Rebel Taxation as Extortion or a Technology of Governance? Telling the Difference in India’s Northeast

• Published date: 01 March 2025
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140241237472
• Author: Zachariah Mampilly,Shalaka Thakur
• Date: 01 March 2025

Article

Comparative Political Studies

2025, Vol. 58(3) 462–493

© The Author(s) 2024

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140241237472

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Rebel Taxation as

Extortion or a

Technology of

Governance? Telling the

Difference in India’s

Northeast

Zachariah Mampilly

1

and Shalaka Thakur

2

Abstract

Payments made to non-state armed groups are often treated as predation. But

rebel organizations deploy multiple logics when constructing their taxation

systems, many of which cannot be reduced to extortion. Rebels also use

taxation as a “technology of governance”to resolve a number of social and

political challenges related to constructing a wartime order. Drawing on

extensive subnational research in four distinct areas of control by a single

organization, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah, we argue

that two factors, political legitimacy and military control, determine whether

taxes are extortive or deployed as a technology of governance. Our con-

trolled comparison shows that rebels frequently implement a wider variety of

taxes than commonly presumed and that these different categories of taxation

are shaped by the larger social and political context in which the group

operates.

Keywords

rebel governance, rebel taxation, Nagaland

1

CUNY, New York, NY, USA

2

Geneva Graduate Institute, Geneva, Switzerland

Corresponding Author:

Zachariah Mampilly, Marxe School, CUNY, 55 Lexington Ave, New York, NY 10010, USA.

Email: zachariah.mampilly@baruch.cuny.edu

Many army [personnel], ministers, prime ministers have tried to stop us from

collecting. But they cannot! They can never stop the NSCN from collecting

taxes. They cannot stop this contribution to the movement.

- NSCN-IM Minister (Kilonser)

1

.

Introduction

In Dimapur, the commercial center and largest city in Nagaland, a long

running insurgent organization regularly visits civilian homes seeking a

payment. Families are expected to contribute around 250 Indian Rupees

(

contribute, forcing the collectors to return multiple times. Despite possessing

the capacity to punish shirkers with violence and other punitive measures,

often, the collectors return empty handed. Even if the payment is collected, the

cost of visiting households, both f‌inancially and in terms of popular support,

likely exceeds the value of the contribution. Considering the cost, why would

an insurgency devote so much effort to collecting such payments?

Armed groups around the world frequently collect “taxes”from civilians

and businesses. Yet the nature of these payments–upon whom they are levied,

in what manner and for what purpose–remains relatively opaque. Instead,

many analyses start by assuming that any payment made to a non-state armed

group is a form of extortion in which the group threatens to deploy force in

order to extract the funds necessary for its survival (Collier, 2000;Sabates-

Wheeler & Verwimp, 2014). Writing in the New York Times about the Islamic

State, for example, the former Brookings Institution analyst Charles Lister

(2015) rejects the idea that payments to non-state groups can ever be referred

to as “taxes”at all: “By way of such taxation -- or more correctly, extortion.”

This despite him acknowledging that funds were collected on a regular

schedule based on publicly announced rules and procedures, often considered

the key criteria for distinguishing between a tax and arbitrary and unpre-

dictable looting (Revkin, 2020, p. 757; Suykens, 2015, p. 150).

There are both conceptual and empirical reasons to be wary of treating all

payments to a rebel group as extortion. It cannot account for the variety of

taxation practices armed groups engage in, nor can it explain taxes that are

revenue neutral or even negative, i.e., the cost of collection is more than the

revenue it brings in. To return to the example above, based on off‌icial budget

documents from the rebel organization’s own Ministry of Chaplee (Finance)

Affairs, we calculate the total amount of money brought in by the “house tax”

represents only about 0.5% of the organization’s total income,

2

a pittance

considering the manpower devoted to collecting it. To put this into per-

spective, the total house tax collected is less than a f‌ifth of what the group

budgeted for uniforms for the Naga Army in 2019.

Mampilly and Thakur 463

In this paper, we argue that beyond its revenue generation function, rebel

taxation should also be understood as a “technology of governance”that

resolves a number of political, organizational, and f‌inancial challenges for

armed groups as they seek to advance their strategic objectives. These include

the need to generate popular support and develop a larger wartime order, a

desire to build and maintain discipline within the organization, and the ability

to sustain a viable economy that can ensure civilian livelihoods during war.

While extortion certainly exists, many forms of rebel taxation are shaped by

political considerations related to the nature of the military struggle and the

nuanced dynamics that def‌ine rebel-civilian relations (Krause et al., 2023). As

a result, rebel tax practices ref‌lect attempts to balance their need for revenue

against both the costs of collection as well as the other political purposes for

which taxes have historically been levied.

Recent scholarship has begun to shed light on the political dynamics of

taxation by armed groups (Gilbert, 2022;Jackson, 2018;Krauser, 2020;

Mampilly, 2021). Based on a study of Islamic State taxation, Revkin (2020),

for example, concludes “that ideology and the costs of warfare were both

important determinants of IS’s pattern of taxation”(p. 763). Through a

statistical analysis of 247 armed groups, Breslawski and Tucker (2021) argue

that Marxist groups are more likely to utilize taxation and “that armed groups’

decisions to tax civilians are not explained exclusively, or even predominantly,

by economic factors”(p. 347). In this paper, we build on these insights re-

garding the non-economic functions of rebel taxation. But our goal is not only

to assess the impact of ideology. Instead, we hold ideology constant by taking

advantage of the subnational variation in the tax practices of a single orga-

nization, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-

IM). By leveraging subnational variation in the rebel taxation system across

four different areas, we identify the specif‌ic factors that led to the im-

plementation of distinct taxation regimes across space.

3

Specif‌ically, we

suggest that two factors–political legitimacy combined with military control–

shape the nature and types of taxes that a specif‌ic group will implement.

We begin with a historical examination of NSCN-IM taxation in order to

identify the often contradictory forces that shape the development of a rebel

taxation system. We show how it evolved from the relatively simple practice

of collecting “donations”to a sprawling system with multiple categories of

taxes, each operating according to distinct logics based on who they targeted

as well as the reasons for their implementation. Drawing on extensive

f‌ieldwork within four distinct areas under varying degrees of political and

military control by a single group, we then show how these forces led to

different taxation regimes being implemented in each. We f‌ind that, rather than

driven by a revenue maximizing imperative–as the logic of extortion would

predict–the political and military context in which the group operates de-

termines the nature of the taxation regime. We conclude by showing how such

464 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

an approach can improve understanding of rebel taxation systems as well as

move the study of rebel governance forward.

History and Structure of NSCN-IM Taxation

The NSCN-IM is one of the largest non-state armed groups in Northeast India,

a region def‌ined by a cornucopia of low intensity conf‌licts that render it among

the most militarized in the country. Founded in 1988, the organization

emerged out of the struggle for Naga nationhood that has waxed and waned

for seven decades. The conf‌lict has its roots in both the distinct history of

colonial domination and in the unequal development that has def‌ined the

region since its incorporation into India in 1948.

4

By the 1950s, the conf‌lict

had turned violent. Initially unif‌ied under the Naga National Council (NNC),

the turn to violence led to a splintering of the nationalist movement. In 1975,

the NNC signed the Shillong Accord with the Government of India (GoI),

which required it to abandon the armed struggle. Some rebel leaders rejected

the decision to disarm, leading to the creation of the NSCN.

By 1980, the NSCN had emerged as the preeminent armed faction. In 1988,

tensions between its leaders led to a further split and the creation of the NSCN-

IM, named for its founders, Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah. In

1997, the NSCN-IM signed a ceasef‌ire agreement with India that remains in

force today. Today, a variety of different groups operate coterminously

throughout Nagaland and neighboring states, sometimes clashing but often

forging fragile agreements with both each other and the GoI that have kept the

conf‌lict low in intensity for decades (Baruah, 2020;Hanson, 2021;Hazarika,

1995;Sarbahi, 2014). As Staniland (2021) notes, these conf‌licts can take a

“variety of forms, from intense warfare to close alliances to enduring limited

cooperation arrangements”(p. 128).

