Recognizing and Resolving Social Dilemmas in Supply Chain Public–Private Partnerships

• Date: 01 December 2013
• Published date: 01 December 2013
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/jbl.12033

Recognizing and Resolving Social Dilemmas in Supply Chain

Public–Private Partnerships

Matthew W. McCarter

1

and Darcy Fudge Kamal

2

1

University of Texas at San Antonio

2

Chapman University

The public–private partnership (PPP) is a popular strategy for creating global sustainable value. However, many PPPs struggle to realize

their value-added potential. Why do some public–private partnerships succeed while others fail, and how may those struggling succeed?

Combining supply-chain integration and social dilemma perspectives into the conversation of PPPs, we examine the dynamics and psychology

of cooperation necessary for PPP success. Addressing the first part of our research question, we recognize three social dilemmas that can mani-

fest while managing PPP supply chains: a give-some dilemma, a take-some dilemma, and a give-or-take-some dilemma. To address the second

part of our research question, we present a taxonomy of strategies resolving these PPP social dilemmas through the enhancement of trust, self-

efficacy, and social responsibility. We discuss implications for PPPs, supply-chain, and social dilemma literatures.

Keywords: cooperation; give-some dilemma; take-some dilemma; public–private partnership; social dilemma; supply-chain integration

INTRODUCTION

The public–private partnership (PPP) is a popular strategy for

achieving collective action in cities, states, and nations (Skelcher

2005). Furthermore, PPPs are capturing interest of supply-chain

management and public-policy scholars (Hodge and Greve 2007;

Yescombe 2007; Fawcett et al. 2011). One reason for a PPP’s

appeal involves enhancing social welfare (Linder 1999) through

“global sustainable value creation”(Mahoney et al. 2009, 1034)

that neither public nor private entities could achieve on their

own. The second appealing quality is that the risks and rewards

of PPPs are shared among partners (Ruben et al. 2007; Kov

acs

and Tatham 2009).

Despite their attractiveness, many PPPs struggle to create pro-

jected value (Hodge 2004). Because PPPs are to enhance social

welfare, their failure often brings heavy costs—not only on

exchange partners (e.g., damaged relationship) but—on third-

party stakeholders (e.g., tax payers and community members)

who rely on the PPP (Muraskin 1998). The struggle of PPPs

leads some to comment that PPPs “seem to have the potential to

address society’s most complex problems [but] often appear to

produce little of value”(Koschmann et al. 2012, 332). We

address the two-part research question “Why do some public-pri-

vate partnerships succeed while others fail, and how may those

struggling succeed?”

The psychology and dynamics of cooperation provide a foun-

dation to answer our research question. Weihe (2010) observes

that, while considerable research on PPP formation exists, little

research addresses how cooperation is generated and sustained

after PPPs are formed. Fawcett et al. (2011) suggest that, to cre-

ate value, PPPs must not only effectively integrate supply-chain

resources to create value but cooperatively share risks and

rewards.

We draw from two literatures to understand cooperation in

PPPs: supply-chain integration and social dilemmas. We submit

that sustaining cooperation in integrated PPP supply chains

creates three social dilemmas: the give-some dilemma, the take-

some dilemma, and the give-or-take-some dilemma (Dawes

1980; McCarter et al. 2011a). We offer a taxonomy of strategies

for navigating these social dilemmas through enhancing trust,

self-efficacy, and social responsibility among supply-chain part-

ners.

Our article makes three main contributions. First, our research

answers Weihe’s (2010) call for examining the microfoundations

to sustained cooperation in PPPs. Second, the PPP context neces-

sitates the introduction of take-some and give-or-take-some

dilemmas—complementing well-known give-some dilemmas—

into the supply-chain literature. Introducing these two social

dilemmas opens discussion on collective-action problems that

occur after supply-chain partners successfully pool resources.

Third, our taxonomy uses governance value analysis (Ghosh and

John 1999) to provide specific solutions to solve social dilemmas

for PPP supply chains.

The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Sec-

tion “PPPs and supply chain integration”reviews the supply-

chain integration literature germane to PPPs. Section “Recogniz-

ing PPP social dilemmas”recognizes that integration of PPP sup-

ply chains is a social dilemma, and discusses three social

dilemmas in PPPs. Section “Resolving PPP social dilemmas”

deduces a taxonomy of solutions resolving PPP social dilemmas.

Section “Discussion and conclusion”concludes with implications

of our taxonomy for PPP, supply-chain integration, and social

dilemma literatures.

PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND SUPPLY

CHAIN INTEGRATION

In our literature review, we followed the steps outlined by Cre-

swell (2008, 29–30). We identified initial keywords public-private

partnership and cross-sector partnership and searched EBSCO

and Google Scholar databases. We began with influential papers

Corresponding author:

Matthew W. McCarter, College of Business, University of Texas at

San Antonio, One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA;

E-mail: matthew.mccarter@utsa.edu

Journal of Business Logistics, 2013, 34(4): 360–372

© Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals