Joint training must reflect combat realities; gaps remain in the integration of special operators, conventional forces.

AuthorCarty, William J.
PositionMilitary Essay

In recent conflicts, special operations and conventional forces relied heavily on increased cooperation and mutual support. Consequently, it may be time for the Joint Forces Command, the U.S. Special Operations Command and the services to consider changes in future training and planning, to better reflect present and future scenarios.

Previously, joint SOF and conventional forces planners properly focused on "deconfliction" of operations when needed. But combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan demonstrated that there was a great degree of SOF-conventional force integration at all levels as well.

The capstone manual for employment of SOF is Joint Pub 3-05, Doctrine for Special Operations Forces. It serves as the overarching reference for application of SOF capabilities. The newest edition of JP 3-05, released in December 2003, has gone a long way in addressing doctrinal shortcomings in the previous version, but areas in need of greater emphasis still remain, as well as means of implementation for planning and training considerations.

Joint Pub 3-05 states that, among other things, SOF missions are conducted independently or in conjunction with conventional forces. Also on this topic, JP 3-05 says special operations can be conducted in support of a conventional force's tactical objectives when doing so will be critical to the achievement of strategic or operational objectives by that conventional force.

Another change to the role of SOF in conflicts is the direct result of the September 11 attacks. SOCOM transformed from a supporting command to a supporting and supported command, with the commander of SOCOM now having full responsibility for the conduct of the global war on terrorism. Within this context, special operations are conducted as an independent campaign, as an overarching strategy incorporating the geographical combatant commander's individual theater campaign plan. However, doctrine for conventional force support to SOF, as conducted in Afghanistan, is lacking or non-existent.

Throughout Operation Enduring Freedom, assets from conventional forces that SOF traditionally would have played a supporting role to regularly supported SOE Army forces were used to secure SOF bases, and a Navy aircraft carrier served in direct support of SOF operations. Special Forces and Air Force SOF employed strategic and operational-level air assets in tactical roles. Rangers parachuted into objective Rhino long before the Marines occupied it as their base, and Army Special Forces seized the U.S. Embassy and used an Explosive Ordnance Disposal detachment from the Army 10th Mountain Division to clear it, prior to turning it over to the Marines.

Lessons learned from SOF actions in Afghanistan were applied in Iraq, parceling out large portions of the area of operations to SOF forces, but this time in support of the Combined Forces Land Component Command. Western Iraq fell almost exclusively to SOF, with SOF in the north again, working with indigenous forces to set conditions...

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