To understand NSCN-IM taxation, it is necessary to examine previous

efforts at collecting funds by armed Naga organizations. One of the challenges

of studying taxation in Nagaland is that different subgroups have distinct

attitudes concerning payments to a political authority–either state or non-

state–ref‌lecting the diversity of different communities that constitute Naga

identity and their distinct relationships to both the GoI and Naga nationalism.

These varying attitudes towards payments can make it challenging to dis-

tinguish between a donation, a tax and extortion. For example, some Naga

dialects use the same word for both taxation and extortion. While others, like

the Sumi subgroup, distinguish asuqha (tax) from suxakuchu (extortion) with

the former referring to a household contribution to the common good while the

latter refers to a payment taken forcefully out of fear of penalty.

5

While we recognize these attitudinal differences towards payments among

Naga subgroups, we maintain that it is possible to distinguish taxation from

donations and extortion. One way to do this is to ask why civilians comply

Mampilly and Thakur 465

with demands for payment? As captured by the Sumi word for taxation, a key

aspect of how some Naga differentiate taxation from extortion revolves

around the question of consent, a dynamic that centers individual rationality

and its relationship to coercion. While donations suggest compliance driven

purely by individual choice and hence free from coercion, extortion relies

solely or at least primarily on the threat of violence. Taxation, meanwhile,

suggests compliance undergirded by both coercion and social pressure.

Even those who criticize Naga armed groups, recognize that tax com-

pliance is driven by more than fear of individual harm. For example, when

asked why Nagas comply with rebel taxation demands, Mar Longkumer, a

spokesperson for Against Corruption and Unabated Taxation (ACAUT), an

NGO that lobbies against rebel taxation, offered the following:

Naga society is close knit. We all know each other. Stigma and shame of

exposure is very powerful in Naga society. It is how social cohesion is

maintained.

6

This suggests that in order to understand taxation among the Naga, it is

necessary to appreciate both the coercive capacity of the armed group as well

as the overlapping and often contradictory social logics including stigma,

shame, and pride that drive individual compliance.

According to NSCN-IM members, as well as civilians we interviewed, the

collection of ‘taxes’from people and organizations has its roots in the in-

ception of the Naga nationalist movement. While some claim that the

movement began collecting donations as early as 1927, it was not until the

1950s after the NSCN-IM’s predecessor organization, the NNC, established

the Federal Government of Nagaland (FGN), that tax collection began in

earnest. Money was needed to purchase arms, to feed the cadre and pay for

their children’s school fees, to conduct a census of the remote populations

scattered throughout the region, and to cover the travel costs for Naga dip-

lomats. Under the FGN, there was a “Ration Tax”that was levied in order to

raise funds to feed the Naga Army, a “House Tax”that doubled as a census,

and a “Commercial Tax”placed on businesses. These were distinct from the

voluntary donations from businesses and civilians, of which there were plenty

in the early days of the movement, according to our informants.

The NSCN-IM claims that its taxation system is based on the foundation

laid by its predecessor, particularly in regards to its routinization and the

widespread acceptance of the principle of rebel taxation by the Naga pop-

ulation (see Suykens, 2015, pp. 150–152). As explained by one NSCN-IM

Minister, the organization viewed itself as the natural successor to the FGN/

NNC: “[As] we gained more training and weapons from Bangladesh, the

NSCN reoccupied the places that the NNC left through the 80s and 90s.”A

“legitimate government”would always collect taxes and it was thus the right

466 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

of any government, which he argued is currently the NSCN-IM: “With the

NSCN it is the same people, same systems. It is like BJP is gone, Congress

comes.

7

Similarly NNC is gone, NSCN has come.”

8

Despite these claims of continuity, following the signing of the ceasef‌ire

agreement, the method and amount of taxation changed considerably. In-

terviewees who experienced NSCN-IM taxation before and after the ceasef‌ire

described this change in different ways. According to key members of the

apex Naga civil society organization, the Naga Hoho, tax collection shifted

towards a more coercive and less voluntary approach after the ceasef‌ire:

[Before the ceasef‌ire] it was a ‘loyalty tax.’It was not an imposition. It is like, I

am also willing to be a part of it [the movement], you are also. It was paying as a

loyalty to your movement–they should give service tax in a way of donation.

Now the question of voluntary does not arise.

9

A retired Indian Administrative Service off‌icer of Naga descent summed

up the post-ceasef‌ire shift in this way: “The whole purpose for which the

conf‌lict had begun became a turf war regarding taxation.”

10

He claimed that

the conf‌lict switched from a rebellion against the state to one between armed

groups, a fact he attributed to the GoI becoming the dominant source of

income and revenue to be taxed. In other words, as competition between rival

groups grew, payments were more often ‘levied’rather than solicited as

donations.

A Naga journalist agreed, “The nature of the war economy changed along

with it [the ceasef‌ire]. The more fragmented it got, the more problematic the

issue of taxation got.”

11

He suggested that a “ceasef‌ire generation”born after

1997 had come of age never knowing the conditions that led the Naga to pick

up arms in the f‌irst place. Nor did they experience what life under a single

unif‌ied armed group was like. Instead, younger Naga were more likely to be

disillusioned with all armed groups, viewing them as corrupt and coercive

rather than representing the interests of the Naga people. A pastor in Dimapur

summed up:

During my childhood, every household gave a kilo of rice to them every month.

People would give joyfully because there were no factions. Today,every faction

says they are the original and they are legitimate. So whom to follow? That is the

problem today.

12

The taxes collected by the NSCN-IM have expanded and diversif‌ied

through the years. According to the NSCN-IM Home Minister (Kilo Kilo-

nser), stability between the government and the rebels has allowed the or-

ganization to increase the variety of taxes it imposes as well as the amount of

Mampilly and Thakur 467

revenue they generate: “Before we couldn’t collect 100% because of dis-

turbances and hindrances are there. Now we can collect as per our law.”

13

The political wing of the NSCN-IM, known as the Government of the

People’s Republic of Nagaland (GPRN), sets tax policies for all areas under its

control. Within this body, the Steering Committee and the Council of Min-

isters (Kilonsers) make the decisions regarding types and levels of taxation

and directs the Finance Ministry (also called the Chaplee Ministry) to im-

plement them. When there are irregularities in collection or with individuals

and communities who resist, tax collection is shifted to the Naga Army who

are reputed to be more stringent. A certain amount of the tax collected in each

district under the NSCN-IM is kept by the Chief Administrative Off‌icers

(CAO) for use within their district. The rest is, or at least is supposed to be,

passed on to the Central Command at Camp Hebron, the group’s headquarters.

While it is tempting to conclude that rebel taxation became more coercive

over time as a result of the ceasef‌ire, interviews in some areas provide ev-

idence to the contrary. According to one village chief:

Before the ceasef‌ire, it was terrible. [They would] beat us black and blue. They

would come, but they would not stay in the village. You would have to make it

reach them in the jungle. Now, the NSCN cadre, they are more polite.

14

He quickly added, “But sometimes, the politeness does not linger for long.”

This suggests that a chronological approach to NSCN-IM taxation that

demarcates the pre and post-ceasef‌ire periods is insuff‌icient as populations

located within different areas had substantially different views on the nature of

NSCN-IM taxation. (We will return to the impact of the ceasef‌ire in the case

studies below). Instead, as we will discuss, it is essential to consider the

subnational spatial variation in political and military control and how this

shapes the actual taxation regime put in place.

Categories of Rebel Taxation Implemented by the

NSCN-IM

Part of the challenge of comprehending the logic of rebel taxation is that many

studies focus on taxation at checkpoints or sites of natural resource extraction

(for examples, see Krauser, 2020;S´

anchez de la Sierra, 2020;Schouten,

2023). These are important areas of study both because they constitute a major

revenue source for armed groups and because they allow scholars to gather

data in a concentrated fashion that can be analyzed using quantitative

methods. They also offer clear policy takeaways that have already been acted

upon by governments and international organizations (Mampilly, 2021).

Yet, the focus on these sites distorts understanding of the larger phe-

nomenon of rebel taxation. Focusing on checkpoints and other extractive sites

468 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

elides numerous forms of taxation that armed groups frequently implement,

such as taxes on households, service taxes, taxes on small businesses, or those

levied on household items and other basic goods. Checkpoint taxes also differ

from other types of taxes as they do not require the armed group to maintain a

relationship with a specif‌ic constituency over a prolonged period, but are by

nature def‌ined by episodic control over frequently shifting terrain (Schouten,

2023). In addition, many armed groups do not engage in such practices while

collecting other types of taxes. As such, drawing conclusions from studies of

sectors def‌ined by extraction is akin to studying state taxation practices by

focusing on import taxes while ignoring income, sales and other taxes that

affect many more people, even as they may generate less revenue.

To address these concerns, we begin instead by cataloging the full range of

taxes that the NSCN-IM collects. These can be grouped into f‌ive broad

categories including a ration tax, household tax, commercial tax, service tax

and other miscellaneous taxes including vehicle taxes and taxes collected at

checkpoints. These categories were initially provided to us by the NSCN-IM,

but were conf‌irmed by examining budget reports, interviewing Indian security

forces, and consistent with our theoretical focus on civilian perceptions,

through interviews with people paying each category of taxes across our case

studies.

The “Ration Tax”is collected from the village council by the Naga Army.

Traditionally, it was a f‌ixed amount paid in the form of rice. Through this tax,

in the words of one rebel leader, “every family contributes to the sustenance of

the Naga Army.”

15

Apart from the money allocated by the Finance Ministry,

the Naga Army is expected to sustain itself from the ration tax collected from

the villages located near each unit’s camp.

As described in the opening, the “Household Tax”also doubles as a way to

conduct a census, and for the GPRN government to keep track of its wards. An

annual sum of around 250 rupees is collected from each household. Even in

the most impoverished villages, this is a nominal amount of money. In towns

and cities, there are collectors who take the money by going door to door. In

rural areas, the village headman is expected to collect the tax from each

household. Given the small amount, collection is relatively non-coercive even

as it occasionally generates resistance (mostly through shirking) among Naga

civilians. Where there is resistance, “diff‌icult areas”

16

in the words of a former

Finance Minister, the rebels deploy special collectors.

Both the ration tax and the household tax generate little revenue, and in the

case of the latter, may even be revenue negative. When we asked Royem Chu,

the Deputy Secretary of the NSCN-IM Finance Ministry, why bother col-

lecting such taxes at all considering the costs, he responded: “Just to know that

they are members of the Nagas. It has nothing to do with big revenues”

17

(see

also Suykens, 2015, p. 151).

Mampilly and Thakur 469

The bulk of NSCN-IM revenue from taxes is derived from the “Com-

mercial Tax”that is levied on businesses. It is the responsibility of the Finance

Ministry which deploys collectors to assess each business operating within

NSCN-IM areas of inf‌luence. There is considerable variation in the collection

of the commercial tax which is a feature of the tax collection regime that

allows for the rebels to negotiate actual rates directly with tax payers. Ac-

cording to a Naga contractor from a NSCN-IM area of inf‌luence: “Like the

Indian government, NSCN-IM does [tax collection] systematically, usually

charging 5%. But I can negotiate with them also. It depends on the area

commander/controller.”

18

In the words of an electronic store owner, “Ev-

eryone negotiates. It’s a bargaining system.”

19

As with the payment of the

household tax, the majority of businesspeople and contractors we interviewed

attested that they received a receipt upon payment of the tax and that collectors

would provide a phone number they could contact to negotiate payment. If the

cut taken was less than the off‌icial rate as a result of negotiations with the area

commander, they were not given a receipt, a dynamic they viewed as creating

a large scope for corruption.

In addition to the commercial tax, some businesses also have to pay sector

specif‌ic taxes. For example, a large source of NSCN-IM revenue comes from

taking a cut from all contracts awarded for infrastructure and building. The

rate of tax on different contract works is determined centrally by the Tatar

Hoho, the parliament equivalent within the GPRN. Some business people,

including transporters, have to pay both the lump sum (in the form of a

godown tax) as well as the taxes at checkpoints within NSCN-IM controlled

territory, fueling resentment.

The commercial tax is usually collected in a regularized manner in areas

where the NSCN-IM has a high degree of territorial control. In fragmented

areas, tax collection is more ad hoc, and does not stick to the centrally de-

termined rates. While a few businesspeople and contractors expressed a

willingness to pay the rebel government and consider it their duty, on the

whole, taxes on commercial actors are more often accompanied by threats

compared to other taxes. Our informants reported an almost ubiquitous role of

death threats, kidnapping and shootings with regard to the various commercial

taxes, making it diff‌icult to distinguish whether they should be considered a

tax or simply extortion. When asked why he did not report the rebels, one

printing shop owner suggested that the police “are involved with the un-

derground groups.”

20

Even when the police do make an arrest, a different store

owner suggested that rebel cadres are rarely arrested and will continue their

threats upon being released. According to our informants, in areas where the

NSCN-IM has a stronger presence, the police do not interfere with the rebels

at all.

A“Service Tax”is collected from every Indian government employee who

works in NSCN-IM territory. Initially,2% of their ann ual salary was deducted,

470 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

though around 2017 this was reduced to 1% after various other Naga armed

groups started taxing government workers as well. According to an interview

with an NSCN-IM off‌icial, this reduction was done to “lift the burden,”though

it is as likely due to resistance the group encountered.

Apart from the regular service tax, ad hoc demands for payments are often

made on government employees. How likely an employee is to concede is

determined by their position, the specif‌ic agency they work for and their

individual discretion. In interviews, it appeared that ad hoc demands for

payment were made of Sub-Divisional Off‌icers more frequently than from

higher up off‌icials like the Deputy Commissioner (DC), the highest ranking

GoI off‌icial within a district. While DCs are rarely targeted for direct pay-

ments, they are frequently pressured by the rebels regarding who should be

awarded specif‌ic contracts or government schemes. While some DCs do

attempt to resist, many who have taken a stand were forced out of the district

due to rebel threats, a pattern that suggests that this tax also frequently crosses

the line into extortion.

In addition to the above four categories, the NSCN-IM also levies a number

of miscellaneous taxes. Following the ceasef‌ire, it has worked to increase and

systematize these additional taxes. For example, individuals and businesses

who own a car or truck are expected to pay the “Vehicle tax”in order to

operate it within NSCN-IM territories. The amount of the tax paid annually is

determined by the type of vehicle and its size. Some portion of the collected

money goes to the CAO of a region where the vehicle is registered with the

rest going to the Finance Ministry (the IM controlled area is divided into

26 regions). In addition, trucks and vans carrying goods also pay taxes at

NSCN-IM checkpoints based on the size of the vehicle and what they are

carrying. Higher value items (like betel nut) are taxed up to six times as much

as fruits and vegetables, demonstrating a progressive logic in checkpoint

taxation (Thakur, 2023).

Some of the above categories are usually seen as more predatory than

others. For example, the service tax levied upon Indian government em-

ployees or taxes at checkpoints were more commonly referred to as extortion

as compared to the household tax according to our respondents. But as our

subnational cases reveal, this is in no way uniform. While it is tempting to

conclude that certain categories discussed above are always extortion while

others are legitimate taxation, our case studies reveal signif‌icant geographic

differences on how the same category is perceived across space. In the next

section, we offer a theory to account for this variation before moving on to our

case study evidence.

Mampilly and Thakur 471

Theorizing Variation in Rebel Taxation

The previous sections provide a history of NSCN-IM taxation as well as

laying out the range of different taxes they developed. We now return to the

question posed at the start of this paper: how do we account for the variation in

implementation and perception of different taxes across space? We theorize

that rebels can engage in both taxation and extortion and that it is possible to

distinguish between the two based both on the motivation of the armed group

as well as how civilians understand their behavior.

The claim that all rebel taxation is a form of extortion relies on two as-

sumptions, one economic and one political. Economically, rebels are viewed

as revenue maximizing actors seeking to maximize the return on their in-

vestments, by which we are referring to the civilians and commercial actors

they exert control over as a result of their military capabilities and territorial

holdings. Politically, they are viewed as criminal bandits, wielding violence in

pursuit of economic gains, free from any normative or ideological constraints

or objectives (see Mampilly, 2011 for a full discussion). The combined effect

is to treat rebel taxation as akin to an apolitical racketeer who generates

revenues by selling protection from the threat they themselves pose (Tilly,

1975), rather than a legitimate political authority seeking to collect revenues

from a def‌ined civilian constituency. These assumptions lead to a model of

rebel taxation that is top-down, unidirectional and highly coercive with no

agency for civilian or commercial actors.

In contrast, we argue that rebel taxation should also be understood as a

“technology of governance,”by which we are referring to actions taken by a

political authority with the goal of shaping the conduct of other actors,

producing desired effects and avoiding undesired events. Rose, who coined

the term, def‌ines a technology of governance as “an assemblage of forms of

practical knowledge, with modes of perception, practices of calculation,

vocabularies, types of authority, forms of judgment, architectural forms,

human capacities, non-human objects and devices, inscription techniques and

so forth”with the purpose of achieving, “certain outcomes in terms of the

conduct of the governed (which also requires certain forms of conduct on the

part of those who would govern)”(Rose, 1999, p. 52). Rather than a top-down,

revenue maximizing logic, Rose calls attention to the interactive and non-

economic logics that shape the deployment of such technologies. He argues

that a technology of governance is “hybrid, heterogeneous, traversed by a

variety of programmatic aspirations and professional obligations, a complex

and mobile resultant to the relations amongst persons, things and forces”

(p. 52).

Rose’s relational approach can be productively deployed to grasp the logic

of rebel taxation. Rather than ref‌lecting the singular preferences of the rebel

leadership, a rebel taxation system is better understood as resulting from the

472 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

complex relationship between persons (rebels and civilians), things (com-

mercial and agricultural products) and forces (the civil war itself and its

corresponding impacts on social life). As Wynter et al. (2021) have written,

“Taxation as a technology of governance can be used to steer actions and

outcomes, monitoring, measuring and managing practices…it can be used as

a mechanism to facilitate processes, monitor agents remotely, exercise power

over them, discourage deviant behaviour and produce the government’s

desired behaviour”(p. 9).

One of the most striking examples of taxation as a technology of gov-

ernance is the use of the jizya by Islamist rebellions including the Islamic State

and the Taliban. Often translated as a “poll tax,”the jizya was collected from

non-Muslims in exchange for protection. In addition to recognizing the

sovereign authority of the insurgency, payment of the jizya also required that

eligible communities adhere to a set of behavioral conditions punishable by

death including, “bans on building or repairing churches, public display of

faith, ownership of weapons, selling wine, having taller buildings than

Muslims, and raising their voices in church”(Lia & Aarseth, 2022, p. 265).

In short, a technology of governance refers to the mechanisms through

which an armed group seeks to establish a larger order–social, political and

economic–in its pursuit of its specif‌ic objectives.

21

It ref‌lects the broader

governing rationality

22

that shapes the governance system adopted by an

armed group in its attempts to displace the incumbent power. Put simply,when

implementing a taxation system, rebels must balance competing priorities that

go beyond revenue maximization. In particular, they must weigh the value of

the resources they could acquire with the costs associated with different

collection regimes. We theorize that rebels will only tax civilians to the degree

that it does not threaten their larger strategic objective by pushing civilians to

work against the rebel organization through non-compliance or even de-

fection. The challenge for rebels is that determining the optimal level of

taxation requires an appreciation of the behavior of the state, competing armed

groups and most importantly, the civilian population and commercial actors,

all of which operate according to multiple logics that are diff‌icult to discern

and f‌luctuate in relation to shifting conf‌lict dynamics.

While civilians may generally dislike taxation, they are likely to comply

under two conditions. First, they believe the taxation authority itself to be

legitimate. And second, they believe punishment will only be meted out to

non-compliers, i.e., selectively (Kalyvas, 2006).

Political legitimacy is a notoriously diff‌icult dynamic to capture

(McWeeney et al., 2023). This is especially true when discussing a conf‌lict

situation characterized by multiple belligerents seeking to assert their au-

thority over a single national population (or subset thereof). Legitimacy for

non-state armed groups can be viewed as the manner in which a political

authority establishes its right to govern by making and interpreting rules that

Mampilly and Thakur 473

allow it to gain support and compliance (Podder, 2017). Rather than a static

condition, scholars suggest it is better understood as a dynamic process with

rebels deploying different strategies that strengthen their legitimacy by es-

tablishing a social order, providing public goods, and giving meaning to these

through symbolic actions (Mampilly, 2015). As McWeeney et al. (2023) note,

such “legitimacy-seeking”actions are “used by a rebel group to engender non-

coercive compliance and adherence to their authority that is directed toward

diverse audiences irrespective of the ultimate success of such behaviors.”

Crucially, this is not a one-way interaction (van Baalen, 2021). Rather, it is

essential to understand how civilians perceive the armed group which they can

signal by engaging in a variety of actions including, “collaboration, seeking

social goods, voting, using a currency, paying taxes and pledging allegiance”

(Duyvestyn, 2017, p. 680).

Whether a group possesses the ability to punish selectively is challenging

to capture in a situation of widespread insecurity. Still, scholars have shown

that an armed group can punish civilians more selectively contingent on their

degree of territorial control (Kalyvas, 2006). Where control is uncontested,

armed groups have better access to information that will allow them to wield

violence selectively, thereby avoiding stoking resentment that can risk ci-

vilians defecting to a rival. In contrast, where armed groups face multiple

contestants to their authority, civilians have options they can turn to seek

protection (Kasf‌ir, 2015). As with legitimacy then, control is a function of both

top down (rebel military strength) and bottom up (civilian agency) dynamics

(Krause et al., 2023).

Thus, we view taxation as the result of two factors that shape compliance.

Specif‌ically, the wartime order established by the armed group which de-

termines the amount of tax they can levy before it leads to resentment among

civilians and a loss of popular support; and second, its military strength which

is the primary determinant of its capacity to deploy violence selectively to

ensure civilian compliance.

Our concern is to assess under what conditions armed groups treat taxation

as a technology of governance or as an opportunity for extortion. Extortion

refers to a logic of payment in which one actor relies on the threat of physical

harm in order to maximize the revenue it can collect from another (c.f. Tilly,

1975). In contrast, a technology of governance refers to a situation in which an

actor levies taxes to shape the conduct of another, specif‌ically civilians and

commercial actors, thereby reducing its reliance on coercion and with little

regard for the revenue it may or may not generate.

Typology of Rebel Tax Systems

In this section, we present a typology of rebel taxation based on the two

dimensions described above–military control and political legitimacy. These

474 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

ideal types serve as heuristics to categorize our empirical observations on

rebel taxation, map out its characteristics and understand the relationship and

patterns between armed groups and the people they tax under different levels

of control.

Political legitimacy is the popular support a group enjoys. We assess the

legitimacy of a particular group by asking interviewees if the armed group in

question is considered to be a legitimate authority, whether due to historical

experiences, sub-ethnic makeup

23

and related traditional loyalties, ideological

alignment or more instrumental reasons, such as goods and services offered.

As discussed above, we also take seriously the various legitimation strategies

the armed group deploys in different areas of control (Terpstra & Frerks,

2017).

Military control refers to the amount of contestation rebel groups face

within their area of operation, whether from the incumbent government or its

paramilitary forces as well as from other armed groups that can challenge the

group’s domination. In addition, as recent literature on civilian agency has

argued, local communities can inf‌luence the degree of control an armed group

is able to exercise over a specif‌ic territory (Rubin, 2020). Thus we assess

control as both a function of the number of armed groups operating within a

territory and the degree to which civilians accept or reject their dominion.

Table 1 summarizes our expected outcomes for each ideal type.

The Hegemon: High Political Legitimacy, High Military Control

From the perspective of the armed group, being the Hegemon is the best

possible outcome. With no armed competitors, the group is able to collect

taxes without interference from other groups and with a low risk of civi lians

defecting to other options, thereby reducing the need to use coercion. For

civilians, payments are viewed no differently than paying taxes to a recog-

nized state government. In general, we expect armed groups operating under

such conditions to develop a highly regularized taxation regime that rarely if

ever resorts to indiscriminate violence. Under such conditions, taxation is

likely to be deployed for revenue generating purposes but also to build and

sustain a broader wartime order.

Table 1. Typology of Rebel Taxation Ideal Types.

Political legitimacy

Military control High Low

High The hegemon The extortionist

Low The lover The pretender

Mampilly and Thakur 475

The Lover: High Political Legitimacy, Low Military Control

From the civilian point of view, the Lover is the most attractive type of armed

group.

24

Lacking military control while enjoying popular support suggests

that the armed group cannot rely on coercion to ensure compliance for fear of

civilians defecting to alternatives. For civilians, paying taxes is a way to

support the armed group both materially and symbolically in a manner that

most closely resembles a voluntary donation. In general, we expect armed

groups operating under such conditions to develop a less regularized system

that rarely resorts to violence in order to collect payments. While taxation may

generate revenue, the inability to enforce compliance suggests that it will more

commonly be deployed as a technology to bolster their political legitimacy by

demonstrating their capacity to serve as rational governing authority without a

substantive coercive capacity.

The Pretender: Low Political Legitimacy, Low Military Control

The Pretender represents the weakest position for the armed group, while

civilians have the highest degree of power in relation to that group. Though

groups may resort to violence to extract payments, this is likely to be

counterproductive as civilians have multiple options to either f‌lee the armed

group, defect to one of its competitors, or even challenge it violently. For

civilians, the armed group is likely to be viewed as a nuisance and any

payments made to the armed group are likely to be ad hoc, irregular and of low

value. In general, we expect armed groups operating under such conditions to

impose lower “taxes”in an ad hoc fashion and only be successful when

married to overt threats of violence that may ultimately be unenforceable.

The Extortionist: Low Political Legitimacy, High Military Control

For civilians, the Extortionist represents the worst case scenario as they have

low capacity to inf‌luence the behavior of the armed group. Lacking local

political legitimacy while maintaining a high degree of military power, the

armed group has no reasonable expectation of soliciting voluntary compliance

from the civilian population. Instead, any tax it is able to collect is likely to

result from civilian fear of punishment. Armed groups operating in areas

where the local population has fundamentally different ideological views or

identitarian characteristics (i.e., racial, religious or ethnic differences) are most

likely to experience this dynamic. In general, we expect armed groups op-

erating under such conditions to deploy taxes irregularly relying primarily on

violence in order to ensure compliance. We also expect this to be the least

common type as armed groups will rarely be able to sustain a high degree of

military dominance in areas where they face widespread resentment.

476 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

Table 2 summarizes our expectations on the nature of the taxation regime

we expect to see operating within each.

Subnational Cases

As discussed in our historical section, the protracted and distinctive ceasef‌ire

between the NSCN-IM and the GoI dramatically shapes the scope conditions

for the case studies. With no demarcated ceasef‌ire lines or exclusive zones of

control, the NSCN-IM and the GoI coexist in the same geographic space, with

parallel and competing governance institutions including security, policing,

justice and administration (Thakur & Venugopal,2018 ). The calculus between

these two actors shifts between those areas where the NSCN-IM has its

strongholds and in places where its control is fragmented due to the presence

of many smaller groups. Where it faces less contestation from other armed

groups (as in Ukhrul described below), the NSCN-IM benef‌its from the tacit

acceptance of its presence by the Indian government (Staniland, 2012).

Compared to other cases where the state remains an active combatant, the

NSCN-IM f‌inds it easier to operate, govern, and collect taxes. In spaces where

the group faces competition from other non-state armed groups, the GoI is less

deferential making them more closely resemble civil wars where such tacit

agreements do not shape the rebel incumbent dynamic.

25

In the case studies below, we look at the taxation practices developed by the

NSCN-IM within four different areas of control in order to understand the

characteristics of rebel taxation and explore how it is perceived by the

population in each. Looking at the same group across different areas helps

control for a variety of factors that may inf‌luence tax policies including the

group’s ideology, its internal organizational structure,

26

its central policy on

taxation, and the broader conf‌lict dynamics (Arjona, 2016;Giraudy et al.,

2019). Within these different areas of inf‌luence, we document the distinct

types of taxes they levy and the differences in implementation across areas.

The process of selecting the subnational cases occurred in two phases.

Through initial exploratory research in the Indian states of Manipur and

Nagaland in 2016, we identif‌ied differences in the degree of control exercised

by the NSCN-IM across different districts. We then chose towns/villages that

most closely f‌it these ideal types and conducted interviews in each. To protect

Table 2. Summary of Expectations.

Hegemon Voluntary Low violence Regularized

Lover Voluntary Low violence Ad-hoc

Extortionist Involuntary High violence Ad-hoc

Pretender Involuntary Medium violence Ad-hoc

Mampilly and Thakur 477

the identities of the interviewees, the subnational cases are named after the

districts these towns/villages are a part of, rather than mentioning the specif‌ic

f‌ield sites.

To put together the picture of taxation in each district, we interviewed

village chiefs, businessmen and contractors, members of civil society, NGO

workers, and civilians during multiple f‌ield visits from 2016–2022,

27

in

addition to consulting a variety of primary and secondary sources. Inter-

viewing both the armed group, as well as the people they taxed, alongside

observers among the Indian security and intelligence forces allowed us to

triangulate our f‌indings by including various actors with different roles

thereby mitigating bias and allowing us to obtain diverse perspectives.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted regarding the structure and

nature of the taxes paid, as well as their perceptions about these payments. By

enabling interviewees to express their ideas freely, we sought to generate an

accurate understanding of what taxation and/or extortion means within each

local context. In addition, we also attempted to observe the hesitance or

forthcoming-ness of interviewees, what Fujii (2010) refers to as “meta-data,”

to assess whether fear shaped their responses regarding non-state taxation.

Such an approach was necessary to discern the degree to which civilians

consent to the existing taxation regime.

Combined with interviews with members of the NSCN-IM leadership, our

approach allows us to consider the issue from the perspective of both the

armed group levying taxes as well as the civilians paying them. This was

necessary to make the f‌ine distinctions between when a payment should be

considered a tax or when it is more accurately understood as extortion. We

then attempt to extract overarching trends to understand what characterizes

rebel taxation and the underlying logics behind it in each of the four areas. The

case studies below provide a more nuanced picture of when armed groups are

likely to rely on a logic of extortion and when they are more likely to deploy

taxation as a technology of governance.

UKHRUL (The Hegemon)

Ukhrul is the stronghold of the NSCN-IM. It is the birthplace of Thuingaleng

Muivah, the M in IM. Many families in Ukhrul have members who are a part

of the NSCN-IM with around a third of the Naga army having roots in the

district. The presence of the NSCN-IM is thus interwoven into the fabric of

society, giving the organization a high degree of political and social control.

Local support makes the IM’s military control relatively uncontested by

either the GoI or other armed groups. Indeed, when the NSCN-IM was

targeted by the Indian security forces, local civil society actors and civilians

protested in support of the group leading the Indian Army to pause planned

actions against it. Government personnel are also most likely to comply with

478 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

the group’s demands for payment because of an overwhelming sense, as one

former Deputy Commissioner stationed there put it, “We are the outsiders.”

28

As the dominant actor within the district, the NSCN-IM does not face much

competition in tax collection from other armed actors. Where rivals do attempt

to tax the local community, interviewees suggested that the NSCN-IM se-

lectively punishes villages and individuals who pay them, even when done out

of duress. This high degree of control also means the organization is able to

collect taxes in a regularized manner. All f‌ive categories of taxes mentioned

above are collected in Ukhrul. Yet despite possessing a high degree of military

control, taxes are not increased beyond the percentages set by the NSCN-IM

leadership. The percentage cut on contract works as well as the percentage

taken from Indian government employees, the household tax and the com-

mercial taxes levied on businessmen all remain the same despite the increased

capacity to collect, indicating that retaining their political legitimacy is an

important factor shaping rebel tax policy.

Indeed, most civilians we spoke with in Ukhrul view the idea of taxation by

the NSCN-IM as legitimate. However, the changing ways in which the group

sets tax policies and the perception that corruption and coercion is increasing

have affected the views of some. As explained by a Naga NGO worker, “The

objective (of taxing) was good but the implementation was bad.”

29

This

dichotomy in the way taxation is perceived captures the dynamic well. While

the NSCN-IM’s right to collect is acknowledged, taxes that are considered

unnecessary and excessive are resented.

TAMENGLONG (The Populist)

In Tamenglong, the NSCN-IM faces competition primarily from the Ze-

liangrong Unif‌ication Front (ZUF), which aspires to carve out a region for the

Zeliangrong, a Naga sub-group. Militarily, the two groups are in open combat,

f‌ighting over territory and the taxation rights that go along with it. The ZUF is

also suspected of aligning with the Indian security forces, a view reiterated not

only by members of the NSCN-IM, but also acknowledged in interviews

conducted with members of the ZUF. Apart from the ZUF, a few other armed

groups also have a small presence in the region. This competition for civilian

loyalty shapes politics in the region. During f‌ieldwork, we observed active

efforts on the part of the NSCN-IM to delegitimize its rivals, especially the

ZUF, in Tamenglong.Leaders gave speeches accusing the ZUF cause of being

invalid and calling for support for the NSCN-IM as the true representative of

the Naga struggle.

In Tamenglong, the NSCN-IM is forced to compete with other groups for

the right to tax local populations and businesses. As a result, taxation is less

regularized, as the group cannot easily tax in a contested territory. While the

household tax is collected from areas under its inf‌luence, it is limited by the

Mampilly and Thakur 479

f‌ight over control with the ZUF. Other taxes, like those collected from

businesses and the Indian government are demanded by both sides, resulting

in lower and more inconsistent payouts. Contractors for infrastructure proj-

ects, for example, work in areas controlled by both the NSCN-IM and

the ZUF.

Informants taxed by both organizations consistently framed the NSCN-IM

positively against the ZUF. For example, a businessman exclaimed:

There is no problem paying the IM. Their cadre is there with maturity. Their aim

is clear, their demands are clear.ZUF works just for money. With the NSCN-IM,

political right is there, political aim is there. We have to support!

30

While he pays both groups, he pays the ZUF only under duress. His

employees, he claimed, are kidnapped if he refuses to comply. In contrast, he

openly expressed support for the NSCN-IM and viewed paying taxes to the

organization as fulf‌illing his duty to the Naga national cause.

Competition has also led to a more undisciplined taxation regime. Cadres

often make demands of their own volition by claiming to operate on behalf of

the NSCN-IM. In one instance, an NGO worker narrated how he called the

bluff of a cadre. He claimed to have told the rebel tax collector that he knew

the local Commanding Off‌icer and would verify the demand with him, at

which point the collector left.

31

This demonstrates that while some cadres

make unauthorized demands, it cannot be done with impunity.

Though considered the lesser of two evils by many, certain sections of

society continue to f‌ind NSCN-IM taxes unfair and coercive. For example, the

NGO worker complained that he was being taxed as a business, though he

worked for a nonprof‌it organization. Still, his complaint was not against the

entire NSCN-IM taxation regime, but rather that the commercial tax should

only apply to for-prof‌it businesses.

While the NSCN-IM is able to collect less regularly given their contested

territorial control in Tamenglong, the level of coercion it deploys compared to

its rivals appears to be generally lower given its desire to retain popular

support. In interviews with contractors from the area, payment to the group is

thus seen as taxation, while similar demands made from competitors are

viewed as extortion.

DIMAPUR (The Pretender)

Dimapur is the largest city and business center connecting Nagaland to the

outside world via rail and air. It is host to the largest number of armed Naga

groups vying for control with at least six other armed factions, most of which

splintered from the original NSCN. Interviews in Dimapur with businesses

and armed groups indicate that no one group has a clear advantage in terms of

480 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

political legitimacy or military control and that there are no f‌ixed areas of

inf‌luence. Rather, the groups compete and coexist, with their cadre making

multiple demands from the same stakeholders. The overall picture is one of

multiple groups each exerting varying degrees of control with no single actor

able to exert dominance.

Taxes collected by the NSCN-IM in Dimapur are mostly ad hoc and limited

by the competitors it has and how much they tax. The primary constituency

taxed in Dimapur are local businesses, many operated by non-Nagas who have

migrated to the region to service the large Indian military presence. Some non-

Naga perceive favoritism towards the Naga community. One business owner

from Uttar Pradesh, a state in North India from where many business leaders

hail, claimed that Nagas were given more scope for negotiation by the various

rebel groups in contrast to other ethnicities. He claimed that while tax col-

lectors did not ask about ethnicity when collecting taxes, they could tell by the

“face shape.”Naga informants disagreed. In the words of one civil society

leader who led a campaign to gain favorable tax rates for Naga business

people: “The IM does not care if he’s a Bengali, a Bihari, or an illegal

Bangladeshi…NSCN-IM should exempt Nagas from taxation, but they still

wouldn’t yield.”

32

Taxing businesses in Dimapur can be lucrative, drawing armed groups to

the city, each hoping to carve out their own piece of the taxation pie. The local

NSCN-IM unit modif‌ies the taxes it levies from those set by the Central

Command to bring them closer to those charged by other groups. Since a rmed

groups are all viewed as illegitimate by local businesses and much of civil

society, being seen as predatory is not in the NSCN-IM’s interest. All armed

groups in Dimapur reduce the amount they tax businesses, for example from

5% to 2%, as no business can afford to pay such high percentages to multiple

groups. Indeed, all groups, including the NSCN-IM, collude to set what they

consider a reasonable total tax rate with each gaining a share based on their

perceived relative power. Figure 1, produced by a local Naga advocacy or-

ganization, shows the respective rates each group levies on eggs.

Contestation between armed groups has led to businesses and civil society

organizations mobilizing and protesting against non-state taxation in Di-

mapur. Like all non-state groups in Dimapur, taxation by the NSCN-IM is

considered extortive because of the cumulative burden placed on businesses.

The complaint is against double (or more) taxation. In the words of one

businessman, “If it was one group, we would close our eyes and pay. But now

it is eight groups.”

33

This sentiment was reiterated across interviews with the

business community. The apex Naga civil society representatives also re-

frained from openly distinguishing between who has the legitimate authority

to collect. According to one civil society informant, “…we cannot exclude

anyone. When people are saying they are overburdened with taxation, they are

talking about everyone.”

34

Mampilly and Thakur 481

Compared to other areas, taxation in Dimapur is mostly understood

through its economic impacts. Many informants resented price increases

which they attributed to the multiple groups levying taxes on businesses.

NSCN-IM off‌icials that we interviewed were sensitive to the accusation, but

argued that “other factors beyond taxes”were responsible for price inf‌lation.

Taxation under this type does see low levels of regularization. However,

the lack of any specif‌ic group having military dominance combined with their

overall low levels of legitimacy does not necessarily empower civilians.

Therefore, while they are being taxed less by any one individual group, in

sum, the taxation is considered excessive and extortive. The frequency of the

term “extortion”used to describe non-state taxation by interviewees is re-

vealing as it does not focus on the NSCN-IM specif‌ically, but is based on the

cumulative effect of the multiple demands for payment they face.

CHANDEL (The Extortionist)

Chandel is home to close to a dozen different Naga subgroups (referred to as

tribes locally). The acceptance of the NSCN-IM and its legitimacy varies

signif‌icantly from tribe to tribe. While larger tribes are closely linked to the

rebellion, often occupying positions of power within the rebel governance

system, many smaller tribes do not consider the group legitimate nor do they

consider it to be working in their interest. In fact, members of the smaller tribes

Figure 1. Tax amounts on eggs. (Source: Against Corruption and Unabated Taxation

2016).

482 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

professed a preference to remain a part of the Indian state of Manipur rather

than be a part of an independent greater Nagaland, where they fear oppression

from larger tribes who dominate the ranks of the NSCN-IM. In villages

controlled by better-represented tribes, the sentiment was markedly different

from those controlled by minority tribes, with some interviewees refusing to

even use the word ‘tax,’preferring terms like ‘loyalty’

35

instead. Thus, while

not a perfect example of the ‘extortionist’type, which, as we suggested above,

is likely to be a rare dynamic, the description below is based on the cases of

minority villages in Chandel where resentment against the NSCN-IM is the

highest.

In possession of uncontested military dominance, the NSCN-IM does not

face competition in tax collection. The Household Tax is the responsibility of

village chiefs, who collect from each family in the village. As with other

places under NSCN-IM control, this is set at a nominal rate of INR 250 a year.

Sometimes, if families are unable to pay, village chiefs may take the amount

due to the NSCN-IM from one of the Indian government schemes that operate

within their villages. Most of the revenue generated in Chandel comes from

government schemes and contract work. The percentage cut on contract works

and on any project from the government is generally 5% (which is supposed to

go to Hebron) and a further 2% that they collect for the region.

In the words of one civilian from a minority tribe, “The NSCN does

nothing for me except hollow rhetoric. Does not give us development–in fact

it slows down because of them. Does not even give us a sense of unif‌ied

identity!”

36

This sentiment is echoed by members of the smaller tribes, with

many perceiving the NSCN-IM as supporting the larger tribes they are in

conf‌lict with. In the words of one village chief we interviewed, there is a

reluctance to pay: “Let this NSCN issue be over. Till the end of my life I

cannot live under this diktat. I also want to live peacefully.”

37

This was

accompanied by a frank acknowledgement of the role of fear in shaping his

actions: “If I f‌ight against [rebel taxation], government can’t give me pro-

tection, no law and order. I can be killed–who likes to be killed, ya?”The

burden, according to the village chief and reiterated by elders in other villages

is mostly indirect. Because a large part of money is taken from the aid for

development and public works that is supposed to benef‌it the local com-

munity, there is discontent: “‘I should get 35 kg of rice, but I am getting 10 kg.

Who will be happy?”

As the group lacks legitimacy, being in possession of a high degree of

military control means that coercion is high. Yet, surprisingly, the group does

not resort to ad hoc taxation or indiscriminate violence as might be expected

from the theoretical framework. Taxes are regularized and in line with rates set

by the Central Command.

Mampilly and Thakur 483

Subnational Comparison of Rebel Taxation Regimes

The evidence presented in the subnational cases provides considerable support

to our theoretical framework. Specif‌ically, while some rebel taxes are viewed

as extortive, taxation practices and civilian perceptions vary according to the

larger political and military context. In areas where the NSCN-IM is primarily

concerned with maintaining its political legitimacy, as in Ukhrul and Ta-

menglong, taxation is used as a technology of governance to strengthen its

position among the civilian communities and to reinforce the larger wartime

order. In these districts, taxation is largely regularized and based on policies

set at the central level. Where civilians or businesses attempt to shirk payment,

punishment is meted out selectively or commonly avoided altogether. While

some may resent paying taxes, they mostly do not question the NSCN-IM’s

right to levy taxes in the f‌irst place.

Even in areas where the NSCN-IM does not have broad popular legitimacy,

they are often viewed as more legitimate than rivals. This dynamic comes into

particular relief in Tamenglong where the group faces competition from the ZUF.

Rather than viewing all non-state taxation as illegitimate, civilian informants

regularly distinguished between the two groups based on the percepti on that the

NSCN-IM was the more legitimate representative of the larger Naga struggle.

In contrast, in Dimapur, where the group lacks both political legitimacy and

military control, local civilians and civil society regularly viewed all forms of

non-state taxation as illegitimate. This was true despite the fact that the NSCN-

IM sought to lower the amounts of tax collected in order to improve com-

pliance. Local businesses and civil society in particular have sought to

challenge a situation they characterize as “multiple taxation”in which dif-

ferent actors claim the right to levy taxes (Santoshini, 2016). In response, the

NSCN-IM exhibits less concern for its political legitimacy among the local

population, focusing instead on ensuring that its share of tax revenue is not

undercut by competitors. Still, a few informants distinguished between the

NSCN-IM and other groups. A business owner who expressed resent ment

about paying rebel taxes told us: “IM is better. They are very frank.”

38

He

claimed the group’s taxes were standardized and they always provided a

receipt in contrast to others. He also claimed to use the NSCN-IM to resolve

disputes suggesting that they are faster than the government, even for the non-

Naga population.

Chandel departs the most from our theoretical expectations, at least in

relation to the behavior of the armed group. While civilians, especially from

minority tribes, view the NSCN-IM as an illegitimate actor, we saw little

evidence that the group resorted to excessive or indiscriminate violence to

ensure compliance. Taxes also remained largely regularized and adhered to

standards set by the Central Command, contra our expectations. While this

may ref‌lect aspirations by the group that it can, over time, emerge as a

484 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

legitimate authority, it also suggests that not every armed group will behave as

an extortionist even where conditions make this likely.

Across the subnational cases, we also documented how different categories of

taxes seem to follow distinct logics. For example, the commercial tax levied on

businesses was most likely to resemble racketeering, with the armed group

relying on force to ensure compliance with seemingly little concern for the costs

to its political legitimacy. In contrast, we found few examples of coercion being

used to ensure compliance with the household tax. While interviews revealed that

citizens did face pressure to comply, many openly boasted of their ability to shirk,

especially in areas of contested control like Dimapur. This suggests that rather

than a revenue source, the household tax is used more as a tool to maintain social

order within areas under NSCN-IM control. Put differently, it is a technology of

governance that plays both a symbolic role in allowing the rebellion to visibly

perform a core function of sovereignty and an instrumental role that makes the

population legible by providing useful demographic and other information about

civilians living under rebel dominion, a necessary f‌irststepinestablishinga

system of governance. As Scott (1998), any political authority has an inherent

need to make society legible in order to “arrange the population in ways that

simplif‌ied the classic state functions”(p. 2).

Our analysis suggests that taxation can serve both as a technology to

promote a preferred wartime order as well as a mechanism for raising funds, a

dynamic that comes into relief only when we consider the range of different

taxes armed groups implement including those that have no obvious revenue

generating potential. Greater attention should be paid to the different cate-

gories of taxes armed groups levy and how this shapes the logic of en-

forcement behind them.

Conclusion

Adopting a subnational approach to rebel taxation systems provides a better

picture of the factors that motivate rebel behavior and how civil ians respond. It

can reveal how rebels often weigh competing priorities when determining specif‌ic

tax policies based on whom they tax, in what manner and for what purposes. By

examining the varying political and strategic contexts in which one specif‌ic

organization, the NSCN-IM, developed and implemented its tax system, this

paper explores the tradeoffs rebels make when choosing to deploy taxation as a

revenue generating mechanism versus viewing it as a tool to maintain or establish

a larger wartime order in pursuit of their strategic objectives.

Taxation, alongside coercion and ideological suasion and interrelated with

both, is one of the central technologies of governance a would be authority

wields as it attempts to develop, mold and transform its political constituency

(Gowrinathan & Mampilly, 2019). We argue that rebels are more likely to

understand taxation as a technology of governance when the existing political

Mampilly and Thakur 485

context pushes them away from viewing it simply as a revenue generating

device. By examining the tax policies and practices adopted by the NSCN-IM

in vastly different contexts, the paper provides novel evidence of the varying

forces beyond revenue generation that shape rebel taxation.

While the core insight–taxation as a technology of governance–has long

characterized studies of state taxation, we demonstrate that such an approach is

useful for understanding rebel tax collection as well. Approaching rebel taxation

as a technology of governance also holds promise for those in terested in more

holistic and nuanced accounts of rebel governance. While much has been written

recently on the provision of services by armed groups, governance is equally

concerned with the regulation of civilian and commercial actors. As Jasanoff

(2020) notes, “regulatory policy is a socio-technical imaginary that projects onto

society desired futures toward which people are expected to direc t their actions”

(p. 38). In many ways, taxation remains the key technology through which rebels

seek to regulate the economic and social lives of their civilian constituents by

deploying it towards building and sustaining a wartime order. Approaching

taxation as a regulatory technology also allows us to bridge the gap between

studies of rebel f‌inancing and rebel governance. In contrast to studies of rebel

f‌inancing which isolate economic dynamics from other aspects of rebel behavior,

studies of rebel governance have done much to demonstrate how civilians are

engaged in complex negotiations with rebel political authorities as they seek to

establish a larger social order.

Future studies should continue to treat taxation as an integral component of

rebel governance systems rather than a discrete phenomenon operating ac-

cording to its own distinct logics. Rather than compartmentalizing rebel f‌i-

nancing, such an approach holds the promise for deepening understanding of

the social dimensions of money (Parkinson, 2016) and how it relates to a

number of issues of concern for scholars of rebel organizations and civil war

generally including the internal organization of rebel groups, fragmentation,

civilian resistance, and of course, the f‌inancing of rebellion itself.

