A Rejoinder
| Author | Keith J. Mueller |
| Date | 01 June 1987 |
| Published date | 01 June 1987 |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591298704000209 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
A
REJOINDER
KEITH
J.
MUELLER
University
of
Nebraska
OLITIGAL
scientists
are
well
advised
to
develop
new
and
more
valid
measures
of
gubernatorial
powers.
Measures
such
as
Schlesinger’s
-m-
original
measure
and
the
updates
by
Beyle
(1983)
and
myself
(Mueller
1985)
are
helpful
in
understanding
structural
authority,
but
not
actual
power
that
may
be
developed
by
individual
governors.
Since
power
is
the
ability
of
one
actor
to
get
another
to
do
something
he/she
would
not
otherwise
have
done,
authority
is
only
one
ingredient
among
several
(including
per-
suasive
abilities)
that
contribute
to
power.
The
measures
critiqued
by
Nel-
son
Dometrius
are
measures
only
of
formal
power,
not
actual
power.
Rather
than
spending
time
and
effort
debating
measures
of
formal
power,
we
ought
to
incorporate
replicable
measures
of
informal
power
into
a
more
compre-
hensive
index.
Current
measures
of
formal
powers
are
useful
indicators
of
comparative
institutional
strengths
of
governors.
There
is
little
to
gain
in
any
of
the
changes
suggested
by
Dometrius -
especially
since
his
criti-
cisms
ignore
the
empirical
basis
of
the index.
Changes
in
the
formal
powers
index
are
necessary,
but
the
ones
suggested
by
Dometrius
are
based
on
unfounded
criticisms
of
my
work.
The
principal
problem
identified
by
Dometrius
is
that
there
is
too
little
variation
across
states
in
the index.
The
16
offices
chosen
by
Schlesinger
and
replicated
by
myself
show
remarkable
variation
across
states,
contrary
to
the
argument
in
the
article
that
constitutions
will
in
effect
&dquo;lock
in&dquo;
certain
offices
as
elected.
Reconstructing
the
raw
scores
(meaning
the
total
points
awarded
to
a
state
based
on
the
appointive
powers
for
each
of
the
16
offices
-
a
possible
range
of
0
for
no
appointment
power
to
80
for
complete
ap-
pointment
power;
controlled
for
absence
of
offices
by
calculating
a
percentage
that
could
range
from
0
percent
control
to
100
percent
control),
shows
a
remarkable
variation
of
11
percent
to
73
percent
control
in
these
offices.
Further,
the
appointment
powers
did
change
over
time,
as
the
following
discussion
of
28
shifts
in
rankings
illustrates.
Between
1960
and
1982,
32
states
experienced
an
increase
in
appointive
powers
and
18
states
experienced
declines;
no
state
remained
constant
and
only
19
states
experienced
changes
of less
than
5
percent.
Still,
reconstructing
the
appointive
powers
measure
may
be
warranted
if
we
could
be
confident
the
results
would
be
dramati-
cally
different.
However,
as
the
author
tacitly
admits,
variation
is
still
con-
strained,
especially
variation
over
time.
Contrary
to
another
argument
levied
against
the
index,
the
rankings
of
appointment
powers
show
considerable
change.
Between
1960
and
1982
there
were
28
shifts
in
state
rankings
in
appointment
powers;
of
those,
25
represented
actual
reductions
or
increases
in
appointment
powers
of
gover-
nors,
not
mere
changes
in relative
positions.
For
example,
Idaho
dropped
from
a
score
of
32
to
2
because
the
total
percent
of the
governor’s
power
fell
from
49
percent
to
40
percent:
conversely,
the
appointment
power
score
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