Removing Miranda from School Interrogations

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Citation: Vol. 99
• Publication year: 2021

99 Nebraska L. Rev. 16. Removing Miranda from School Interrogations

Removing Miranda from School Interrogations

Martin R. Gardner ^[*]

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. Introduction .......................................... 17

II. Miranda and Its Progeny ............................. 19
A. Pre-Miranda Coerced Confession Doctrine ......... 19
B. Miranda v. Arizona ............................... 20
C. "Custodial Interrogation" .......................... 21

III. Miranda and Juvenile Interrogation ................... 22
A. Supreme Court Cases ............................. 23
1. J.D.B. v. North Carolina ....................... 23
2. Fare v. Michael C ............. ................. 25
B. Lower Court Cases ................................ 27
1. Interrogations Solely by School Officials ........ 27
2. SRO Involvement in Interrogations by School Officials ....................................... 31
a. Miranda Warnings Required ............... 31
b. Miranda Warnings Not Required ........... 33
c. Critique of the Agency Approach ........... 35
3. Interrogations Dominated by SROs with School Officials Present ............................... 37
4. Police Dominated Interrogations ............... 39

IV. Social Science and Juvenile Interrogations ............. 41
A. Neurological Differences Between Adolescents and Adults ............................................ 41
B. Miranda Comprehension .......................... 43
C. Waiving Miranda Rights .......................... 45
D. Risk of False Confessions .......................... 46

V. Eliminating Miranda Requirements for School Interrogations ........................................ 49

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A. Miranda Warnings as Futile ....................... 50
B. Coerced Confession Protection ..................... 51
C. Promoting Sound Educational Policy by Removing Miranda Requirements ............................ 52
D. Removing Miranda from School Interrogations Is Consistent with Existing Supreme Court Case Law ......................................... 55

VI. Conclusion ............................................ 57

I. INTRODUCTION

In Miranda v. Arizona, ^[1] the United States Supreme Court held that statements obtained from suspects subjected to "custodial interrogation" ^[2] are inadmissible in criminal proceedings unless the interrogators issue warnings of the rights to remain silent and to have counsel present during interrogations. ^[3] The Court clarified that custodial interrogation can occur outside the police station. The Court declared: "Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves." ^[4]

One context "outside criminal court proceedings" that is particularly problematic is the school setting when juvenile students are questioned at school. ^[5] As will be shown, courts consistently hold that students are not in custody when questioned solely by school administrators. In such situations, students need not be read Miranda warnings, even when the fruits of such questioning are ultimately used in juvenile or criminal court proceedings. ^[6] It is a different story when questioning involves school resource officers (SROs) or police officers. Some courts find that students subjected to such interrogation are in custody and officers must give Miranda warnings. Other courts find the situation to be noncustodial. ^[7] One court described such inconsis-

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tency as "messy," ^[8] while a leading commentator observed that courts "issue rulings on custody which appear to be utterly irreconcilable." ^[9]

This Article attempts to provide resolution to the confused law governing school interrogations by arguing that students are not in custody for Miranda purposes when school administrators conduct interrogations or are present when SROs or police officers question students. This conclusion is justified by emerging social science evidence that Miranda warnings are largely ineffective in informing students of the substance of their rights. Even after being warned, students seldom assert their right to remain silent and routinely confess. ^[10] Thus, requiring Miranda warnings is largely an exercise in futility that, as will be shown, sometimes has the perverse result of excluding voluntary incriminating statements obtained through Miranda violations. Moreover, this Article argues that when school authorities participate in informing students of Miranda rights, the school is teaching students the morally questionable lesson that failing to be forthcoming in telling the truth is acceptable. Finally, it will be shown that school interrogations present a unique context justifying withholding Miranda applicability.

While participation by school authorities in interrogations should remove Miranda requirements, statements by unwarned students will not automatically be admissible in juvenile or criminal proceedings against the students. The traditional coerced confession doctrine will still apply, ^[11] rendering inadmissible any statement coerced under the totality of the circumstances.

This Article proceeds by discussing in Part II Miranda and its progeny defining the meaning of "custodial interrogation." Part III discusses the current case law addressing the applicability of Miranda to juveniles while at school. Part IV considers social science evidence identifying differences between juveniles and adults that demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Miranda warnings given to juveniles. Finally, Part V argues that school students are not considered in custody for Miranda purposes when school authorities participate in student interrogations. While such a conclusion requires the Supreme Court to rethink its decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, ^[12] this Article argues that overruling J.D.B. is at home with other existing Supreme Court case law.

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II. MIRANDA AND ITS PROGENY

A. Pre-Miranda Coerced Confession Doctrine

Until Miranda v. Arizona, states regulated police interrogations ^[13] entirely by due process principles that precluded governmental use of coerced confessions. ^[14] The due process doctrine embraced a subjective focus on the will of the suspect and denied the use of confessions that were "involuntary" in light of the "totality of the circumstances." ^[15]

The perceived inadequacy of the due process approach as the sole constitutional check on police interrogation is well documented. ^[16] The vagueness of the voluntariness standard left the police with little guidance in conducting interrogations so as to assure the admissibility of confessions resulting therefrom. ^[17] Such uncertainty resulted from the process of case-by-case judicial assessments of whether the particular suspect's will was overborne, ^[18] an issue hardly susceptible to objective

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analysis. ^[19] Moreover, because station house interrogation had always been conducted in secret, ^[20] defendants routinely experienced difficulty recreating the interrogation process resulting in an inevitable "swearing contest" generally won by the police. ^[21] Such a police-dominated atmosphere creates the obvious risk of undue pressure being exerted upon suspects by zealous interrogators bent on solving crime. Miranda was the Supreme Court's black letter rule response to the shortcomings of the due process doctrine.

B. Miranda v. Arizona

Miranda v. Arizona considered the admissibility of statements obtained from suspects subjected to custodial police interrogation without the presence of counsel or warnings of constitutional rights. The Court held that admitting these statements would violate the suspect's Fifth Amendment right not to "be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." ^[22] The Court found that the atmosphere of custodial interrogation was inherently coercive ^[23] and thus "exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of individuals" in inducing their confessions. ^[24] Therefore, "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice." ^[25]

The "protective devices" articulated by the Court are the now-famous warnings: informing suspects that they have a right to remain silent, that any statement they make may be used as evidence against them, and that they have a right to counsel during interrogation at State expense if they are indigent. ^[26] The Court found that without such warnings prior to interrogation, the privilege against self-incrimination, long cherished as a protection of defendants' rights in judicial proceedings, ^[27] degenerates into a "form of words" effectively overrid-

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den by police practices aimed at inducing statements from suspects held incommunicado in the station house. ^[28] If this is true, central constitutional...