Reactions in the Maghreb to the Gulf crisis and war.

• Author: Zoubir, Yahia H.

WHEN THE GULF CRISIS OCCURRED, the Maghreb was in a peculiar period. Therefore, a brief overview of the situation prevailing in the region on the eve of the crisis is essential in order to better understand the different reactions to the crisis and to the war.

The Maghreb has been experiencing a period of transition characterized by cyclical instability which began in the early 1980s.(1) Despite the differences between the five regimes (Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia), all failed to fulfill the rising expectations of their populations. The rate of unemployment, with the exception of Libya, is very high; the demographic explosion has aggravated the acute housing crisis and created a mass of unemployed among the youth; the lack of democratic institutions alienated both intellectuals and masses; the prospect of European integration in 1992 raised new fears with respect to trade and immigration. Furthermore, the crumbling of the Eastern Bloc and the call for democratization in China and in Africa could not leave the Maghrebis oblivious to such developments. In fact, it may be argued that due to the hardships they have experienced, the Maghrebis have since the early 1980s increased their demands for democratization and for an improvement of their conditions of living well before similar events took place in Eastern Europe. The respective governments' inability to respond positively to such demands has led to riots in Morocco (1981 and December 1990), Tunisia (1984), and Algeria (1980, 1986, and much more seriously in October 1988). In brief, Maghrebi populations have rejected the processes of development imposed upon them by the so called "developmental dictatorships," and have sought radical change within a less authoritarian, perhaps democratic, context. From their perspective, neither the state capitalist/socialist experiment led by a single party, nor the liberal development under a monarchy have fulfilled their expectations. More importantly, the failure of system performance in the Maghrebi countries compelled the citizens to look elsewhere for salvation. The surge of radical Islamism can be explained, albeit partially, in this context. Yet, the emergence of radical Islam also should be situated in the international setting. Israel's defeat of the arabs in the June 1967 War was a severe blow to Arab nationalism, an ideology which had dominated the Arab World since the 1940s. One of the major consequences of the defeat has been the continuing rise of Islamic fundamentalism. In the late 1970s and in the 1980s, the Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, appeared to many Islamic leaders in the Maghreb as the "ideal model" where wealth and Islam were mixed together and, therefore, should be emulated. This is not to say, however, that this model was attractive to the Maghrebis at large. As shall be seen below, the Maghrebis were and still are quite resentful of the Gulf countries.

Furthermore, at the international level, it should be pointed out that the Maghrebis, despite their geographical distance from the Mashreq, continued to be frustrated by the absence of a solution to the Palestine question and the issue of Jerusalem. The incapacity of the Arab regimes to find a political or military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict undermined the legitimacy of these regimes in the eyes of their people. The West, mainly the United States because of its unconditional support for Israel, was also blamed as the main impediment to the establishment of a Palestinian state. Maghrebi support for Palestine should not be underestimated.

However, with the exception of the Palestinian question, the Mashreq was not a major preoccupation of the Maghrebis. Before the Gulf crisis, most Maghrebis, Algerians in particular, were not fond of Saddam Hussein, whose war against Iran was seen as senseless and unjust, Iraq being the aggressor. Government and masses alike believed that it was a war between Muslims and that it could only serve the interests of the "enemies of Islam," namely, the United States and Israel. Further, the dispute between Kuwait and Iraq before August 1990 attracted little attention in the Maghreb, where the major preoccupations were greater democracy, improvement in the standards of living, and more social justice. Therefore, Saddam Hussein's dictatorial Ba'thist regime was far from representing the model to be imitated because, in the eyes of the Maghrebis and other Arabs, this type of regime had serious limitations. The Gulf crisis took place amidst all these internal problems. In Algeria, in particular, the growing popularity of the Islamists, following their overwhelming victory in the municipal and departmental (wilayat) elections in June 1990, remained the main concern for Algeria and its neighbors. The crisis, in a sense, shifted the focus of attention and provided the Algerian regime with a badly needed respite.

Reactions in the Maghreb to the Gulf crisis can be identified within four phases.

