Ranked-Choice Voting and the Potential for Improved Electoral Performance of Third-Party Candidates in America

• Published date: 01 May 2022
• Author: Alan James Simmons,John E. Transue,Manuel Gutierrez
• DOI: 10.1177/1532673X211072388
• Date: 01 May 2022
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

American Politics Research

2022, Vol. 50(3) 366–378

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/1532673X211072388

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Ranked-Choice Voting and the Potential for

Improved Electoral Performance of

Third-Party Candidates in America

Alan James Simmons

1

, Manuel Gutierrez

1

, and John E. Transue

2

Abstract

Proponents of ranked-choice voting highlight a number of arguments for why such an approach to elections should be adopted.

One major argument is that ranked-choice voting will encourage voters to support more third-party or independent candidates

and break the electoral stranglehold of the two main parties in America. Considering app roximately two-thirds of Americans

want a third major party this argument may prove appealing to American voters, but there is currently no empirical evidence to

support such claims. In this project, we explore a theory of why ranked-choice voting may increase voter support for third-

party or independent candidates and test the argument that ranked-choice voting (RCV) will improve the fortunes of third-party

candidates using a survey experiment. We find significant support for the claim that ranked-choice voting increases support for

third-party candidates.

Keywords

ranked-choice voting, third-party candidates, survey experiment

Introduction

Ranked-choice voting is an electoral system where voters

pick a first-choice candidate and have the option to rank

further candidates in order of their preferences: second, third,

and so on. If a candidate receives more than half of the first-

choice preferences, that candidate wins. However, if there is

no majority winner after counting first choices, the candidate

with the fewest votes is eliminated, and voters who picked

that candidate as their “number one”will have their votes

count for their next choice candidate. This process continues

until a candidate wins with more than half of the votes.

A frequent argument from proponents of ranked-choice

voting in the United States is that ranked-choice voting will

break the “political stranglehold”of the two major parties that

the current U.S. plurality elections produces. This argument is

so pervasive that less than a week before the 2020 US

presidential election, CNN ran an opinion piece supporting

ranked-choice voting based on this very argument (Drutman

& Slaughter, 2020). This coverage by CNN of ranked-choice

voting builds on numerous other discussions regarding the

adoption of ranked-choice voting in major media companies

in the U.S. since 2016.

1

Further, third parties themselves

make similar arguments about the potential impact of RCV on

their electoral successes (Wade, 2020). Considering two-

thirds of Americans want a third major political party in

the United States (Drutman et al., 2018) this argument could

be quite persuasive in gaining voter support for RCV across

the United States.

2

However, to the knowledge of the research

team on this project, no one has yet empirically tested

whether RCV leads to increased support for third-party

candidates.

3

Not only has CNN, and other media outlets, published

articles and op-eds supportive of RCV but prominent U.S.

politicians have also endorsed this electoral reform. For in-

stance, Elizabeth Warren said that she believed RCV would

strengthen democracy (Warren & Raskin, 2020). Andrew

Yang, another 2020 candidate for the U.S. presidency, and

2021 candidate for mayor of New York City made RCV part

of his policy platform and expressed that “centrist candidates,

despite having wider support, lose out to candidates who

appeal to the fringes of each party”(Yang, 2020). A third

2020 candidate for US president, Vermont Senator Bernie

1

University of Illinois at Springfield, Springfield, IL, USA

2

Institute for Legal, Legislative, and Policy Studies, University of Illinois at

Springfield, One University Plaza, MS PAC 451, Springfield, IL 62703-5407, USA.

Corresponding Author:

Alan James Simmons, Institute for Legal, Legislative, and Policy Studies,

University of Illinois at Springfield, One University Plaza, MS PAC 451,

Springfield, IL 62703-5407, USA.

Email: asimm2@uis.edu