Rebuilding Labor Power in the Postindustrial United States

• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Author: Andrew Schrank
• Date: 01 September 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0002716219868672
• Subject Matter: Prescriptions: Jobs, Wages, and Regional Development

172 ANNALS, AAPSS, 685, September 2019

DOI: 10.1177/0002716219868672

Rebuilding

Labor Power in

the

Postindustrial

United States

By

ANDREW SCHRANK

868672ANN The Annals of the American AcademyRebuilding Labor Power in the Postindustrial U.S.

research-article2019

Workers in the United States have lost their voice (or

influence) in Washington and the workplace. Industrial

unions are ill-suited to the postindustrial economy, and

alternative organs of representation and influence (i.e.,

“alt-labor”) are trapped in a vicious circle of vulnerabil-

ity and volatility that limits their likely growth. As a

result of this, power is increasingly skewed toward

employers and their political allies, who add to labor’s

difficulties by eliminating and evading remaining labor

protections. The federal government could help to

restore a balance of power between workers and

employers by establishing and enforcing a robust wage

floor: (1) a $15 an hour minimum wage, (2) a nation-

wide hotline for workers who believe that their rights

had been violated (“911 for workers”), and (3) a data-

base that would allow regulatory agencies and worker

organizations to rationalize and coordinate labor and

employment law efforts. Doing so would produce a

positive feedback loop so workers regain their voice on

the job and in politics.

Keywords: organized labor; unions; workers; labor

law; minimum wage; regulation

Workers in the United States have lost their

voice. Union membership hovers at

approximately 10 percent of the labor force,

down from a postwar peak of more than 30

percent. Congress and the courts have banned

nonunion alternatives—like works councils and

joint consultation committees—that engage in

bilateral negotiations with employers. The

result is a “voice gap” (Adler 2003, 372; Colvin

2003, 712; Kaufman 2012, 466; Kochan et al.

2019, 3) that depresses wages and benefits, and

aggravates inequality, by altering the balance of

Andrew Schrank is Olive C. Watson Professor of

Sociology and International and Public Affairs at

Brown University. His research has appeared in leading

journals in political science, sociology, international

development, and Latin American studies. He is

the coauthor (with Michael Piore) of Root-Cause

Regulation: Protecting Work and Workers in the

Twenty-First Century (Harvard University Press 2018).

REBUILDING LABOR POWER IN THE POSTINDUSTRIAL U.S. 173

power between workers and employers on the job and in the broader political

sphere (Krueger 2018).

Observers of this dynamic part company over solutions that might help

America’s workforce to regain its voice. Some look to the New Deal for ideas and

push for legislation designed to revitalize the traditional labor movement (Compa

2016; Elk 2018). They hold that unions are down but not out and that judges and

politicians are the principal obstacles to their success. Others hold that labor law

reform is neither likely nor sufficient in an era of deindustrialization, automation,

and austerity (Theodore 2016, 160; Milkman and Luce 2017, 159; Hirsch and

Seiner 2018, 1731), and they look to “a deeper, pre-New Deal past” (Cowie 2016,

15) for inspiration. They place their faith in alternative labor (alt-labor)

arrangements—including immigrant rights organizations, worker centers, and

nonprofit law firms—that allegedly demand less state support.

I try to stake out a middle ground that restores worker voice and redresses

inequality not by bypassing but by building upon existing labor and employment

legislation. In particular, I hold that by raising the minimum wage established by

the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938 to $15 an hour, establishing a hot-

line for workers who believe that their rights at work have been violated (“911 for

workers,” or 911-4w), and building a database that would allow regulatory agen-

cies and worker organizations to use the data collected to rationalize and coordi-

nate their enforcement efforts, the federal government could establish and

enforce a robust national wage floor (Economic Policy Institute [EPI] etal. 2019)

that would simultaneously protect, embolden, and empower workers on the job

and in politics.

The key is to recognize and exploit the potentially positive feedback loop

between exit and voice (Hirschman 1970): when workers are able to demand

statutory protections and their enforcement, they are more likely to be better

paid in the labor market as a whole; when they are better paid in the labor market

as a whole, they are better able to threaten or survive exit from their incumbent

employers; when they are better able to threaten or survive exit from their

incumbent employers, they are better able to exercise voice in politics and the

workplace; and when they are better able to exercise voice in both arenas, they

are better able to demand statutory protections that further boost wages and

benefits and their enforcement. Taken together, therefore, an enforceable wage

floor should not only turn bad jobs good but simultaneously foster the growth of

a virtuous circle of (potential) exit and (actual) voice at the firm and societal levels

down the road.

I make the case for a meaningful wage floor in five principal sections. First, I

describe the limits to the New Deal model in an era of deindustrialization, auto-

mation, and decentralized production. Industrial unions presuppose an industrial

economy, I argue, and large-scale industry is a thing of the past. Second, I discuss

the achievements and limitations of alt-labor against the backdrop of the New

Deal model. While alternatives to industrial unions are long overdue, in light of

the breakdown of mass production and the growth of the service sector, they are

unlikely to achieve their goals by sidestepping the political process or embracing

the “militant voluntarism” (Cowie 2016, 37; see also Duff 2014, 874; Jacobs 2018,