Complex realities lie behind U.S. rush to train Iraqi Army.

• Author: Erwin, Sandra I.
• Position: DEFENSE WATCH

It has become crystal clear that fielding a competent Iraqi Army is a tenet of the U.S. exit strategy. What is far less apparent is what exactly constitutes a competent Iraqi fighting force, and how long it will be before it can relieve American troops.

The "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq," which the administration unveiled last month, lists a series of metrics by which the success of Iraqi units will be gauged: the number of "actionable intelligence" tips received from Iraqis, the percentage of operations conducted by Iraqis alone or with minor coalition assistance, the number of car bombs intercepted and defused, and offensive operations conducted by Iraqi and coalition forces.

The strategy, however, makes no mention of how long it will take for Iraqi forces to take control of their country. The document makes vague references to "near term" goals of standing up "robust security forces" to gather intelligence, destroy terrorist networks, and maintain security. In the "medium term," the strategy calls for Iraqi forces to take the lead in defeating terrorists and insurgents and providing their own security.

The officer in charge of training Iraqi troops, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, said he could not offer specific timelines for reaching those goals. Notably, Dempsey told Pentagon reporters via telephone, he was not privy to the "National Strategy for Victory in Iraq" until the White House released it to the public, on Nov. 30. "I'm not really exactly familiar with how we translate calendar years into short and midterm," Dempsey said.

Given the mind-numbingly complicated effort of building an Iraqi security force, any attempt to set rigid timeframes would not make sense, nor would it take into account the lessons from history, says retired Army Maj. Gen. Robert Scales, a historian and military analyst.

Political pressures to withdraw U.S. forces from Iraq cannot make up for the fact that it takes many years to groom a large army, which in the case of Iraq, is expected to exceed 300,000 troops, organized into 10 divisions.

"Creating an army is very complex," says Scales. "There are so many moving parts."

Making matters worse is that the U.S. Army must create and mentor this force at the same time that it is fighting a guerilla war against insurgents, rogue militias and AI-Qaeda operatives.

"The hardest thing is to groom an indigenous army during a war," Scales says. In Vietnam in the 1960s, U.S. commanders in charge of...