Reexamining Kautilya and Machiavelli

• Author: Stuart Gray
• Published date: 01 December 2014
• Date: 01 December 2014
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0090591713505094
• Subject Matter: Articles

Political Theory

2014, Vol. 42(6) 635 –657

© 2013 SAGE Publications

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DOI: 10.1177/0090591713505094

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Article

Reexamining Kautilya

and Machiavelli:

Flexibility and the

Problem of Legitimacy

in Brahmanical and

Secular Realism

Stuart Gray1

Abstract

Since the rediscovery of the ancient Indian political thinker Kautilya and his

Arthaśāstra in the early twentieth century, scholars have argued for similarities

between his political thinking and Machiavelli’s, especially on the topic of

realism. Employing a new analytic approach to reexamine their political

thought, I locate unidentified tensions and overlaps between Machiavelli’s

secular ethic, which pulls towards autonomous standards, and Kautilya’s

political-theological ethic, which follows traditional brahmanical beliefs. In the

first part of the essay, I challenge existing interpretations of Kautilya’s thought

and clarify a coherent political theology in the Arthaśāstra. The second part

critically assesses their realist positions using the concepts of flexibility and

legitimacy. While I explain how the Machiavellian position poses justifiable

objections to the apparent repression and self-defeating nature of brahmanical

realism, I also argue that the Kautilyan position raises important questions

concerning both the flexibility and inflexibility of a secular realist position.

Keywords

Kautilya, Machiavelli, realism, comparative political theory

1Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD, USA

Corresponding Author:

Stuart Gray, Johns Hopkins University, 338 Mergenthaler Hall, 3400 North Charles Street,

Baltimore, MD 21218, USA.

Email: sgray32@jhu.edu

505094PTX42610.1177/0090591713505094Political TheoryGray

research-article2013

636 Political Theory 42(6)

In the early twentieth century and perhaps the earliest statement made by an

eminent western political thinker regarding the similarity between Machiavelli

and the Indian thinker Kautilya,1 Max Weber insightfully claimed: “A genu-

inely radical ‘Machiavellianism,’ in the popular sense of the word, received

its classical formulation in Indian literature as early as Kautilya’s Arthashastra.

. . . Machiavelli’s The Prince is harmless in comparison.”2 Following Weber,

many scholars have called attention to similarities between the political

thought of Machiavelli and Kautilya. For Machiavelli scholars, historians of

political thought, and comparative political theorists Weber’s evocative com-

parison to Kautilya remains intriguing, as he suggests Kautilya formulated a

“truly radical Machiavellianism” long before Machiavelli composed any

work. Weber’s claim further implies that aspects of Machiavelli’s political

thought may not be, from a cross-cultural perspective, as original as some

political theorists assume. This cross-cultural comparison also elicits the

question: contra Machiavelli’s assumptions, could an effective political the-

ology–based realism exist, and could it be more effective than a secular real-

ism?3 Roger Boesche follows Weber and argues that Machiavelli is,

comparatively speaking, a moderate realist on the topic of extralegal vio-

lence, further arguing that Kautilya is actually the first great political realist.4

One might then ask if Kautilya could counter a central Machiavellian claim:

perhaps separating a religious highest good from politics is unnecessary

when formulating a successful realist approach to politics, and maybe even

counterproductive.

While this position possesses some merit, previous scholarship has missed

Weber’s general point about Kautilya in the “Vocation” lectures, thus pre-

venting a deeper understanding of the important tensions and overlaps

between a brahmanical and secular realism. To begin, Kautilya’s and

Machiavelli’s conception of realism differ in a fundamental way. Weber sug-

gests Machiavelli’s significance rests not in his realism but rather in separat-

ing politics from religion and conceiving an autonomous political sphere,

thus making possible a distinct yet successful political ethic. As Weber points

out, Kautilya’s Arthaśāstra displays a more ruthless realism and remarkably

efficient responsiveness to a variety of political necessities. Machiavelli’s

originality and the comparison with Kautilya thus invoke the question of how

an effective political realism could be developed without being religiously

motivated.5 When revisiting Weber’s comment, the most intriguing aspect of

Kautilya’s political stance, from a cross-cultural perspective, is that it never

confronted the need to develop an autonomous political realism precisely

because of the brahmanical framework in which it was justified.

Building on these observations, this essay critically reexamines Kautilya’s

and Machiavelli’s realist political thought. Employing a new analytic