Regulatory Capture Recaptured

• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12246
• Date: 01 July 2014
• Published date: 01 July 2014
• Author: Martin Lodge

Book Reviews 539

edited volume in the best sense, composed of strong

chapters by a stellar cast of contributors. Furthermore,

the sum is more than its parts, as the design and fram-

ing of the volume enhance its overall message that

capture accounts need a more sophisticated approach

and that capture is hardly inevitable.

One of the key contributions of this volume is

the critical engagement with accounts that stress

“ capture.” As noted by Carpenter and Moss in their

introductory chapter, capture has been a dominant

theme throughout the last few decades, emerging

from a range of intellectual traditions.  e most

dominant account involves the economic theory

of regulation as formulated by Stigler, Peltzman

(1989), and others. According to this account,

concentrated industries are well placed to capture

regulation, as politician-regulators are keen to

enhance their reelection opportunities by granting

favorable regulatory standards to such powerful

interests. Carpenter and Moss def‌i ne “strong” cap-

ture as “the result or process by which regulation,

in law or application, is consistently or repeatedly

directed away from the public interest and toward

the interest of the regulated industry, by the intent

and action of the industry itself ” (13). Such a def‌i -

nition establishes a basis for empirical exploration.

It also sets a high barrier for the actual existence of

capture to be established.  is challenge is taken

further in Carpenter’s chapter on “Detecting and

Measuring Capture” (chapter 3).  is chapter will

become key reading in any course on regulation.

Carpenter distinguishes two kinds of indicators

for two types of capture: “statutory” (i.e., the

legislative basis on which agencies might act) and

“agency” (i.e., where the behavior of the agencies is

seen to be following industry interest).

Daniel Carpenter and David A. Moss, eds., Prevent-

ing Regulatory Capture: Special Interest Inf‌l u-

ence and How to Limit It (New York: Cambridge

University Press, 2013). 530 pp. $70.00 (cloth),

ISBN: 9781107036086; $24.99 (paper), ISBN:

9780101070646704.

Regulation remains at the front line of politi-

cal controversy. Whether it is because of the

meltdown of f‌i nancial institutions, oil spills,

electricity blackouts, mining disasters, or contami-

nated food, regulatory instruments and organiza-

tions have been criticized for, among other things,

their inaction, their overreach, and their closeness to

regulatory industries. One of the standard accusations

has been “capture”—the idea that dominant industry

interests have succeeded in perverting the intended,

public-interested aims of the regulatory regime,

such as public health, systemic industry viability, or

environmental safety. Whereas this view of capture

is widely associated with calls for “more” or “better”

regulation, the most prominent account of capture, by

George Stigler (1971), is directed at regulation per se.

According to Stigler, regulation “as a rule, is acquired

by the industry and is designed and operated primar-

ily for its benef‌i t.” Regulation is about controlling

market entry. More broadly, the solution to capture is

deregulation.

 is highly partisan conf‌l ict over regulation, and in

particular the notion of “capture,” is at the heart of

the volume edited by Daniel Carpenter and David

A. Moss. Simply put, this volume makes a seminal

contribution to the f‌i eld of regulation and to the

debate about the idea of capture itself. It represents a

milestone in policy and academic debates and deserves

to be a reference point for many years to come. It is an

Regulatory Capture Recaptured

Sonia M. Ospina and Rogan Kersh, Editors

Martin Lodge

London School of Economics, United Kingdom

Martin Lodge is professor of political

science and public policy in the Department

of Government and the Centre for Analysis

of Risk and Regulation at the London

School of Economics. His interests are in the

areas of regulation and executive politics.

E-mail: m.lodge@lse.ac.uk