Rawlsian Theory and the Circumstances of Politics

DOI10.1177/0090591710372862
Published date01 October 2010
AuthorAndrew Mason
Date01 October 2010
Subject MatterArticles
/tmp/tmp-18BWQTaMlneKf2/input Political Theory
38(5) 658 –683
Rawlsian Theory and
© 2010 SAGE Publications
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the Circumstances
DOI: 10.1177/0090591710372862
http://ptx.sagepub.com
of Politics
Andrew Mason1
Abstract
Can Rawlsian theory provide us with an adequate response to the practical
question of how we should proceed in the face of widespread and intractable
disagreement over matters of justice? Recent criticism of ideal theorizing
might make us wonder whether this question highlights another way in which
ideal theory can be too far removed from our non-ideal circumstances to
provide any practical guidance. Further reflection on it does not show that
ideal theory is redundant, but it does indicate that there is a need for a non-
ideal theory that does not consist simply in an account of how to apply the
principles which are yielded by ideal theory to non-ideal circumstances in
the light of what is feasible and an assessment of the costs of implementation.
Indeed any non-ideal theory that can adequately address this question will
have to be partially autonomous, drawing on a notion of legitimacy that is
rather different to the one which lies at the heart of Rawlsian ideal theory.
Keywords
Rawls, justice, legitimacy, disagreement
Jeremy Waldron argues that Rawlsian theory1 has paid insufficient atten-
tion to what he calls the circumstances of politics, that is, the existence of
intractable disagreement over matters of justice, which occurs not only
1University of Southampton, United Kingdom
Corresponding Author:
Andrew Mason, Politics and International Relations, School of Social Sciences, University of
Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ, United Kingdom
Email: A.D.Mason@soton.ac.uk

Mason
659
amongst professional theorists but also ordinary citizens.2 This disagree-
ment arises in relation to a range of different issues and occurs at different
levels. It includes disagreement over what counts as a just exercise of
coercive political power, disagreement over basic liberties and how
much weight each should be accorded, disagreement over what consti-
tutes a just distribution of wealth and income, and disagreement over what
decision-making procedures are likely to produce the most just outcomes.
Sometimes these disagreements are over fundamental principles, whilst on
other occasions they concern the application of shared principles to com-
plex circumstances that are interpreted differently. At a more abstract level
(and mainly in academic writings), there is disagreement over whether an
adequate theory of justice must be constructivist, realist, or contextualist
in character—or none of these. In Waldron’s view, Rawlsian theory is
flawed because it does not provide us with an adequate response to the fact
that widespread disagreement over matters of justice is likely to persist
even if there is a particular set of principles that are the best defended or
the most reasonable.
Recent criticism of ideal theorizing, or of some forms it takes,3 might
make us wonder whether this problem highlights another way in which
various assumptions—in this case about achieving convergence on a par-
ticular conception of justice—can deprive ideal theory of value by making
the gap between it and non-ideal circumstances too great. Here I resist this
conclusion but argue that reflection on the question of how we as citizens
should proceed in the face of widespread and intractable disagreement over
matters of justice—which I shall refer to as the political question—shows
that we need a non-ideal theory which does not consist simply in an account
of how to apply the principles that are yielded by ideal theory to non-ideal
circumstances in the light of what is judged to be feasible and an assess-
ment of the costs of implementation. Indeed any non-ideal theory that can
adequately address the political question, when that question is understood
as a plea for practical guidance, will have to be partially autonomous, draw-
ing upon a notion of legitimacy that is rather different to the one which lies
at the heart of Rawlsian ideal theory. The notion of legitimacy that I defend
does not bridge the gap between ideal theory and our nonideal societies but
rather contributes to an important but neglected area of non-ideal theoriz-
ing which takes the circumstances of politics seriously in a way that ideal
theory, in its dominant form at least, is unable to do because of its framing
assumptions. Although ideal theory is importantly incomplete, I do not
claim that it lacks value.4

