Reluctantly remembering Somalia - part 3.

• Author: Wentling, Mark

On September 25, a U.S. helicopter was brought down and all three crew members aboard were killed. Not all the details about the shooting down are known as there were efforts to cover up the details surrounding this pivotal event. In hindsight, it was unfortunate that the events surrounding the shooting down of this helicopter were not made more widely known and examined in more detail. Lessons learned from this tragic event may have helped prevent the tragedy that was to follow eight days later.

Just after the helicopter crashed, there were grisly reports of Somali women and children ripping apart the bodies of the dead crewmen as they vied to see who could get the biggest bones to keep as souvenirs. There were even worse reports about Somalis tearing off flesh to eat later. It was also alleged that the head of one crewman had been impaled on a stake and was on display at Bakara Market. I am not sure of how much any of this was true but these were the kind of things we were hearing at the time. One thing for sure this was a big turning point in the conflict as we saw that Somalis had figured out how to shoot down low flying helicopters, and, thus, U.S. government policy makers were obliged to re-visit again the basis and the need for continuing this "humanitarian" mission.

There has been a book written and a movie (I still have a hard time watching it) produced on "Black Hawk Down," so I will not go into any details and stick to what this piece is supposed to be all about, i.e. my own personal recollections. I remember I was in my office on October 3 doing duty as the most senior civilian at post on that day when one of the FAST marines from the observation point we had on the roof came in to tell me that they thought one of our helicopters had been shot down and there was a lot of black smoke rising from the Olympic Hotel area where it went down. Immediately, I followed the marine up the ladder to the roof so I could see for myself but I no sooner arrived on the roof when I reversed myself and flew back down the ladder as we were being fired at by Somali snipers.

I later learned that as soon as the helicopter went down the Somali militiamen and almost every Somali with a gun mobilized into something of a pre-planned full court press throughout Mog. Roadblocks were thrown up everywhere, armed men were stationed at every corner and snipers went into action. A special alarm was sounded and every Somali prepared for a big fight. Those who could not fight were told to stay inside. Later, a second helicopter was shot down and a third helicopter suffered damage and crashed when it returned to base. Already, we were hearing that Somali children and women were dancing on the downed helicopters. The Somalis seemed to have a plan of action while we did not have a plan A or B.

It was a long day and night of pandemonium as we tried to find out what was happening. Given that the Special Forces were outside of our chain of command and had undertaken this operation without the knowledge of the UN, it was hard to know what was happening and harder to do anything to help those who had been downed in broad daylight in the busy and very congested Bakara Market area of Mog. Hours passed before the UN could be properly briefed. Agreement was eventually achieved to send troops from the U.S. Army 10th mountain division along with some UN Pakistani troops and a Malaysian contingent to rescue the down U.S. troops.

The Malaysians mainly got the nod to go in because they were the only ones with armored personnel carriers and this fact underscored the absence of the additional military equipment that had been requested but never provided. Sadly, long before these troops were able to fight their way in the middle of the night through all the roadblocks, our special forces had suffered a number of casualties. In the end, 84 U.S./UN troops lost their lives that night and it estimated that from 500 to 1,500 Somalis died in this huge fire fight. Given the heavy fire power used by the U.S. military, it was hard to avoid this kind of carnage and high levels of collateral damage.

Much of that terrible time remains a blur in my mind. We were all traumatized and puzzled over the tragedy that had taken place. We could not understand why the Special Forces broke many of their own rules, which called for operating only at night, and carried out a drop in the middle of day in one of the most heavily populated and armed areas of Mog. They had lots advantages at night but not many in the day. We later learned that they were under a lot of pressure to succeed in their mission after several months of failure and, if they did not succeed soon, they would be recalled, so they made this last ditch, exceptionally risky effort to complete their mission.

Needless to say, this was a watershed moment for our involvement in Somalia and the highest levels of the U.S. government were seriously shaken and senior decision-makers were pressured to scramble to bring the situation under control and to elaborate an end-game strategy. The ugly scenes broadcasted on TV of dead U.S. soldiers being dragged through the streets of Mog raised public anger and sentiment against the presence of U.S. troops in Somalia. This military disaster ultimately led to the resignation of the Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, and contributed to the end of the career a couple of years later of Major General William Garrison, who was the top commander of the special forces operating in Somalia. Also, the U.S. Special Envoy, Robert Gosende, was recalled to Washington for consultations but was never allowed to return.

Immediately following events of October 3 and 4, President Clinton dispatched his first Somalia envoy, Ambassador Robert Oakley, to speak directly with Aideed about achieving peace and the release of the helicopter pilot, Michael Durant, who had been captured, and the turn over the bodies of Durant's fellow crewmen. These negotiations did result in the release of Durant, who had been held captive for 11 days, and the delivery of the bodies, and one Nigerian soldier who had been captured earlier. I note that one of the bodies was missing a head; therefore, I was convinced that a head had been impaled at Bakara Market. Much of what occurred in these intense negotiations is not known but it is thought that...