Rejecting the clear and convincing evidence standard for proof of incompetence.

AuthorMeyers, Alaya B.
PositionSupreme Court Review

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996)

  1. INTRODUCTION

    In Cooper v. Oklahoma,(1) the United States Supreme Court examined whether a state could require a defendant to prove his incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence.(2) Though the Court had already upheld one state statute that required a defendant to prove his incompetence by a "preponderance of the evidence,"(3) Cooper held that the heightened "clear and convincing evidence" standard was an impermissible violation of a defendant's fundamental right under the Due Process Clause not to be tried while incompetent because it greatly increased the potential for an erroneous decision.(4) The Court relied on a two-part argument, first looking at historical precedent and then examining whether Oklahoma's rule exhibited "fundamental fairness in practice."(5)

    This Note argues that the Supreme Court was correct to strike down Oklahoma's heightened statutory requirement for proof of incompetence. By setting such a high standard, Oklahoma virtually guaranteed that its courts would convict many defendants who were more likely than not incompetent. This result would have been contrary to due process and had no rational justification.

  2. BACKGROUND

    Incompetency is a mental disability that impairs a defendant to the extent that he cannot grasp the nature of the charges against him nor assist counsel in his defense.(6) Because such an impairment could jeopardize a defendant's opportunity to receive a fair trial, the Supreme Court has long held that the trial and conviction of an incompetent competent defendant violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.(7)

    There are several underlying rationales behind the Due Process Clause's prohibition of trying an incompetent defendant. First, it increases the accuracy and reliability of the trial since an incompetent defendant cannot, for example, adequately testify on his behalf.(8) The requirement also enhances fairness, since an incompetent defendant cannot make decisions regarding the course and nature of his defense.(9) In addition, it maintains the "dignity" of the trial, in that an incompetent defendant may behave in an offensive or inappropriate manner.(10) Finally, a competent defendant's comprehension of why he is being punished makes the punishment more just.(11)

    The Court first laid out the modem two-part test for determining competency in Dusky v. United States(12) a defendant must have (1) "sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding" and (2) "a national as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him."(13) Six years later, in Pate v. Robinson,(14) the Court gave a more formal definition of incompetency, emphasizing that state procedures must be sufficient to protect a defendant's fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial.(15)

    Although Dusky established a two-part test for competence, the Court had not yet been entirely clear as to the evidentiary burden that defendants needed to meet to satisfy the test.(16) In the 1977 case of Patterson v. New York,(17) which dealt with raising an affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance, the Court discussed the evidentiary burden defendants must meet in order to prevail.(18) Justice White, writing for the majority, relied on Leland v. Oregon(19) and Rivera v. Delaware(20) for the proposition that the appropriate standard necessary to raise an affirmative defense of insanity was "a preponderance of evidence."(21) Because this case dealt with insanity, however, significant questions still existed as to the constitutionally required standard of proof for incompetence.

    Two years later, the Court addressed the appropriate standards for competency in Addington v. Texas,(22) where the issue arose in the context of a civil proceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental hospital.(23) The Court, per Justice Burger, held that "the individual's interest in the outcome of a civil commitment proceeding is of such weight and gravity that due process requires the state to justify confinement by proof more substantial than ... [a] preponderance of the evidence."(24) The Court remanded the case back to the lower court with the suggestion that the proper standard should be something "equal to or greater than the clear and convincing standard which ... is required to meet due process guarantees."(25) The Court distinguished civil commitment proceedings from criminal prosecutions, noting that different standards were both appropriate and necessary.(26) In justifying the distinction, Justice Burger emphasized that a civil commitment proceeding did not have the same impact as a criminal trial.(27) Specifically, justice Burger observed that the "standard applied in criminal cases manifests our concern that the risk of error to the individual must be minimized even at the risk that some who are guilty might go free."(28)

