Recruitment and Retention in British Army Reserve Logistics Units

• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16657320
• Published date: 01 October 2017
• Author: Patrick Bury
• Date: 01 October 2017
• Subject Matter: Mini-Forum on Recruitment

Mini-Forum on Recruitment

Recruitment and

Retention in British

Army Reserve Logistics

Units

Patrick Bury

1

Abstract

The British Army Reserve (AR), and in particular its logistics component, is

undergoing profound changes. The Future Reserves 2020 policy aims to expand the

AR and make it more deployable on operations. However, to date, FR20 has

struggled to attract the recruits required to man this more deployable reserve force,

despite recruitment campaigns offering increased monetary benefits. This study

sampled AR logistics soldiers’ reasons for joining, remaining in service, and mobi-

lizing when deployed. Consistent with the previous research, the study found that

soldiers who joined for institutional reasons were more associated with longer

career intentions and mobilizing for intrinsic reasons. Soldiers who joined for

occupational reasons were less satisfied with all elements of reserve service and

deployed in order to fulfill their contracts. These trends suggest that recruitment

campaigns that stress the pecuniary benefits of reserve service may attract soldiers

less committed to reserve service and deployments and who are harder to retain.

Keywords

institutional–occupational orientations, British Army Reserve, recruitment, reten-

tion, Future Reserves 2020

1

Security and Strategy Institute, University of Exeter, Devon, UK

Corresponding Author:

Patrick Bury, Strategy and Security Institute, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4PD, UK.

Email: pbb201@exeter.ac.uk

Armed Forces & Society

2017, Vol. 43(4) 608-631

ªThe Author(s) 2016

Reprints and permission:

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

DOI: 10.1177/0095327X16657320

journals.sagepub.com/home/afs

The British Army is currently in a period of the most significant organizational

transformation since the end of conscription in 1963. Driven by financial, and to a

lesser extent, strategic imperatives, how the army perceives its future missions and

how it organizationally orientates itself toward fulfilling them is changing. There are

many facets to these ongoing reforms—known as Army 2020—the most profound of

which is the reduction in regular army manpower from 102,000 in 2010 to 82,000 by

2020 (Ministry of Defence [MoD], 2012). A large proportion of these cuts to the

regular army have been focused on combat service support (CSS, or logistics)

personnel. Such a reduction in personnel has resulted in changes to the structure

and readiness of the army, and in particular, a renewed emphasis on the integration

of the Army Reserve (AR), the rebranded Territorial Army (TA). As part of the

Army 2020 reforms, the AR has been put on a tiered and rotational readiness system

similar to that used by the U.S. Army.

To deliver the greater capability required of the AR under Army 2020, the MoD’s

Consultation Paper, Future Reserves 2020: Delivering the Nation’s Security

Together (FR20), outlined significant changes to the role and size of the AR.

Although previous research has discussed how the TA has been utilized to date

(Dandeker et al., 2010), FR20 marked a major change to the AR’s role within British

defense, changing it from a strategic to an operational reserve force. It will now be

required to deploy routinely on operations and defense engagement tasks with and

without the regulars. Perhaps most importantly, FR20 seeks to offset the reduction in

regular personnel with a more deployable force of 30, 000 army reservists. This

requires the recruitment of over 10,000 new AR soldiers by 2019. It has also pledged

to spend £1.8 billion between 2013 and 2023 on pay, recruitment, equipment, and

better training and support for reservists in a bid to both attract new recruits and

retain existing soldiers, thereby raising the capability of the reserves to meet the new

deployment demands (MoD, 2013). However, the drive to recruit has proved pro-

blematic, despite FR20’s initial introduction of increased remuneration and welfare

packages (‘‘Army reservists to get military pensions and healthcare benefits,’’ The

Guardian, July, 3 2013). With the public proving resistant to joining in the numbers

required, recently joining bonuses for new reservists of £2,300, and other

bonuses for ex-regulars joining the reserves of up to £10,000, have been intro-

duced (‘‘£10,000 for troops to join reserves,’’ The Daily Mail, April 3, 2014).

The failure to recruit in the numbers required, and the need to increase the

reservist ‘‘offer,’’ have raised questions about the overall efficiency of a greater

reliance on the reserve. While the new measures have increased inflow, inter-

views with reservists have revealed that these bonuses have caused concerns

about the commitment of those joining the reserve under these enhanced terms.

(Group and individual interviews; June 13, 2015 and July 11, 2015.) Thus, the

better pecuniary benefits on offer raise the question as to whether the AR is

recruiting the personnel with the right kind of commitment to meet its increased

readiness burden. In short, is recruiting occupationally oriented soldiers organi-

zationally effective for the AR?

Bury 609