Appendix

Interviewee Location Date

1 NSCN-IM minister Ukhrul 02/16

2 Civil society organisation Ukhrul 02/16

3 Driver Ukhrul 02/16

4 Indian government off‌icial Ukhrul 05/16

5 Junior civil servant Ukhrul 05/16

6 Indian security forces Ukhrul 05/16

(continued)

486 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

(continued)

Interviewee Location Date

7 Indian security forces Ukhrul 05/16

8 Police Ukhrul 05/16

9 NGO worker Ukhrul 05/16

10 Village chief Ukhrul 05/16

11 Tribal head Ukhrul 05/16

12 NSCN-IM home minister Camp hebron 06/16

13 Civil society leader Dimapur 07/17

14 Civil society leader Dimapur 07/17

15 Resident colony chairman Dimapur 07/17

16 Pastor Dimapur 07/17

17 Civil society leader Dimapur 07/17

18 Indian government off‌icial (retired) Dimapur 07/17

19 NSCN-IM deputy secretary f‌inance Camp hebron 07/17

20 Businessperson Dimapur 07/17

21 Journalist Dimapur 07/17

22 Businessperson Dimapur 07/17

23 NGO worker Imphal 11/18

24 Journalist Imphal 11/18

25 Journalist Imphal 11/18

26 ZUF off‌icial Tamenglong 12/18

27 NSCN-IM minister Tamenglong 12/18

28 Indian civil servant Tamenglong 12/18

29 Indian government off‌icial Tamenglong 12/18

30 NSCN-IM commander Tamenglong 12/18

31 NGO worker Tamenglong 12/18

32 Contractor Tamenglong 12/18

33 NSCN-IM home minister Dimapur 02/19

34 Member ceasef‌ire monitoring group Kohima 02/19

35 Senior indian civil servant Kohima 02/19

36 Tribal elder Dimapur 02/19

37 Transporter Dimapur 02/19

38 Customs off‌icer Imphal 01/20

39 Civil society organisation Chandel 01/20

40 Village chief Chandel 01/20

41 Village elder Chandel 01/20

42 Village chief Chandel 01/20

43 Contractor Chandel 01/20

44 Contractor Chandel 01/20

45 Businessperson Imphal 01/20

(continued)

Mampilly and Thakur 487

(continued)

Interviewee Location Date

46 Teacher Chandel 01/20

47 Indian sec forces Dimapur 02/20

48 Indian sec forces Dimapur 02/20

49 Student organization Dimapur 03/20

50 Businessperson Dimapur 03/20

51 Businessperson Dimapur 03/20

52 Businessperson Dimapur 03/20

53 Businessperson Dimapur 03/20

54 Businessperson Dimapur 03/20

55 Businessperson Dimapur 03/20

56 Transporter Dimapur 03/20

57 Indian sec forces Kangpokpi 02/21

58 Indian sec forces Kangpokpi 02/21

59 Businessperson/contractor Imphal 02/21

60 Businessperson Imphal 02/21

61 Indian sec forces Tengnopal 03/22

62 Indian sec forces Tengnopal 03/22

63 Indian sec forces Tengnopal 03/22

64 Indian sec forces Tengnopal 03/22

65 Transporter Dimapur 03/22

66 Transporter Dimapur 03/22

67 Police Pallel 04/22

68 Police Pallel 04/22

Acknowledgments

Zachariah Mampilly is the Marxe Chair of International Affairs at Baruch College and

an Aff‌iliated Faculty member at the Graduate Center, CUNY. Shalaka Thakur is a

graduate student in political science at the Geneva Graduate Institute. We acknowledge

that both authors contributed equally to this paper. We are grateful to Sangti Konyak,

Kolby Hanson and Keith Krause for their advice and the H.F. Guggenheim Foundation

for its generous funding for parts of this research.

Declaration of Conf‌licting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conf‌licts of interest with respect to the research,

authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following f‌inancial support for the research,

authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by Harry Frank

Guggenheim Foundation.

488 Comparative Political Studies 58(3)

ORCID iD

Zachariah Mampilly https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4490-7782

Data Availability Statement

Data sharing not applicable to this article as no datasets were generated or analyzed

during the current study.

Notes

1. Interview ID 27. NSCN-IM Minister. December 2018.

2. Based on the NSCN-IM budget for 2019. Copy in author’s possession.

3. A “taxation regime”refers to the taxation practices put in place by a single or-

ganization within a specif‌ic territory and temporal period. A “taxation system”

refers to the entire set of taxation regimes deployed by an organization across areas

under its control, either partial or full.

4. The Nagas actually declared independence prior to the Indian state, a lingering

distinction that continues to impact political discourse in the area today.

5. Interview ID 17. Civil Society Leader. July 2017.

6. Interview ID 14. Civil Society Leader. July 2017.

7. The BJP and the Congress have rotated in and out of power in India for most of its

independence history.

8. Interview ID 27. NSCN-IM Minister. December 2018.

9. Interview ID 36. Tribal Elder. February 2019.

10. Interview ID 18. Indian Government Off‌icial. July 2017.

11. Interview ID 21. Journalist. July 2017.

12. Interview ID 16. Pastor. July 2017.

13. Interview ID 33. NSCN-IM Home Minister. February 2019.

14. Interview ID 40. Village Chief. January 2020.

15. Interview ID 33. NSCN-IM Home Minister. February 2019.

16. Interview ID 27. NSCN-IM Minister. December 2018.

17. Interview ID 19. NSCN-IM Minister. July 2017.

18. Interview ID 32. Contractor. December 2018.

19. Interview ID 22. Businessman. July 2017.

20. Interview ID 20. Businessman. July 2017.

21. Wartime orders capture the larger context in which rebels and states engage in

conf‌lict. On “political order,”see Staniland (2012),on“social order,”see Arjona

(2016), and on “economic order,”see Mampilly and Gutierrez (2023).

22. As Brown (2015) notes, “any ascendant political rationality is not only destructive,

but brings new subjects, conduct, relations, and worlds into being”(p. 36).

23. As discussed below, each of our case studies contain different tribal makeups with

historically distinct relationships to the NSCN-IM. For more on ethnic social

networks and their relationship with insurgent mobilization, see Sarbahi (2021).

Mampilly and Thakur 489

24. We draw inspiration for the “Lover”from Machiavelli who argued that the ideal

authority relationship between a ruler and his subjects would combine both love

and fear. For Machiavelli, men loved “according to their own will”while fear was

produced “according to that of the Prince.”

25. In this context of the NSCN-IM’s shifting, convoluted relationship with the GoI, it

is important to clarify that our focus is not to provide a typical example of rebel

taxation across different contexts. Instead, the examination of NSCN-IM

strongholds provides an illustrative example of rebel taxation at its most pro-

nounced, allowing a more stable basis to understand the relationships between

armed groups and the people they tax.

26. Compliance among lower level cadre with off‌icial policies made by the group

leadership is imperfect, and there can be extortion by individuals within the group

despite policies that explicitly prohibit it. Due to the diff‌iculty of gathering reliable

data on the degree of corruption within any specif‌ic unit of the NSCN-IM, in this

paper, we assume that there is no systematic variation between different units in

regards to corruption among lower-level cadre. While beyond the scope of his

study,we recognize that if there is systematic variation between different units then

this could also affect the perception of the group in different areas.

27. Specif‌ically, we interviewed senior off‌icials of the NSCN-IM and other armed

groups, village chiefs, businessmen and contractors, Indian government off‌icials,

members of civil society and NGO workers with additional input from members of

the Indian security forces and paramilitaries as well as the police. Appendix A

provides the full list of interviewees.

28. Interview ID 4. Indian Government Off‌icial. May 2016.

29. Interview ID 23. NGO Worker. November 2018.

30. Interview ID 32. Contractor. December 2018.

31. Interview ID 31. NGO worker. December 2018.

32. Interview ID 13. Civil Society Leader. July 2017.

33. Interview ID 37. Transporter. February 2019.

34. Interview ID 36. Tribal Elder. February 2019.

35. Interview ID 39. Civil Society Organization. January 2020.

36. Interview ID 41. Village Elder. January 2020.

37. Interview ID 42. Village Chief. January 2020.

38. Interview ID 20. Businessman. July 2017.

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Author Biographies

Zachariah Mampilly is the Marxe Endowed Chair of International Affairs at

the Marxe School of Public and International Affairs, CUNY.

Shalaka Thakur is a PhD Student at the Graduate Institute of International

Studies.

Mampilly and Thakur 493