    Finally, in 1992, the Court directly addressed the appropriate standard of proof that a state could place on a defendant to prove his incompetence at a criminal trial. Justice Kennedy, writing for a five justice majority in Medina v. California,(29) examined a California statute requiring the defendant to prove his incompetence by a preponderance of evidence.(30) The Court upheld the statute, finding it did not violate the Due Process Clause.(31) Significantly, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim that the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge(32) was the proper method to analyze the burden of proof standard for competency.(33) Mathews dealt with a challenge on due process grounds to administrative procedures for termination of Social Security disability payments, and the Mathews Court adopted a three-part balancing test for assessing due process claims.(34)

    Justice Kennedy rejected the Mathews balancing test as the appropriate way to determine requirements in a criminal procedural case.(35) For criminal cases, justice Kennedy instead adopted the more "narrow" due process test used in Patterson v. New York in the context of a defendant's burden in proving extreme emotional disturbance.(36) Under this test, a state's regulating procedures are not subject to due process regulation unless they offend a fundamental principle of justice.(37)

    Justice Kennedy then undertook both a historical and operational analysis, ultimately concluding that placing the burden of proof on a criminal defendant to establish his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence did not violate a fundamental principle of justice.(38) Significantly, the Court based this holding largely on the fact that it would only affect a limited class of cases in California, those in which "the evidence that a defendant is competent is just as strong as the evidence that he is incompetent."(39)

    Although Medina established that a state could require a defendant to prove his incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence, it did not address whether a state could impose a more stringent standard. Cooper v. Oklahoma is factually different from Medina in that Cooper required the Court to consider whether a State could continue a trial "after the defendant has demonstrated that he is more likely than not incompetent."(40) At the time Cooper came before the Supreme Court, Oklahoma was one of only four states that statutorily required a defendant to prove his incompetence by clear and convincing evidence.(41) Oklahoma's statute provided, in relevant part, that "[t] he court ... shall determine, by clear and convincing evidence, if the ... [defendant] is incompetent."(42) The general consensus was that state competency statutes such as Oklahoma's mistakenly adopted Addington's "clear and convincing" standard of proof for competency in a civil commitment procedure by applying it to the wholly dissimilar context of a criminal trial.(43) Yet, prior to Cooper, the Supreme Court had not yet addressed the issue.

  3. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

    On September 8, 1989, investigators discovered Harold Sheppard, an eighty-six-year-old man, dead in his home from stab wounds.(44) They placed the date of death as September 4, and later discovered that Byron Cooper had purchased two watches with the victim's credit card on September 5.(45) Testimony indicated that Cooper intended to trade the purchases for cocaine.(46) On September 19, police officers spotted Cooper in a parking lot and apprehended him after chasing him down.(47) A search revealed that Cooper had a device known to function as a pipe for crack cocaine.(48)

    Investigators then discovered substantial evidence indicating that Cooper was indeed responsible for Sheppard's death.(49) During interrogation, Cooper gave conflicting testimony to police officers.(50) Cooper first admitted to killing Harold Sheppard as well as a second party.(51) He then retracted this admission and ultimately stated that he simply could not remember.(52) Authorities later found some of Mr. Sheppard's possessions in Cooper's residence as well as Cooper's fingerprints on items that may have been used in the burglary.(53) Investigators also found a butcher knife that, when sprayed with a chemical, displayed swipe marks commonly exhibited when blood is wiped off a blade.(54)

    In light of this evidence, on December 4, 1989, the State of Oklahoma charged Cooper with murder in the first degree for killing Mr. Sheppard in the course of a burglary.(55) Before trial began, questions arose concerning Cooper's sanity.(56) Cooper would not communicate with his attorneys and apparently believed that his lead counsel was the devil.(57) In August of 1990, Coopers counsel obtained a judicial order to evaluate Cooper's competency to stand trial.(58) Dr. Edith King testified that Cooper was incompetent to stand trial, finding him delusional and irrational.(59) The court ordered Cooper to the state mental hospital.(60)

    Upon Cooper's release, the court conducted a second hearing on his...

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