Redistricting and Incumbent Reelection Success in Five State Legislatures

• Author: Harry Basehart,John Comer
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X9502300207
• Date: 01 April 1995
• Published date: 01 April 1995
• Subject Matter: Articles

241

REDISTRICTING

AND

INCUMBENT

REELECTION

SUCCESS

IN

FIVE

STATE

LEGISLATURES

HARRY BASEHART

Salisbury

State

University

JOHN

COMER

University

of

Nebraska

Does

redistricting

affect

the

election

success

of

incumbents?

Does

it

affect

the

electoral

fortunes

of

political

parties?

These

questions

are

examined

in

five

states

that

used

different

redistricting

processes

in

1991-1992

and

in

two

states

where

the

redistricting

process

changed

from

1981-

1982

to

1991-1992.

In

states

where

redistricting

was

highly

partisan,

parties

controlling

the

process

gained

politically.

In

states

where

redistricting

was

bipartisan,

that

is,

both

parties

were

involved,

neither

party

gained

an

advantage.

Likewise,

where

redistricting

was

nonpartisan,

that

is,

parties

were

excluded

from

the

process,

neither

party

gained

an

advantage

and

the

outcome

was

least

hospitable

to

incumbents.

Much

of

the

scholarly

interest

in

legislative

redistricting

can

be

reduced

to

two

interrelated

questions:

Does

redistricting

affect

the

reelection

of

incumbents,

and

does

it

affect

the

number

of

seats

each

party

wins?

The

answers

to

both

questions

remain

elusive.

Glazer,

Grofman,

and

Robbins

(1987)

found

that

redistricting

had

little

impact

on

parties

or

incumbents

in

Congress.

They

argue

that

the

need

to

compromise

in

drawing

district

lines,

particularly

where

state

government

is

divided

between

the

parties,

minimizes

the

prospect

that

parties

or

incumbents

will

gain

much

of

an

advantage.

Cain

(1985),

on

the

other

hand,

observes

that

congressional

redistricting

in

California

in

1980

enabled

the

Democrats

who

controlled

the

process

to

win

an

additional

five

seats.

King

(1989)

observes

that

partisan

bias

in

state

legislative

redistricting

occurs

in

states

where

one

party

Authors’ Note:

The

authors

wish

to

thank

Crystal

Mintzer

for

assistance

in

data

collection

and

Tom

Kazee

for

the

helpful

comments

on

an

earlier

version

of

the

article.

AMERICAN

POLITICS

QUARTERLY,

Vol

23

No

2, Apnl

1995

241-253

©

1995

Sage

Publications,

Inc