Redistributive Preferences and Protests in Latin America

• Published date: 01 October 2019
• Date: 01 October 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002719827370
• Author: Patricia Justino,Bruno Martorano
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Redistributive Preferences

andProtestsinLatin

America

Patricia Justino

1

and Bruno Martorano

2

Abstract

This article analyzes the role of individual redistributive preferences on protest par-

ticipation. The article focuses on Latin America, a region that has experienced sub-

stantial protests and demonstrations in the last decade, making use of individual-level

data on redistributive preferences and protest participationcollected across eighteen

countries in 2010, 2012, and 2014. The results show evidence for an association

between strong individual preferences for redistribution and participation in protests

motivated by the lowquality of services and institutions,failures to reduce corruption,

and perceived lower standards of living. The results are robust to alternative esti-

mators, samples, and model specifications and not affected by endogeneity concerns.

Keywords

protests, redistributive preferences, individual motivations, inequality, Latin America

Protests have erupted in many parts of the world following the global financial crisis

in 2007–2008 (Ortiz et al. 2013). In Latin America, anti-government protests have

seized the entire region over the last few years (Biekart, 2015; Lo´pez Garcı´a, 2017;

Moseley, 2015). Many of these events have involved large numbers of people across

all socioeconomic groups. For instance, in Brazil, protests that erupted during the

Confederations Cup in 2013 and the World Cup tournament in 2014 involved more

than 1.4 million people (Layton 2014).

1

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton, UK

2

Maastricht Graduate School of Governance/UNU-MERIT, Maastricht, the Netherlands

Corresponding Author:

Patricia Justino, Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, Falmer, Brighton BN1 9RE, United

Kingdom.

Email: p.justino@ids.ac.uk

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2019, Vol. 63(9) 2128-2154

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002719827370

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A large body of literature spanning decades has tried to understand what moti-

vates people to participate in protests and other social movements (Gurr 1970;

Huntington 2006; Tilly and Tarrow 2015). This literature has proposed a number

of explanations for individual participation in protests, including the role of emo-

tions such as anger, empathy, outrage, and pride (van Stekelenburg and Klander-

mans 2007; Goodwin and Jasper 2003); reactions against state repression (Tarrow

1989; Della Porta 1995); and the pursue of individual and group interests (Coleman

1974). A dominant explanation has been the role of economic inequality and relative

deprivation (Gurr 1970; Lichbach 1989; Boix 2008). Empirically, however, the

deprivation/inequality hypothesis has produced ambiguous results, with some stud-

ies finding a positive association between inequality and protests (Nollert 1995),

while others report either no relationship or a negative association between the two

phenomena (Dubrow, Slomczynski, and Tomescu-Dubrow 2008; Solt 2015). What

explains this discrepancy in empirical findings?

The argument that inequality and relative deprivation may drive protests is based

on the assumption that high (low) levels of inequality automatically result in higher

(lower) demand for redistribution from citizens at the bottom of the distribution.

This assumption has its origins in the pioneer work of Meltzer and Richard (1981),

who showed that rises in income inequality result in greater redistribution from the

rich to the poor in democracies where the median voter determines the outcome of

political competition. However, the Meltzer–Richard theoretical framework impli-

citly assumes that individual preferences and demands for redistribution will depend

on where the individual is located in the overall income distribution. In democracies

with high levels of inequality, the median voter is located closer to the poorest and

will, therefore, demand more redistribution. If demands are not met, the median

voter will either vote for the opposition in the next election (Meltzer and Richard

1981) or engage in contentious politics to press for more redistribution (Bruhn 2008;

Diaz-Cayeros, Estevez, and Magaloni 2012).

However, high levels of inequality will only lead to greater demands for redis-

tribution if they produce changes in individual preferences for redistribution. This

may not always happen. One reason has to do with levels of tolerance to inequality,

as illustrated by the famous tunnel parable of Hirschman and Rothschild (1973).

This parable describes how beliefs about redistribution are akin to drivers being

stuck in a traffic jam. These drivers have two choices when they observe the other

lane moving: get upset and move lanes or stay in their lane in hope that their lane will

start moving soon. Similarly, individuals may not demand further redistribution—

even if inequality rises—if they believe their lives will improve in the near future

(Alesina and Glaeser 2004). But, to date, the literature on contentious politics has

paid limited attention to the role of preferences in affecting individual propensity to

participate in collective protests, even though earlier literature had highlighted

the importance of redistributive preferences grounded on values and beliefs

(Gurr 1970).

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