Remuneration vs. reelection: a senatorial balancing act.

AuthorCouch, Jim F.

Unique events often give rise to other unique events. Such was the case of Hurricane Katrina--the costliest and most destructive natural disaster in U.S. history. The resulting casualties and staggering damage estimates from the savage storm in late August 2005, led the U.S. Senate to vote overwhelmingly (92 to 6) against a Senate pay raise. Most senators apparently felt that voters would not look kindly on a Senate pay raise given the devastation caused by Katrina.

The Senate vote was largely symbolic because the House of Representatives was not going to take a vote on rescinding a pay raise for members of Congress. Thus, senators voting against the raise knew their votes would resonate well with voters but have no impact on the annual congressional pay raise sanctioned by law. Of the six senators who did vote for the pay raise, five--James Jeffords (I-Vt.), Daniel Inouye (D-Hawaii), Jeff Bingaman (D-N.M.), Richard Lugar (R-Ind.), and Kit Bond (R-Mo.)--were long-time incumbents whose seats were not threatened, and one--Paul Sarbanes (D-Md.)--was about to retire.

Typically, votes cast by members of Congress are relatively easy to predict. The empirical analysis of congressional voting patterns suggests that measures of ideology and party affiliation play a decisive role in explaining overall voting behavior. A vote on congressional pay, however, is not typical. It creates a dilemma for lawmakers by pitting two margins of self-interest against each other: pecuniary gains and reelection. Senators are clearly made better off by not opposing annual pay raises--salaries have increased from $98,400 in 1990 to $165,200 in 2006. Yet, those increases are likely to irritate voters and could harm a senator's chances for reelection. In this article, we examine those conflicts of interest and how they affect voting behavior in the case of senatorial pay raises.

It is often reported that cooperation among politicians, or bipartisanship, is a thing of the past. However, our results suggest that at least in the case of the Senate, when it comes to an issue as controversial as a pay increase, senators are fully capable of cooperating. More vulnerable senators (in terms of their probability of reelection) are allowed to vote against a pay raise, knowing that those in a more secure position can vote for the increase. The more vulnerable senators likely compensate senators who take the unpopular position of voting in favor of the pay increase with favorable votes on future legislation.

The Framers of the Constitution, after much debate, made two very important decisions about the salaries of those elected to serve in the U.S. Senate. First, the Framers decided that senators' salaries would be paid out of the U.S. Treasury and not by the states that elect them. The idea was that state governments could punish senators by withholding their pay, thereby influencing national decisions. Second, the newly elected Congress would determine the method and amount members would receive

We would like to focus on the second decision...

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