Reflections on the Ig’s Role, Stellarwind, and the Information Sharing Fiasco

Ref‌lections on the IG’s Role, Stellarwind, and the

Information Sharing Fiasco

Joel Brenner*

INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119

I. WHEN A PROGRAM IS HIGHLY SENSITIVE OR LIKELY TO BE

CONTROVERSIAL, THE IG SHOULD BEGIN TO REVIEW IT EARLY . . . . . . 120

II. YOU CANNOT BE RESPONSIBLE FOR OVERSEEING A PROGRAM IF YOU

DO NOT HAVE A COMPLETE UNDERSTANDING OF ITS TERMS . . . . . . . . 121

III. WHEN PEOPLE KNOW YOU HAVE A BIG STICK, YOU RARELY NEED TO

SWING IT. PERSUASION OFTEN GETS BETTER RESULTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121

IV. THE RULES GOVERNING INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION – NOT

OPERATIONAL OR TARGETING INFORMATION, BUT THE RULES ABOUT

WHAT CAN AND CANNOT BE COLLECTED – MUST BE MADE IN PUBLIC 122

V. INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES MUST CONTINUE TO HONOR THE “NEED TO

KNOW” PRINCIPLE. SEPARATING THE DUTY TO DISSEMINATE CLASSIFIED

INFORMATION AFTER 9/11 FROM THE DUTY TO PROTECT IT WAS A

FAILURE OF JUDGMENT THAT DIRECTLY CONTRIBUTED TO STRATEGIC

LOSSES OF INFORMATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

VI. TRUST IS EASY TO DESTROY AND HARD TO CREATE. EXPLAIN

YOURSELF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

VII. IGS CAN BE MORE EFFECTIVE BY REVIEWING OR AUDITING SOME

PROGRAMS WHILE THEY ARE ON-GOING, AND BEFORE MILESTONE

DECISIONS ARE MADE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

VIII. REGARDLESS OF WHAT THE STATUTES SAY, YOU’RE NOT

INDEPENDENT IF YOU CAN’T AFFORD TO QUIT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126

INTRODUCTION

I was sworn in as the Inspector General (IG) of the National Security Agency

(NSA) in April 2002, on the heels of the 9/11 attacks. Four months later, the NSA

director, Lt. Gen. Michael Hayden (USAF) read me into a top-secret collection

program called Stellarwind. The program had begun the month after the attacks.

It had two parts. Under the f‌irst part, NSA intercepted phone calls between per-

sons overseas who were known to be aff‌iliated with al Qaida and anyone in the

United States. Under the second part, NSA collected bulk phone call metadata

about all the phone calls made in the United States – not the content of the calls,

* Joel Brenner is a Senior Research Fellow at MIT’s Center for International Studies and a member

of the Intelligence Community Studies Board. He was the Inspector General of the National Security

Agency (2002-2006), the National Counterintelligence Executive (2006-2009), and Senior Counsel of

NSA (2009-2010). Early in his career he was a trial lawyer in the Antitrust Division of the U.S.

Department of Justice. © 2021, Joel Brenner.

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