Reflections on Twenty Years of Counterterrorism Strategy and Policy

Ref‌lections on Twenty Years of Counterterrorism

Strategy and Policy

Nicholas J. Rasmussen*

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

I. CT STRATEGY ACROSS THREE ADMINISTRATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

II. TOWARD A MORE REALISTIC APPROACH TO COUNTERTERRORISM . . . . . . . 38

A. Maintaining Our Strengths: Integration, Direct Action,

Intelligence, Partnerships, Layered Defenses . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

B. Addressing Our Shortcomings: Countering Violent Extremism,

Near-Term Threat Disruption vs. Long-Term Ideological

Challenge, Regional Stabilization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

CONCLUSION: REFRAMING OUR STRATEGIC GOALS AND THE

AMERICAN PUBLIC’S EXPECTATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

INTRODUCTION

As we approach the 20

th

anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on the United States, it

is natural to engage in self-ref‌lection—and even self-criticism—of the way we as a

nation responded to the events of that horrible day in 2001, and in subsequent years

as the terrorist threat evolved and took on new and different forms. In one sense,

there is much on which to look with satisfaction and even pride. After all, the incon-

trovertible bottom line of our collective effort across three presidential administra-

tions has been the avoidance of additional catastrophic attacks on the homeland. If

you look closely at the way in which our senior intelligence off‌icials describe the

homeland threat environment, there is a range of terrorism-related concerns we

confront as a nation, but the threat of mass casualty attack orchestrated by a foreign

terrorist organization like al Qaeda has diminished signif‌icantly.

1

At the same time, it is diff‌icult to look back on those twenty years of focused

national effort, with the massive application of resources and an extraordinarily

high human cost, and conclude that we have solved or signif‌icantly mitigated the

problem of terrorism and violent extremism. As former UK government off‌icial

Suzanne Raine recently argued, “[t]he uncomfortable truth is that there have been

no real changes to the underlying conditions that gave rise to the new wave of

* Nicholas Rasmussen held senior national security and counterterrorism positions across three

presidential administrations in the post 9/11 period. He concluded his government service as the

Director of the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) from 2014 to 2017. © 2021, Nichloas J.

Rasmussen.

1. See OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE

U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 23 (2021) (noting “Al Qaeda’s senior leadership cadre has suffered

severe losses in the past few years . . .”).

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