Regulatory Attitudes and Behavior: the Case of Surface Mining Regulation
| Author | David M. Hedge,George H. Williams,Donald C. Menzel |
| Date | 01 June 1988 |
| DOI | 10.1177/106591298804100207 |
| Published date | 01 June 1988 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
REGULATORY
ATTITUDES
AND
BEHAVIOR:
THE
CASE
OF
SURFACE
MINING
REGULATION
DAVID
M.
HEDGE,
West
Virginia
University
DONALD
C.
MENZEL,
University
of
South
Florida
GEORGE
H.
WILLIAMS,
University
of
South
Alabama
TREET-LEVEL
bureaucrats
enjoy
considerable
discretion
and
auton-
omy
in
carrying
out
their
responsibilities.
As
a
result,
the
actual
con-
tent
of
public
policies
is
frequently
determined
by
the
actions
and
decisions
of
those
responsible
for
carrying
out
programs
on
a
day-to-day
basis
(K.
Davis
1969;
Elmore
1978;
Lipsky
1980;
Sorg
1983;
and
C.
Davis
1985).
Against
this
backdrop
of
line
discretion
and
responsibility,
a
number
of
scholars
stress
the
importance
of
attitudes
in
shaping
field-level
be-
havior.
In
his
classic
study
of
the
Forest
Service,
Kaufman
(1967:
222-23),
for
example,
goes
so
far
as
to
maintain
that,
In
the
last
analysis,
all
influences
on
administrative
behavior
are
filtered
through
a
screen
of
individual
values,
concepts,
and
images.
Some
sig-
nals
are
screened
out,
some
come
through
in
full
force,
some
are
modi-
fied
or
attentuated.
To
the
extent
the
leaders
of
an
organization
can
manipulate
the
screen,
they
can
increase
the
receptivity
of
field
person-
nel
to
organizational
directives,
decrease
their
receptivity
to
outside
in-
fluences.
More
recent
studies
of
implementation
and
regulation
stress
similar
themes.
Implementation
scholars,
for
instance,
argue
that
support
of
poli-
cies
and
their
goals
among
agency
personnel
is
critical
for
effective
im-
plementation
(Kaufman
1973;
Van Horn
and
Van
Meter
1975,
1976;
Sabatier
and
Mazmanian
1979;
Kelman
1980;
Bullock
and
Lamb
1984;
Davis
1985).
Others
(Lipsky
1980;
Kagan
and
Bardach
1982)
contend
that
attitudes
toward
clients
-
including
biases
toward
those
being
served
-
also
affect
how
(and
whether)
policies
are
executed.
Still
others
point
to
the
role
orientations
of
bureaucrats
(Foster
and Jones
1978),
individual
goals
(Downs
1966),
larger
social
values
and
priorities
(Mazmanian
and
Sabatier
1980;
Goetze
1981),
and
opinions
about
the
proper
and
respec-
tive
roles
of
federal,
state
and
local
authorities
(Mazmanian
and
Sabatier
1980;
Davis,
1985)
as
key
determinants
of
implementation
decisions.
Received:
February
11,
1987
First
Revision
Received:
July
31,
1987
Accepted
for
Publication:
August
12,
1987
NOTE:
The
research
reported
in
this
article
was
funded,
in
part,
by
grants
from
the
Ford
Foundation,
WVU’s
Energy
Research
Center,
and
the
West
Virginia
Department
of
Nat-
ural
Resources.
The
authors
are
grateful
for
the
technical
assistance
provided
by
Mark
Krause
and
the
constructive
criticisms
of
Joseph
Stewart,
Robert
Duval,
Eric
Herzik,
and
the
Department
of
Political
Science
at
the
University
of
Oklahoma.
324
In
short,
attitudes
are
assumed
by
many
to
be
significant
influences
on
behavior
and,
given
the
discretion
afforded
street
level
personnel,
ul-
timately
public
policies.
But
what
if
they
are
not?
Certainly
there
are
rea-
sons
for
believing
that
the
predispositions
of
administrators
need
not
condition
their
actions,
at
least
not
in
every
instance.
Efforts
in
the
1970s,
for
example,
to
avoid
agency
capture
by
regulated
interests
led
public
officials
to
devise
a
number
of
techniques
(automatic
ticket
writing
or
rotation
of
inspectors)
which
attempted
to
reduce
or
structure
bureaucratic
discretion
and,
hence,
the
influence
of
field-level
attitudes.
Beyond
that,
studies
of
implementation
and
regulatory
decision
making
suggest
that
policy
decisions
and
behaviors
are
likely
to
reflect
a
range
of
variables
that
go
well
beyond
the
orientations
of
individual
bureaucrats
including
the
influence
of
external
actors,
available
resources,
and
the
capabilities
of
bureaucrats
themselves
(see
Van
Horn
and
Van
Meter
1976
and
Mazmanian
and
Sabatier
1980).
Moreover,
even
if
one
can
assume
that
the values
and
predispositions
of
bureaucrats
guide
behavior,
more
complex
questions
concerning
which
attitudes
are
most
likely
to
influence
behavior,
the
conditions
under
which
attitude-behavior
linkages
occur,
or
the
kinds
of
behaviors
most
suscep-
tible
to
attitudinal
influences
are
left
unanswered.
The
question
of
attitude-behavior
linkages
is
central
for
practitioners
and
scholars
alike
since
both
prescriptive
and
explanatory
models
of
regu-
lation
and
implementation
proceed
on
the
assumption
that
attitudes
mat-
ter.
Yet,
a
review
of
the
literature
uncovered
only
one
study
(Mazmanian
and
Sabatier
1980)
which
systematically
examined
attitude-behavior
link-
ages
among
regulatory
officials.
More
typically,
studies
simply
describe,
and
occasionally
explain,
bureaucratic
attitudes
that
are
only
assumed
to
influence
subsequent
behavior
(see,
for
example,
Goetze
1981;
Foster
and Jones
1978;
Hedge
and
Menzel
1985;
C.
Davis
1985;
and Menzel
and
Hedge
1987).
This
article
provides
some
initial
insight
into
this
crucial
issue
by
analyzing
the
relationships
between
field-level
perceptions
and
enforce-
ment
behaviors
among
a
subset
of
federal
and
state
officials
responsible
for
implementing
the
1977
Surface
Mining
Act.
Specifically,
inspector-
level
enforcement
data
and
responses
from
a
survey
of
state
and
federal
inspectors
are
used
to
examine
the
interactions
among
attitudes,
agency
influences,
and
inspector
behavior.
Implementation
of
the
Surface
Mining
Act
by
state
and
federal
offi-
cials
during
the
Carter
administration
provides
a
useful
setting
in
which
to
observe
systematically
these
critical
interactions.
Under
the
1977
act,
the
federal
government
set
out
a
series
of
standards
designed
to
upgrade
the
quality
of
surface
mining
regulation
and
to
promote
greater
unifor-
mity
of
regulation
across
the
states.
According
to
provisions
of
the
act,
states
were
required
to
adopt
a
set
of laws
and
regulations
consistent
with
federal
standards
as
a
condition
for
assuming
primacy
over
or
responsi-
bility
for
enforcement
of
the
law
within
their
borders.
Until
state
pro-
grams
were
approved
(which
in
most
cases
did
not
occur
until
1982),
a
pattern
of
dual
state/federal
enforcement
prevailed.
As
a
result,
we
had
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