PHASE I: THE INVASION OF KUWAIT

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 generated mixed feelings in the Maghreb countries. Regimes and populations alike were astonished.(2) At the government level, Algeria and Morocco expressed the strongest opposition to the occupation. Algeria demanded the restoration of the legal authorities in Kuwait with full territorial integrity. The Algerian Government asked for the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi forces and the respect of Kuwaiti sovereignty.(3) Algerian officials were fearful that the invasion would divide the Arab World even further and that it would provide a pretext for Western, mainly US, intervention in the area. From the onset, Morocco, too, adopted a firm position against the Iraqi invasion. This was largely due to the Moroccan monarchy's ties with the Gulf monarchies.(4) The political parties, too, were surprised by the invasion, but observed a reserved attitude because of the good ties many of them enjoyed with Iraq.(5) Similarly, Tunisia rejected the invasion without, however, condemning Iraq.(6) Libya, while arguing that the invasion was an Arab matter and that Arab unity was essential,(7) seemed more preoccupied with possible US intervention than with taking a clear position on Iraq's action. Mauritania, for its part, sided openly with Iraq.(8) At the Ministerial Council meeting in Cairo on 3 August, the Maghrebi states failed to present a common position. Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia voted in favor of the resolution condemning the occupation of Kuwait; Mauritania abstained and Libya did not even participate in the vote. Neither Libya nor Mauritania condoned the invasion, but their respective positions seemed to be predicated upon their desire to keep channels of communication open with Iraq.

At the popular level, the Islamists were the most vocal voices against Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. This can be easily explained by their resentment toward Saddam Hussein, a secular ruler who showed no pity toward the Islamicist movement. But the major reason for the Maghrebi Islamicists' initial support for Kuwait was determined by their financial dependence on Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states. The leaders of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria described Saddam Hussein as either a Haddam or a Khaddam (destructor or servant) and challenged him to liberate Jerusalem. They also accused the Ba'th Party in Iraq of having massacred Muslims.(9)

A second trend in the Maghreb consisted of those who disapproved of the invasion, but showed little sympathy for the Kuwaitis, especially their regime. It is not unfair to say that Maghrebis in general despise the Gulf Arabs whom they often identify with the princes. They are resentful of their alleged egotism, their lack of generosity and consideration vis-a-vis the less fortunate countries of the Arab World, and their depraved conduct. The Maghrebis are scornful of the Gulf princes because of the image they carry--arrogance due to their wealth, immoral behavior, uncivilized manners, loose mores, hypocrisy with respect to religious values, and so forth.

The Gulf war and its aftermath has unquestionably strengthened this Maghrebi perception of the Gulf Arabs. It is, of course, possible that the Maghrebis feel, subconsciously, that the Kuwaitis are Arabs who have had it easy, for they have never had to struggle--like the Maghrebis did, especially the Algerians, for their independence--or to work hard like the rest of the Maghrebis and other Arabs to build their societies. Furthermore, Maghrebis have felt that there is an injustice as far as the distributin of Arab wealth is concerned, particularly oil, which they believe is "given by God to the entire Arab Nation." In their eyes, the Kuwaitis and the other Gulf states have sold their oil at cut-rate prices to flood the market and bring down the price of oil, thus depriving countries, such as Algeria and Iraq, which have adopted nationalist economic policies, from financing their development. Gulf regimes are consequently perceived as mere puppets of the West to which they have sold their soul in exchange for military protection.

Subsequent to the invasion, the opposition parties in the Maghreb exhibited a wide variety of responses. In Morocco, the parties were rather slow to react to the Iraqi invasion, esentially because they were stunned by the event, but also because of their fear of provoking King Hassan II, whose close friendship with sister monarchies in the Gulf was common knowledge. Another reason is the fact, as indicated earlier, that some of them had close ties with the Ba'thist regime in Baghdad. In general, however, most parties took a prudent position, except for the communist Parti du Progres et du Socialisme (PPS), which condemned unequivocally the Iraqi regime and its "adventurist" policy.(10)

In Algeria, the reaction was similar. The communist Parti de l'Avant-Garde Socialiste (PAGS), like its counterpart in Morocco, condemned...