Refugees, Mobilization, and Humanitarian Aid: Evidence from the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Lebanon

• Published date: 01 May 2020
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002719885176
• Date: 01 May 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Refugees, Mobilization,

and Humanitarian Aid:

Evidence from

the Syrian Refugee

Crisis in Lebanon

Daniel Masterson

1

and M. Christian Lehmann

2

Abstract

This article examines whether refugees are prime candidates for recruitment into

armed groups and whether humanitarian aid to refugees impacts their choice to

join armed groups. First, our original survey data of 1,358 Syrian households in

Lebanon provide evidence that mobilization among the refugee population is low

at baseline—the first empirical estimates of the magnitude of the rate of Syrian

refugees returning home to fight. Second, leveraging as-if random assignment

around a strict altitude cutoff for a United Nations cash transfer program for

Syrianrefugees,wefindlittleevidencethattheaidprogramhadalargeeffecton

mobilization. If anything, our estimates indicate a small decrease in mobilization.

Our results stand in contrast to published literature arguing that refugees are

prime candidates to join armed groups and humanitarian aid to refugees may

support armed groups and fuel recruitment.

Keywords

civil wars, foreign aid, rebellion, political economy

1

Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford University, CA, USA

2

Department of Economics, University of Brasilia, Brazil

Corresponding Author:

Daniel Masterson, Immigration Policy Lab, Stanford University, CA, USA.

Email: dmasters@stanford.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(5) 817-843

ªThe Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002719885176

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Refugees in particular exit the state because of a direct experience of persecution or

political violence and therefore have strong reasons to oppose the regime from which

they have fled. Although refugees are of course victims of violence, they are also prime

candidates for recruitment involvement in rebel factions.

Salehyan (2009, 40)

In this article, we examine the Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon to test whether

Syrian refugees were prime candidates for recruitment into armed groups and

whether humanitarian aid delivered to the refugees had the perverse effect of fueling

mobilization. The Syrian refugee crisis in Lebanon exhibits a vast majority of the

risk factors for refugee mobilization and aid worsening conflict presented by pub-

lished literature. In Lebanon, we find many of the country’s political and paramili-

tary groups directly or indirectly involved in Syria’s war, often split along

preexisting politicized ethnic divisions; resentment among the host population about

the refugee population; a central state with little capacity to limit mobilization; and

armed groups that regularly crossed porous borders between Lebanon and Syria,

operated near refugee populations, and could have captured humanitarian aid and

recruited refugees. Despite these risk factors, we do not find evidence of refugee

mobilization or that aid affected mobilization.

When and why refugees join armed groups is not simply a question of academic

concern. Over the past one hundred years, two world wars, numerous civil wars,

ethnic cleansing, and genocidal violence have forced millions of people to leave

their homes and communities in order to escape violence. As of June 2018, the

number of refugees worldwide totaled 25.4 million. If we include people forcibly

displaced within the borders of their home country, the number of displaced people

worldwide rises to 68.5 million. Understanding when refugees fight in armed groups

can shed light on the origins and evolution of conflict. It can also help in evaluating

strategies for responding to refugee crises, a central question for the international

community. The United Nations (UN) spends billions of dollars every year on

responses to refugee crises and the amount is increasing. Whether refugees are at

significant risk of joining armed groups, and whether humanitarian aid will make

conflict worse, has important implications for how policy makers should desi gn

responses to refugee crises.

Existing academic and journalistic work highlights cases of refugee crises

where refugees joined armed groups and where transnational insurgent groups

captured aid intended for refugees. Such capture increases groups’ operating bud-

get and capacity to recruit fighters. Furthermore, transna tional insurgent groups

may see the potential for profit from recruiting refugees who are well positioned to

help the group secure aid rents. If this is the case, then humanitarian aid that is

meant to alleviate the suffering of refugees may in fact increase refugee mobiliza-

tion into armed groups, strengthening those groups, prolonging refugee crises,

increasing violence in the home country, and increasing the risk of conflict spil-

lover into the refugee hosting country.

818 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(5)