Rape, Race, and Capital Punishment: An Enduring Cultural Legacy of Lethal Vengeance?

AuthorBeth Bjerregaard,Sondra J. Fogel,Wesley G. Jennings,John K. Cochran,M. Dwayne Smith,Christopher J. Marier
DOI10.1177/2153368717702700
Published date01 October 2019
Date01 October 2019
Subject MatterArticles
Article
Rape, Race, and Capital
Punishment: An Enduring
Cultural Legacy of Lethal
Vengeance?
John K. Cochran
1
, Christopher J. Marier
1
,
Wesley G. Jennings
1
, M. Dwayne Smith
1
,
Beth Bjerregaard
2
and Sondra J. Fogel
3
Abstract
Historical analyses of southern statutes (i.e., Slave Codes, Black Codes, “Jim Crow,”
etc.) and their enforcement reveals evidence of an enduring cultural legacy prescribing
lethal vengeance to Blacks who violate White sensibilities, especially for Black males
accused of sexually assaulting White females. Using a population of official data on
capital murder trials in North Carolina (1977–2009), this study examines the degree
to which this cultural legacy endures to the present by examining the joint effects of
offender’s race and rape/sexual assault on the capital sentencing outcomes of capital
murder trial involving White female victims. Our findings reveal support for the
continuing endurance of this cultural legacy of lethal vengeance.
Keywords
race and sentencing, race and courts, race and death penalty, race-of-the-victim
effects, homicides, victimization, violence against women
Special legal codes to control the behavior of slaves and preserve White hegemony
were originally the carryover of British common law doctrines relating to the villei-
nage system of Feudal England (see Higginbotham 1978). Under this system workers
1
Department of Criminology, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA
2
Department of Criminal Justice, University of North Carolina, Charlotte, NC, USA
3
School of Social Work, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL, USA
Corresponding Author:
John K. Cochran, Department of Criminology, University of South Florida, 4202 E. Fowler Ave., SOC107,
Tampa, FL33620, USA.
Email: cochran@usf.edu
Race and Justice
2019, Vol. 9(4) 383-406
ªThe Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/2153368717702700
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were bound to the land and owed the manor the fruits of their labor; such common law
traditions sanctioned the treatment of indentured servants, apprentices and children
and were easily applied to slaves in the colonies as well. The first such “Slave Code”
in the New World originated in the British colony of Barbados and served as the model
for South Carolina, in turn, these codes quickly became the model of other southern
Slave Codes throughout the colonies (Stampp, 1956). With the founding of the United
States, colonial Slave Codes became the basis for state statutes that continued this
practice of de jure racial discrimination. In most southern states, these antebellum
Slave Codes extended their reached onto free Blacks as well (Shofner, 1977; Vandiver,
Giacopassi, & Curley, 2003) and were even evident in the Black Codes and Jim Crow
laws of the post–civil war reconstruction era, despite the undefined prohibitions
against the unequal protection of the law in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution.
Whether a Slave Code, a Black Code, or Jim Crow, these laws permitted and
prescribed the unequal, and often harsh, treatment of Blacks relative to Whites. These
codes served to preserve White hegemony by regulating even the most mundane
behaviors of slaves and free Blacks (Dodd, 1918; Flanigan, 1974; Imes, 1919;
Paternoster, 1991). Some of these codes criminalized the behaviors of Blacks, which if
engaged in by Whites were not considered crimes. Importantly, these codes provided
for considerably more severe criminal sanctions, including death, for crimes com-
mitted by Blacks than if the same crimes were committed by Whites. These punish-
ments were especially harsh if the alleged crime was against a White, particularly a
White female (Bardaglio, 1994). Often these sanctions were doled out by the slave
owner without the benefit of a criminal trial, or, where a formal legal process was
required by law, the process was a mere formality (Flanigan, 1974). During the
reconstruction/Jim Crow era, an expedited, pro forma criminal trial process served the
same purpose, and, all too often, the lynch mob replaced the slave owner.
Perhaps one of the clearest and most manifest expressions of the unequal
enforcement of these codes involves allegations of rape by Black males against White
women (Bardaglio, 1994; Dorr, 2000; Rise, 1992). For the majority of the 20th
century, rape was a capital crime, especially in the south. Research by Wolfgang and
Riedel (1973, 1975; see also Greenberg & Himmelstein, 1969), showed tremendous
evidence of racial disparity in capital sentencing outcomes, such that a sentence of
death for rape was especially likely for Black defendants with White victims. While
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that capital punishment for the crime of rape is an
unconstitutional violation of the 8th Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment
because such a punishment is disproportionate to the severity of the crime (see Coker
v. Georgia, 1977; Kennedy v. Louisiana, 2008), rape still serves as a highly salient
aggravating circumstance such that those who kill their victims during a rape-involved
homicide are eligible for the death penalty. The question before us in the present study
is whether there is evidence of an enduring cultural legacy such that Black defendants
charged and convicted of a rape-involved capital murder of White females are dis-
proportionately likely to be sentenced to death. To examine this question, we employ
data from official court records for the population of penalty-phase capital murder
trials involving White female victims (N¼312) in the state of North Carolina
384 Race and Justice 9(4)

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