; and [M.sub.t] = [RGSPOP, PRICAP, PUBCAP, HUMCAP, SLTAX, POFIRE, ENERGY, INDMIX, NLOBBY, DLOBBY, GOVJOB], where RGSPOP is the state's real per capita output, PRICAP is the private physical investment rate, PUBCAP is the public physical investment rate, HUMCAP is human capital investment, SLTAX is the burden of the state's tax structure, POFIRE is a measure of public services, ENERGY is the energy price in the state's industrial sector, INDMIX is a measure of the state's industrial mix, and NLOBBY, DLOBBY, and GOVJOB are measures of RSA in the state. All variables (except dummy variables) are measured in their logarithmic first difference form (annual growth rates).

The Justification, Measurement, and Sources of Proxy Variables

To estimate the VAR model, data and proxy variables are required for each of the factors defined above. We briefly discuss each in turn, in the context of the growth equation.

Economic Growth. The economic growth equation (RGSPOP) will include lagged values of RGSPOP, suggesting that growth in one period can influence growth in subsequent periods. The sign of this effect, however, is...

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