Rebel Territorial Control and Civilian Collective Action in Civil War: Evidence from the Communist Insurgency in the Philippines

• DOI: 10.1177/0022002719863844
• Published date: 01 February 2020
• Date: 01 February 2020
• Author: Michael A. Rubin
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Rebel Territorial Control

and Civilian Collective

Action in Civil War:

Evidence from the

Communist Insurgency

in the Philippines

Michael A. Rubin

1

Abstract

Under what conditions do rebel organizations control territoryduring civil war? How

do civilians influence the distribution of territorial control? This article introduces a

civilian agency theory, emphasizing community collective action capacity (CAC)

defined by underlying social network structure, to complement existing explanations

of territorialcontrol. I argue communitieswith greater CAC mobilize information and

resources more efficiently, increasing belligerents’ incentives to control territory.

However, CAC also increases community bargaining power to demand costly

investments in governance, partially offsetting these gains. CAC increases rebel con-

trol in areas of state neglect. But, as state service provision increases, communities

leverage CAC to demand prohibitively costly rebel governance, deterring rebel

control. Thisarticle tests the theory inthe context of the communist insurgency in the

Philippines, using military intelligence reports from 2011 to 2014 to measure village-

level communist insurgent territorial control and a household-level census (2008–

2010) to measure village CAC. Interviews with village elders in Eastern Mindanao

illustrate causal mechanisms and explore alternative explanations.

1

Center for Peace and Security Studies, Department of Political Science, University of California San

Diego, La Jolla, CA, USA

Corresponding Author:

Michael A. Rubin, Cen ter for Peace and Secur ity Studies, Depart ment of Political Sci ence, University

of California San Diego, Soc ial Sciences Building, 9500 Gilman Drive #0521, La Jol la, CA 92093, USA.

Email: mrubin@ucsd.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2020, Vol. 64(2-3) 459-489

ªThe Author(s) 2019

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0022002719863844

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Keywords

civil wars, insurgency, asymmetric conflict, conflict, rebellion

The distribution of belligerents’ control over territory, and the population and

resources within it, is central to understanding civil wars. Territorial control shapes

a variety of conflict processes including civilian collaboration (Kalyvas 2006) and

participation (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), belligerents’ use of violence (Hum-

phreys and Weinstein 2006; Kalyvas 2006; Weinstein 2007), conflict intensity and

duration (Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009), rebel governance (Mampilly 2011;

Stewart 2018), state-building and economic development. As Arjona (2015, 1) has

put succinctly: “at core, all civil wars are a battle for control between a government

and its competitors over civilians and the territory upon which they reside.” If

territorial control is as crucial to understanding civil war as the literature suggests,

it is essential to understand its origins.

Existing research privileges structural military, economic, and geographic factors

and civilians’ political interests and identity to explain the distribution of territorial

control. Both revolutionary (Guevara [1961] 2002; Mao [1937] 2000) and counter-

insurgency (Galula [1964] 2006; Nagl et al. 2008) doctrine emphasize the impor-

tance of manipulating civilian interests, to win popular support, as necessary to

achieving military success. This article contributes to the literature by emphasizing

the role of civilian capabilities. I argue community collective action capacity

(CAC)—the ability to mobilize collective action to pursue common interests—

influences rebel groups’ territorial control, and that its effect is moderated by the

community’s outside options for protection from violence and access to basic ser-

vices, primarily from the state.

1

Because communities with greater CAC gather resources and control access to

information more efficiently, belligerents prefer to control territory in which com-

munities possess high CAC, all else equal. Nevertheless, CAC may also empower

communities to hold belligerents accountable to higher standards of (costly) govern-

ance, cutting against benefits to territorial control. Civilians may reward (punish)

belligerents that promote (violate) community interests (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter

2011; Condra and Shapiro 2012; Shaver and Shapiro 2016). As the weaker side in

asymmetric conflict, rebels are especially dependent on support, and vulnerable to

retribution, from the population.

These countervailing mechanisms imply a conditional relationship. Where the

state cannot provide basic services and security (weaker outside options), CAC

encourages rebel control. The community accepts rebel control at low investment

in governance because even minimal rebel governance improves the status quo.

Therefore, rebels’ surplus benefits associated with higher CAC outweigh the

expected governance costs. As community access to state services increases

(stronger outside options), CAC deters rebel control. The community leverages

460 Journal of Conflict Resolution 64(2-3)