Power Over Rationality: The Bush Administration and the Gulf Crisis.

• Author: Durham, Gesele

The argument advanced in this slim, unfocused and sometimes redundant text suggests that very powerful states can occasionally afford not to be rational. Hybel contends that the emphasis of realists on the international structure is somewhat misplaced because decision-makers approach the world with different beliefs, values and intellectual capabilities. Consequently, their perceptions of reality, their perceptions of the structures and constraints, and what sorts of solutions they devise will differ.

Hybel then seeks to construct a topology of decision-making where the classic rational actor stands at the farthest extreme of the continuum. Closest to rationality is attribution theory where the decision-maker is seen as a naive scientist who commits errors because he does not know better. Schema theory rests even farther along the spectrum and suggests that decision-makers seek to understand the world without using inordinate amounts of time and energy. At the opposite end of the spectrum, farthest from rationality, Hybel places cognitive consistency theory where decision-makers, while trying to understand and solve problems, are also attempting to ensure that their beliefs and values remain mutually consistent. These are the least rational of decision-makers because in order to achieve the latter goal, the mind is required to manipulate information.

Given this topology, Hybel attempts to define why the United States did not engage in a policy of deterrence toward Saddam Hussein. He argues that even though lower level bureaucrats had correctly analyzed the situation, the administration rejected their assessment because it felt that Hussein was a rational actor and would know that an invasion of Kuwait would trigger a costly war Iraq could ill afford following its engagement with Iran. Hybel's analysis is noteworthy for he argues that the Bush administration did little to understand the conflict between Iraq and Kuwait from the Iraqi point of view. Rationality is an individual matter to the extent that utilities and the ranking of options will differ. However, with no Middle East experts guiding the decision-making process, the administration transposed its view of reality onto Hussein and seriously miscalculated his next move.

Once President Hussein had made the move into Kuwait the decision-making process within the administration continued to be less than rational. Indeed, the decision-making process was not dominated by the classical...