Reforming U.S. intelligence: after the terrorist attack.

• Author: Eisendrath, Craig R.
• Position: National Affairs - Cover Story

"... The President and Congress must radically increase their surveillance of intelligence if America is to have a system that is both effective and reflective of democratic values."

THE COLD WAR ended 10 years ago with the demise of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but the intelligence community of the U.S. is still pursuing old targets in Russia and China, despite the Third World political and economic status of these countries. U.S. intelligence seems unable to adjust to the political revolution that has taken place the world over. Its targets and priorities are still wedded to old threat perceptions, and the new and elusive spectre of international terrorism has not led to the out-of-the-box thinking that is required in the 21st century.

The successful targeting of the Pentagon and World Trade Center, unlike Pearl Harbor 60 years ago, has left America confused and disoriented because the enemy's hand was hidden from the intelligence community, and terrorists over the past 20 years have gone unpunished by the U.S. The FBI's quick response in establishing a list of suspects indicates that the perpetrators of these heinous acts in Washington and New York were known, but allowed to move freely around the nation. Equally, the CIA was aware of the vulnerability of America to terrorist attacks, but has been ineffective in protecting the U.S., as evidenced by the damaging assault on the U.S.S. Cole. It is time to reassess the National Security Act of 1947, particularly the intelligence system it created.

With a budget of more than $30,000,000,000, the U.S. intelligence system dwarfs the intelligence budget of any other nation in the world and is larger than the full military budget of all but six countries. It includes not only the Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, but a number of additional Federal agencies, including the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), and the Defense Department's TIARA program, all of which are concerned with tactical intelligence.

A series of intelligence failures since the end of the Cold War gives strong indication that the system has failed to gear up for the new post-Cold War world. These have included the failure to predict India's nuclear tests, assess accurately a North Korean missile launch, come up with a workable plan to undermine Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and terrorist Osama bin Laden, and provide sharp analysis of global financial crises. FBI and CIA agents have been caught after handing over secrets to the Russians, resulting in a loss of vital intelligence. In 1999, during the continuing crisis in Kosovo, the system did not provide accurate information on the location of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, resulting in its bombing--something which might have been avoided simply by consulting maps available to tourists on any home computer.

The destruction of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon has been rightly called a drastic intelligence failure and has given rise to numerous demands for reform. The attacks made clear that the U.S. is highly vulnerable to low-tech assaults, whether from planes, motor launches, or suitcase bombs. Nothing could have made this clearer than the fact that, for decades, America has been unable to stop the clandestine flow of drugs into the country by plane, boat, and suitcase. If drugs, why not bombs?

Several months prior to the tragic events of Sept. 11, Pres. Bush requested that CIA Director George Tenet handle a full-scale review of the intelligence community, similar to the review of the nation's defenses being conducted by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. While Tenet nominally heads the intelligence community, he has little power over its budget and personnel, as the CIA uses up less than 10% of both. A political survivor of the Clinton Administration, Tenet is unable to think outside the box and make the recommendations that would fundamentally change the intelligence system and move beyond the priorities of the Cold War. He is totally wedded to the idea of covert action as the CIA's major role in the national security...