Redesigning Democracy: More Ideas for Better Rules.

• Author: Bernholz, Peter
• Position: Book review

Redesigning Democracy: More Ideas for Better Rules

Hans Gersbach

Cham, Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2017, 248 pp.

In his speech in the House of Commons on November 11, 1947, Winston Churchill famously said, "Democracy is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time."

Churchill was and is still right. Even the best democracies have fundamental problems. The Hobbesian problem remains: a monopoly of government power, even if necessary to maintain the rule of law, can lead to the deterioration of democratic systems and the inadequate provision of public goods. Such a development can be currently seen in countries like Venezuela and Turkey.

But even if no fundamental threats to the rule of law occur as they have in Venezuela and Turkey, there are other hidden influences that can slowly erode individual liberty and extend the power of politicians in otherwise well-functioning democracies. And the electorate may not even perceive what is happening. The inadequate control of representatives by voters, particularly after they have been in office four or five years, is an important factor that contributes to eroding democracies.

Hans Gersbach has been trying to design better democratic systems since the 1990s. His new book, Redesigning Democracy: More Ideas for Better Rides, suggests political mechanisms to address some of the inherent problems in democracy. It comprises two different parts. The first part (Contractual Democracy) argues for contracts between political candidates and the citizens, thus allowing for post-election assessment of the candidates' promises. Gersbach focuses on the fact that inferior short-term projects that show results in the first election period may be selected over superior long-term projects that only come to fruition in the second election period. The second part of the book (Rules for Decision-Making and Agenda-Setting) argues that better political rules for agenda-setting can lead to more optimal outcomes in terms of divisible public goods.

In Part I, Gersbach proposes using contracts with political candidates to improve the democratic system. That produces obvious difficulties: it is impossible for millions of voters to enter into and assess contracts offered by political candidates. Gersbach suggests an independent authority that assesses the performance of the politicians in fulfilling the contract. The candidate who succeeds is rewarded...