Religious Pluralism, Equal Opportunity, and the State

• Published date: 01 March 1991
• Date: 01 March 1991
• DOI: 10.1177/106591299104400111
• Subject Matter: Articles

RELIGIOUS

PLURALISM,

EQUAL

OPPORTUNITY,

AND

THE

STATE

GLORIA

T.

BECKLEY

AND

PAUL

BURSTEIN

University

of

Washington

mericans

have

historically

enjoyed

considerable

freedom

of reli-

~~

gious

belief

(or

nonbelief)

and

worship.

Yet

their

freedom

to

A

pursue

their

religious

tenets

has

been

constrained

in

at

least

two

ways.

First,

Americans

have

often

been

hostile

to

religious

minor-

ities.

Adherents

of

minority

religions

often

felt

that

if

they

wanted

to

gain

access

to

educational

opportunities

or

desirable

jobs

or

housing,

they

should

hide

(or

change)

their

beliefs

and

denominational

member-

ships,

and

minimize

the

expression

of

distinctive

religious

practices.

Second,

American

law

has

long

distinguished

between

religious

belief

and

religious

practice.

&dquo;When ...

one’s

religious

beliefs

encom-

passed

consequences

for

one’s

daily

secular

life,

then

freedom

of

reli-

gious

often

has

been

problematic,&dquo;

note

Way

and

Burt

(1983:

652);

&dquo; ...

the

freedom

to

act

on

the

basis

of

one’s

religious

beliefs

may

be

narrowly

circumscribed

by

public

opinion

and

the

law.&dquo;

However,

changes

in

American

society

during

the

last

several

decades

may

have

significantly

reduced

both

the

legal

and

socio-

economic

constraints

experienced

by

religious

minorities.

Not

only

has

prejudice

against

religious

minorities

declined,

but

legal

doctrine

has

been

altered

as

well.

Way

and

Burt

argue

that

changes

in

judi-

cial

interpretations

of

the

free

exercise

clause

beginning

in

the

1960s

produced

a

&dquo;more

generous

and

accepting

spirit&dquo;

toward

the

RECEIVED:

November

1,

1989

FIRST

REVISION

RECEIVED:

April

2,

1990

SECOND

REVISION

RECEIVED:

June

13,

1990

ACCEPTED

FOR

PUBLICATION:

June

15,

1990

NOTE:

Revision

of

a

paper

presented

to

the

annual

meeting

of

the

American

Sociological

Association,

San

Francisco,

California,

August

13,

1989.

The

work

was

made

possible

by

grants

from

the

American

Jewish

Committee

and

the

National

Science

Foundation

(SES-8509055),

and

is

based

in

part

on

a

report

to

the

Committee.

For

helpful

advice

and

comments

we

would

like

to

thank

David

Singer,

Lawrence

Grossman,

Calvin

Goldscheider,

Sam

Rabinove,

Alfred

Blumrosen,

Arval

Morris,

Cornelius

Peck,

Marvin

Stern,

Florence

Katz,

Lisa

Cubbins,

Marshall

George,

Terence

C.

Halliday,

Judy

Howard,

Satoshi

Kanazawa,

Satomi

Kurosu,

Ken

Pike,

Xinhua

Ren,

Stuart

Scheingold,

Gi-Wook

Shin,

Edie

Simpson,

Beth

Weinstein,

and

Siok-Cheng

Yeoh.

186

religious

practices

of

marginal

religions.

&dquo;If

the

Bill

of

Rights

is

intended

to

protect

minorities,&dquo;

they

write

(1983:

665),

&dquo;then

at

long

last

mar-

ginal

or

dissident

religions

have

found

a

measure

of

constitutional

protection.&dquo;

Furthermore,

in

a

dramatic

break

with

the

past,

government

has

gone

beyond

simply

allowing

free

exercise

(up

to

a

point)

to

actively

intervening

in

social

and

economic

life

to

ensure

that

Americans

are

not

deprived

of

access

to

jobs,

public

accommodations,

education,

or

housing

because

of

the

religious

prejudices

of

their

fellow

citizens.

The

Civil

Rights

Act

of

1964

and

other

major

civil

rights

laws

pro-

hibit

discrimination

on

the

basis

of

religion

as

well

as

race,

national

origin,

and,

in

some

areas,

sex.

Passage

of

the

civil

rights

laws

meant,

according

to

the

historian

J.

R.

Pole

(1978:

326),

that

&dquo;[flor

the

first

time

in

American

history,

equality

became

a

major

object

of

govern-

ment

policy.&dquo;

But

what

is

the

nature

of

the

equality

mandated

by

the

civil

rights

laws?

Do

such

laws

require-in

line

with

the

earlier,

more

restrictive

readings

of the

free

exercise

clause - only

that

individuals

not

be

penalized

for

religious

affiliation

and

belief?

Or

might

the

concept

of

equality

be

expanded - as

interpretations

of

the

free

exercise

clause

have

broadened - to

include

the

notion

that

society

should

accommo-

date,

to

some

degree,

the

religious

practices

of

adherents

to

minority

religions?

As

the

scope

of

federal

government

activity

has

extended

to

the

regulation

of

employment

practices,

it

has

had

to

address

this

issue

and

to

confront

two

competing

views

of

what

constitutes

fair

treatment

for

religious

minorities

in

the

labor

market.

One - the

&dquo;assimilationist&dquo;

view

(Post

1988:

103) - argues

that

nondiscrimination

means

forbid-

ding

employers

to

distinguish

among

employees

on

the

basis

of

reli-

gious

affiliation

or

belief.

If

employees’

religious

practices

interfere

with

standard

business

practices,

however-if,

for

example,

some

employ-

ees

want

special

days

off

for

religious

reasons -

the

employer

has

no

obligation

to

accommodate

them,

and

the

government

has

no

reason

to

prevent

the

employees

from

being

penalized.

The

competing-or

&dquo;cultural

pluralist&dquo;

(Post

1988:

106)-view

claims

that

it

is

important

to

accommodate

religious

practices

as

well

as

beliefs.

Full

acceptance

of

religious

minorities

would

mean

going

beyond

treating

members

of

all

religions

identically;

true

nondiscrimination

means

granting

legitimacy

to

minority

religious

practices

as

well

as

beliefs

(see

also

Galanter

1966).