Regulation of bad things that almost never happen but could: HIPAA and the individual insurance market.

JurisdictionUnited States
Date22 March 2002
AuthorPauly, Mark V.

Since the collapse of the Clinton plan for large-scale health reform, Congress has approached the medical care sector of the economy very gingerly. One apparent lesson of the reform (though an obvious lesson in life) is that people are much less eager for improvements they have to pay for than for those that are supposed to come at zero cost. Once it became clear that the Clinton plan would have had serious financial and distributive implications, the electorate seemed in no mood to even risk the chance of large-scale taxes and transfers.

But the temptation to court votes by "doing something" about the medical care sector, and the obvious and real problems of the sector itself, did, after a several-year hiatus, gradually bring politicians back into full concern mode. First, a few small laws were passed about maternity and mental health benefit design, then came the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and now there is a full rhetorical court press concerning the Patients' Bill of Rights (PBOR).

Politicians' desire to avoid spending tax collections that would be used for other purposes (including tax cuts) has obviously shaped the form of these interventions. It is the shape of health regulatory intervention that, after some general remarks about its character, I want to consider in the context of some (though by no means all) aspects of HIPAA. My view is that much of that law (as with much of PBOR, possibly even including the liability issue) largely represents regulation that forbids practices that rarely happen. While some of these practices may always be harmful, and others might selectively do harm, my point is that the arguments for these regulations are close to insignificant because of the rarity of the practices they are intended to regulate.

If this is so, one might then ask, on the one hand, why such laws are passed, ,and, on the other, what is so harmful if they are? Perhaps the only real consequence of note is the consumption of legislative and political energy and resources: a non-trivial deadweight loss if that political time and energy could have been devoted to other uses valued by citizens, but perhaps no more (and even less) of a waste than if it had been used for other political purposes.

My conclusion is less benign. I think that there are potential negative effects for such regulations that ought to be considered, in prospect or retrospect. At a minimum, something might be able to be done to reduce the damage.

My argument here will largely be one of political economy, in which I do have some general expertise. However, I willingly concede that I am an expert neither in the details of the passage of the HIPAA legislation (I have no insight into "what Congress was really trying to do"), nor in the specifics of what effects the legislation has had. Few others, I suspect, know the former, and no one knows the latter. Apart from a few preliminary reports on some aspects of implementation of the law, there has been, to my knowledge, no definitive large-scale evaluation of its effects. Speculation and anecdote, and even judgments of industry insiders, do not constitute reliable evidence.

The Normative Economics of Regulation

Real-world markets are never as perfect as those diagrammed in economics textbooks, and so in theory there can always be some government intervention that could improve matters. However, both common sense and deep theorizing about political philosophy tell us not to hope for a government bent on steadying every shake and shiver in the invisible hand. Usually, "pretty good" is good enough for markets to appropriately remain unregulated.

The main deviation from perfection in medical markets is not usually on the supply side; there is little natural monopoly and, except for pharmaceuticals, few unexploited economies of scale. (1) Instead, the most serious defect, in theory and in the back of all policymakers' minds, is imperfect information: the typical consumer is acutely conscious that he doesn't really know what he is doing when he goes to buy insurance or physician services. Indeed, were he as omniscient as the textbook consumer of widgets, he could frequently avoid buying either.

The case for government intervention usually requires, however, both that consumers not know and that government know better. To be specific: the strongest case for government intervention is to forbid some action that (virtually) no informed consumer who was rational and unforced would choose to do. If "you'd have to be crazy" to buy a particular product if you knew the score, then government, by banning the product, can do consumers the great favor of avoiding the need to protect against or investigate such products, as well as the occasional mishap that seeps through. Exploding cans of shaving cream, collapsing ladders, and de-laminating fires all fit into this category.

A trickier call is the case of products that some (if fully informed) consumers like while others (if fully informed) hate. The latter group would gain from a ban on such products, while the former group would suffer. A straightforward and utilitarian approach would total the gains and losses and then take the action that maximizes the net. Generally speaking, however, this second case is a better candidate for a full-court press on consumer information (indicate in bold print which dishes are extra spicy) rather than those sorts of Benthamite calculations. But if the many are really many and the few really few, and information hard to provide, there might be a case. So the correct condition might be labeled "almost everyone would have to be crazy."

Necessary and Sufficient

The previous discussion is correct and helpful as far as it goes, and it is a good guide to cases where product quality regulation is not a good idea (e.g., when only a few people are unfamiliar with the dangers of chain saws or butane). However, the "almost everyone" standard would be both necessary and sufficient for intervention only if we could count on government to do the right thing well (and only the right thing). But there are reasons why that may not be a reasonable expectation. I will deal with three of these. (There are more.)

  1. The common requirement to certify individuals, organizations, and entities as in conformance with the regulations can impose substantial administrative costs on the certifiers and certifiees.

  2. The existence of rules and regulations often calls forth its counterpart...

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