660
PoliticalTheory38(5)
Ideal Theory, Idealizations, and Convergence
Rawlsians might reply to the charge that they have paid insufficient attention
to the circumstances of politics, and have failed to address the political ques-
tion, by insisting that it is precisely because they are developing an ideal
theory that they must presuppose convergence on a particular set of principles
of justice. From this standpoint, engaging with the political question may be
important but it falls under non-ideal theory, which is outside of their remit.
Those who work within ideal theory cannot be criticized for failing to address
this question, for as Rawls himself says, “an omission is not as such a fault.”5
Ideal theory is intended to provide states, and indeed the citizens in whose
name they are supposed to act, with some practical guidance but it does not
aim to address every question that arises out of a concern with justice or the
beliefs we hold about it.
But why must ideal theory presuppose convergence on a particular con-
ception of justice? Ideal theory is premised on strict compliance, that is, gen-
eral or widespread compliance with the principles which must be followed
for a society to be fully just.6 As a result ideal theory in effect presupposes the
absence of the circumstances of politics, for it assumes that in a fully just
society there will be convergence on a particular set of principles of justice.
This might be denied on the grounds that a society’s basic institutions can be
organized in accordance with principles that make them just even if not
everyone accepts these principles, and that we should not confuse the idea of
a well-ordered society (which does require everyone to endorse the princi-
ples which govern it) with the idea of strict compliance. But Rawls’s concep-
tion of strict compliance does seem to involve the stronger condition that
those subject to the principles must endorse rather than merely comply with
them, for it is supposed to capture the idea of a (near) perfectly just society,
and Rawls seems to believe that a society could not be fully just unless all its
citizens accept, and act from, the principles which make its institutions and
practices just.7 So ideal theory in Rawls’s sense is concerned with well-
ordered societies, whose basic institutions are organized in accordance with
the principles that must be realized in order for a society to be fully just and
in which citizens not only fully (or near fully) comply with what these prin-
ciples require of them but also endorse the principles.
Yet this cannot quite be Rawls’s considered position, for in his later writ-
ings at least he seems to relax the idea that in a well-ordered society citizens
converge on a particular conception of justice. In his introduction to the paper-
back edition of Political Liberalism, Rawls emphasizes that there is a family

Mason
661
of reasonable liberal political conceptions of justice, of which his favored
view, justice as fairness, is but one8—albeit the most reasonable—and he
seems to allow that some reasonable disagreement over principles of justice
may occur even in a well-ordered society.9 But he nevertheless places strict
limits on what counts as a reasonable conception of justice. It is not only those
conceptions which deny the fundamental equality of different citizens, what-
ever their race, sex, or ethnic origin, that are classed as unreasonable but also
conceptions that fail to give appropriate priority to basic liberties, such as
freedom of conscience. This appears to entail that some communitarian posi-
tions that give community values priority over basic liberties are unreason-
able, as well as forms of religious fundamentalism that are prepared to use the
law to enforce religious compliance. Even if such conceptions are relatively
rare in liberal democratic societies, the same is not true of some other concep-
tions which Rawls also regards as unreasonable, namely, those which lack a
commitment to ensuring that citizens, whatever their social position, have
adequate means to make intelligent and effective use of their liberties and
opportunities.10 This entails that libertarian conceptions of justice, such as
Robert Nozick’s (which denies the justice of redistributive taxation, except as
compensation when people are unjustly deprived of entitlements which flow
from their property rights11), and their popular equivalents, are unreasonable
by Rawls’s lights. A well-ordered society is one whose citizens endorse only
reasonable conceptions of justice and therefore agree that Nozick’s theory and
others like it are unacceptable. The idea that a well-ordered society contains
only reasonable conceptions of justice is not incoherent but it does imply that
a consideration of the question of how citizens of liberal democratic states
should deal with disagreement over matters of justice when it involves one or
more of...

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