Recognizing and Resolving Social Dilemmas in Supply Chain Public–Private Partnerships
Date | 01 December 2013 |
Published date | 01 December 2013 |
DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/jbl.12033 |
Recognizing and Resolving Social Dilemmas in Supply Chain
Public–Private Partnerships
Matthew W. McCarter
1
and Darcy Fudge Kamal
2
1
University of Texas at San Antonio
2
Chapman University
The public–private partnership (PPP) is a popular strategy for creating global sustainable value. However, many PPPs struggle to realize
their value-added potential. Why do some public–private partnerships succeed while others fail, and how may those struggling succeed?
Combining supply-chain integration and social dilemma perspectives into the conversation of PPPs, we examine the dynamics and psychology
of cooperation necessary for PPP success. Addressing the first part of our research question, we recognize three social dilemmas that can mani-
fest while managing PPP supply chains: a give-some dilemma, a take-some dilemma, and a give-or-take-some dilemma. To address the second
part of our research question, we present a taxonomy of strategies resolving these PPP social dilemmas through the enhancement of trust, self-
efficacy, and social responsibility. We discuss implications for PPPs, supply-chain, and social dilemma literatures.
Keywords: cooperation; give-some dilemma; take-some dilemma; public–private partnership; social dilemma; supply-chain integration
INTRODUCTION
The public–private partnership (PPP) is a popular strategy for
achieving collective action in cities, states, and nations (Skelcher
2005). Furthermore, PPPs are capturing interest of supply-chain
management and public-policy scholars (Hodge and Greve 2007;
Yescombe 2007; Fawcett et al. 2011). One reason for a PPP’s
appeal involves enhancing social welfare (Linder 1999) through
“global sustainable value creation”(Mahoney et al. 2009, 1034)
that neither public nor private entities could achieve on their
own. The second appealing quality is that the risks and rewards
of PPPs are shared among partners (Ruben et al. 2007; Kov
acs
and Tatham 2009).
Despite their attractiveness, many PPPs struggle to create pro-
jected value (Hodge 2004). Because PPPs are to enhance social
welfare, their failure often brings heavy costs—not only on
exchange partners (e.g., damaged relationship) but—on third-
party stakeholders (e.g., tax payers and community members)
who rely on the PPP (Muraskin 1998). The struggle of PPPs
leads some to comment that PPPs “seem to have the potential to
address society’s most complex problems [but] often appear to
produce little of value”(Koschmann et al. 2012, 332). We
address the two-part research question “Why do some public-pri-
vate partnerships succeed while others fail, and how may those
struggling succeed?”
The psychology and dynamics of cooperation provide a foun-
dation to answer our research question. Weihe (2010) observes
that, while considerable research on PPP formation exists, little
research addresses how cooperation is generated and sustained
after PPPs are formed. Fawcett et al. (2011) suggest that, to cre-
ate value, PPPs must not only effectively integrate supply-chain
resources to create value but cooperatively share risks and
rewards.
We draw from two literatures to understand cooperation in
PPPs: supply-chain integration and social dilemmas. We submit
that sustaining cooperation in integrated PPP supply chains
creates three social dilemmas: the give-some dilemma, the take-
some dilemma, and the give-or-take-some dilemma (Dawes
1980; McCarter et al. 2011a). We offer a taxonomy of strategies
for navigating these social dilemmas through enhancing trust,
self-efficacy, and social responsibility among supply-chain part-
ners.
Our article makes three main contributions. First, our research
answers Weihe’s (2010) call for examining the microfoundations
to sustained cooperation in PPPs. Second, the PPP context neces-
sitates the introduction of take-some and give-or-take-some
dilemmas—complementing well-known give-some dilemmas—
into the supply-chain literature. Introducing these two social
dilemmas opens discussion on collective-action problems that
occur after supply-chain partners successfully pool resources.
Third, our taxonomy uses governance value analysis (Ghosh and
John 1999) to provide specific solutions to solve social dilemmas
for PPP supply chains.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. Sec-
tion “PPPs and supply chain integration”reviews the supply-
chain integration literature germane to PPPs. Section “Recogniz-
ing PPP social dilemmas”recognizes that integration of PPP sup-
ply chains is a social dilemma, and discusses three social
dilemmas in PPPs. Section “Resolving PPP social dilemmas”
deduces a taxonomy of solutions resolving PPP social dilemmas.
Section “Discussion and conclusion”concludes with implications
of our taxonomy for PPP, supply-chain integration, and social
dilemma literatures.
PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS AND SUPPLY
CHAIN INTEGRATION
In our literature review, we followed the steps outlined by Cre-
swell (2008, 29–30). We identified initial keywords public-private
partnership and cross-sector partnership and searched EBSCO
and Google Scholar databases. We began with influential papers
Corresponding author:
Matthew W. McCarter, College of Business, University of Texas at
San Antonio, One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249, USA;
E-mail: matthew.mccarter@utsa.edu
Journal of Business Logistics, 2013, 34(4): 360–372
© Council of Supply Chain Management Professionals
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