Reconciling the Arab Initiative with Israel's core requirement for peace.

AuthorBen-Meir, Alon

Executive Summary

The most momentous declaration to come out of the Arab world since Israel's inception in 1948 was the Arab Peace Initiative, launched in March 2002 in Beirut, Lebanon, and re-adopted by the Arab League in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, in March 2007. It would be tragic to allow the Initiative to languish, as it offers the most solid promise for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace. Moreover, the Arab Initiative has the potential to tackle the extremism that has engulfed the Middle East to the detriment of both Israel and the Arab states.

Essentially, the Initiative calls on Israel to agree to full withdrawal from the territories occupied since 1967; to arrive at a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem; and to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as the capital. Having spoken about the Initiative with scores of Arab and Israeli officials, I feel strongly that the demands made by the Initiative can be fully reconciled with Israel's core requirements for peace, which they have repeatedly stated as: 1) ensuring Israel's national security and territorial integrity; 2) sustaining Israel's Jewish national identity; 3) securing the unity of Jerusalem as Israel's capital while accommodating the Palestinian demands; and 4) establishing normal relations with the entire Arab world.

The failure to embrace the Initiative by the United States and Israel will send a dangerous message to the Arab states--especially after the Annapolis Middle East conference--that neither country is fully invested in ending the debilitating 60-year-old Arab-Israeli conflict. As such, the political agenda will remain susceptible to the movement of extremist Islamic groups.

The Arab states have decided to reintroduce the Initiative in part due to their heightened vulnerability emanating from the war in Iraq and its explosive regional implications. Many Arab leaders see an end to the Arab-Israeli conflict as a precondition to effectively addressing many of the problems plaguing the Middle East, as well as a means to stabilize the region and secure their political systems. Whereas Israel must begin to take specific measures to signal its intentions to end the occupation of the West Bank and the Golan Heights, the Arab states, other than Jordan and Egypt, must not sit on their hands and wait. They too must reach out to Israel and demonstrate that their Initiative is genuine and that they are ready to engage the Israelis on any level while remaining true to the Initiative's principles.

The Annapolis Middle East peace conference, held in November 2007, might have provided the impetus for continued negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians and opened the door for negotiations between Israel and Syria. Considering, however, the volatility of the region and the existence of extremist groups who are bent on scuttling the peace process, these negotiations will ultimately collapse unless the Arab Initiative, which represents the collective will of the Arab states, is fully behind them.

The changing regional dynamic

The diplomatic activity surrounding the reintroduction of the Saudi Initiative (now called the Arab Peace Initiative) (1) at the Arab League Summit in Riyadh in March 2007 is entirely different from the atmosphere when it was originally adopted during the League's Beirut meeting in March 2002. The convergence of ominous developments in the Middle East in the wake of the Iraq war have placed Israel in a better position strategically than it was five years ago to achieve a comprehensive peace with security.

In 2002, there was no war in Iraq, the second Intifadah (2) was raging, and Iran's ambitions to become the region's hegemon armed with nuclear weapons were far more muted. There was no major Sunni-Shiite conflict looming with the threat of engulfing the entire region, extreme Muslim radicalism was less developed, and the global Jihadi and Takfiri movement was markedly less ambitious. The situation is now reversed. To stem the tide of these ominous trends, peace with Israel has now become urgent, especially in the eyes of Arab Sunni leaders. Many are looking for ways to work with Israel such that the Arab public will allow them to coalesce more strongly against Iran and the growth of extremism, which the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in particular feeds into. In addition, because Syria is essential to producing a united Sunni front, ending the conflict with Damascus has assumed a new urgency.

Thus, the Initiative provides an historic opportunity to achieve a lasting and comprehensive peace between Israel and all Arab states. This is particularly critical as the Initiative offers, in the words of the former Foreign Minister of Jordan Dr. Marwan Musher, "Peace not only with Israel's neighbors but all Arab states, none excluded, which has always been a key Israeli demand." On the basis of the document itself and the intent of the Arab states behind it, the Initiative can be reconciled with Israel's four core requirements for making peace: 1) ensuring Israel's national security and territorial integrity; 2) sustaining Israel's Jewish national identity; 3) securing the unity of Jerusalem as Israel's capital while accommodating the Palestinians; and 4) establishing normal relations with the entire Arab world.

To accomplish this historic breakthrough, both Israel and the Arab states must carefully take into account the prevailing perceptions that have come to be accepted as realities, while ignoring certain realities on the ground that neither time nor circumstances can change. That is, although the requirements for a comprehensive peace can be pieced together, a successful breakthrough will depend on the ability of Arab and Israeli leaders to disabuse their respective communities of the notion that either side can have it all. Leaders from both sides need to cultivate a national mindset conducive to a peace agreement that will likely fall short of what the general public has been led to believe is possible. Neither Israel nor the Arab states can claim to seek a real peace if they do not show the flexibility necessary to resolve some of the most intractable issues separating them. The impetus to do so must lie in the mutual recognition that they now have a unique, if not historic, opportunity to capitalize on the changing regional and geopolitical dynamics (resulting from the Iraqi situation and Iran's regional ambitions) and thus can make peace with normal relations, a reality that has eluded them for the past 60 years.

It is in the context of these developments that the Initiative has become so critical. The Initiative calls on Israel to agree to full withdrawal from the occupied territories; to arrive at a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem, based on UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (3) and other resolutions including UN Security Council Resolution 242 (4); and to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as the capital. Prime Minister Olmert has so far rejected in principle the right of return and does not subscribe to full withdrawal from the territories. Nevertheless, the Israeli government sees positive elements in the Initiative, which in its original form was dismissed by the Sharon government after being adopted by the Arab League more than five years ago. Although the Middle East is in unprecedented turmoil, the new unfolding regional developments offer a genuine opportunity to dramatically advance the Arab-Israeli peace process.

The Arab Initiative in principle

It is important to note that the preamble of the Initiative contains elements that were used in past negotiations between Israel and Egypt and Israel and Jordan, specifically, principles enunciated in UN Security Council Resolution 242 (5). Similar negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians in the early 1990s led to the Oslo accords, although the negotiations in the summer of 2000 failed at the last minute. Israel and Syria also engaged with each other on the same basis during the mid-1990s, especially in December 1999 and March 2000 (6); however, in the end they too were unable to reach agreement, although an accord between the two states is considered by many Israeli and Syrian officials to be entirely within reach (7). From this brief summary, it is possible to surmise that, given the environment in which the Arab Initiative has been re-launched, it can certainly form the basis for future negotiations. The Initiative begins with this statement:

The Council of the League of Arab States at the Summit Level, at its 14th Ordinary Session,

- Reaffirms the resolution taken in June 1996 at the Cairo extraordinary Arab summit that a just and comprehensive peace in the Middle East is the strategic option of the Arab countries, to be achieved in accordance with international legality, and which would require a comparable commitment on the part of the Israeli government.

- Having listened to the statement made by his royal highness Prince Abdullah Bin Abdullaziz, the crown prince of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in which his highness presented his initiative, calling for full Israeli withdrawal from all the Arab territories occupied since June 1967, in implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, reaffirmed by the Madrid Conference of 1991 and the land for peace principle, and Israel's acceptance of an independent Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, in return for the establishment of normal relations in the context of a comprehensive peace with Israel.

The document then goes on to establish the critical principle that peace is the strategic option. In light of the fact (or in recognition of it) that this has been Israel's goal, albeit in accordance with national security and demographic requirements, the following clause in the Initiative stating that no military solution exists is of paramount importance:

Emanating from the...

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