Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.: the Supreme Court clarifies a discrimination plaintiff's evidentiary burden in order to avoid judgment as a matter of law.

• Jurisdiction: United States
• Author: Chotiner, Adam S.
• Date: 01 October 2000

In Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 2000 WL 743663 (U.S. 2000), the Supreme Court resolved an issue which has stymied the labor and employment field for years, an issue the Court itself helped perpetuate in its 1993 decision St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). The issue: What quantum of evidence must an employment discrimination plaintiff proffer in order to survive judgment as a matter of law for the defendant-employer, once the employer produces evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged adverse employment action? In resolving this issue, the Court unanimously chose to ease the burden which various courts, including the 11th Circuit, previously had placed on discrimination plaintiffs.

Standards of Proof

The issue resolved in Reeves had its genesis over 30 years ago, when the Supreme Court, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), introduced the now-ubiquitous burden shifting analysis for employment discrimination cases in which the plaintiff is relying on circumstantial evidence. The analysis has three parts: First a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.[1] If a prima facie case is proven, it "creates a rebuttable `presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against' [the plaintiff]."[2] Next, in response to the prima facie case, the defendant-employer must articulate, but need not prove, a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action.[3] Once the defendant satisfies its burden of production, "the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted, and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity," in which the plaintiff has "a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."[4] The question splitting the courts for years had been, "what exactly does a plaintiff need to do in order to demonstrate pretext?"

At the same time that courts have grappled with the "pretext" issue, they have also attempted to mold a wholly separate analysis for employment discrimination cases when the plaintiff is relying on "direct evidence." The Supreme Court has described direct evidence, rather unhelpfully, as evidence "sufficient to show that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the particular employment decision such that a reasonable factfinder could draw an inference that the decision was made `because of the plaintiffs protected status."[5] Unfortunately, the cases which have attempted more particularly to define and categorize "direct evidence" have produced even murkier results than those involving circumstantial evidence and "pretext."[6] However, regardless of how one describes "direct evidence," it is clear that courts consider "direct evidence" and "circumstantial evidence" to be distinct standards of proof in the realm of employment discrimination.[7] This is significant, since a plaintiff who proves his or her case through direct evidence shifts the burden of proof, and not just the burden of production, to the defendant, which must then prove that it would have taken the same action even in the absence of the unlawful discrimination.[8]

Hicks: More Questions than Answers

In Hicks, the trial court found that the plaintiff had disproven the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons. Nevertheless, the trial court, in a bench trial setting, ultimately ruled in favor of the employer.[9] The appellate court reversed, holding that "[o]nce [a plaintiff] prove[s] all of [a defendant-employer's] proffered reasons for the adverse employment actions to be pretextual, [the plaintiff is] entitled to judgment as a matter of law."[10]

Justice Scalia's majority opinion in Hicks was clear in stating that the Court of Appeals was wrong in holding that rejection of the employer's proffered non-discriminatory explanation mandates judgment as a matter of law for the plaintiff.[11] However, in trying to explain what was the correct test to use, Justice Scalia's opinion in fact engendered a fierce split among, and even within, the circuit courts of appeal. Indeed, within just a few pages of one another, Justice Scalia's opinion seemingly gave both plaintiffs' and employers' counsel reason to celebrate:

[R]ejection of the defendant's proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination....[12]

It is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination.[13]

The former language seems to indicate that a jury is free to find intentional discrimination if, and only if, it rejects the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation. On the other hand, the latter language could be interpreted as requiring a plaintiff to submit some additional evidence, in addition to discrediting the employer's explanation, in order to avoid judgment as a matter of law. Justice Scalia assured that "[p]anic will certainly not break out among the courts of appeals" as a result of the Hicks decision.[14] Unfortunately, this seemingly innocuous prediction completely missed the mark; in fact, what resulted among the circuit courts of appeal was mass confusion.

Aftermath of Hicks

After Hicks, and based on the seemingly conflicting language contained therein, courts took two general approaches to the third part of the McDonnell Douglas test. On the one side was the "pretext" camp. These courts held that a plaintiff could satisfy his or her ultimate burden of proof by demonstrating, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was merely a "pretext" for discrimination and not worthy of belief.[15] On the other side were the "pretext-plus" courts, which required an employment discrimination plaintiff to provide some additional evidence of discrimination in addition to essentially disproving the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason.[16] In the 11th Circuit, opinions landed on both sides of the issue.[17]

Reeves: Supreme Court Rejects Pretext-Plus

Roger Reeves had worked for Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., for 40 years.[18] In 1995, Reeves was 57 years old serving as a supervisor for Sanderson when he was terminated.[19] Sanderson filed suit, claiming that he had been unlawfully terminated because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).[20] A jury returned a verdict in favor of Reeves,[21] and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed.[22]

Since Reeves' case was "based principally on circumstantial evidence," the Supreme Court, without...