Race to judgment? An empirical study of Scott v. Harris and summary judgment.

• Author: Yowell, Amelia G.

INTRODUCTION

In three of the most cited cases in its history, the U.S. Supreme Court strongly encouraged the use of summary judgment as an efficient way to rid the federal dockets of frivolous claims before expensive trials. (1) After this trilogy of decisions, scholars expressed concern about the heavy use of summary judgment. (2) Two decades later, most of the judicial and scholarly world seemed content again with the state of summary judgment. (3) Then came Scott v. Harris. (4) With a video link included underneath the Supreme Court's decision, it is hard to imagine a more modern test of the relationship between judges, evidence, and summary judgment.

Summary judgment is perhaps the most important tool in evaluating the legal sufficiency of a claim. Once a judge grants a summary judgment motion, the claim is barred from a jury. (5) A granted motion also bars the cause of action for purposes of claim and issue preclusion. (6) Because the impact of summary judgment is expansive, the way federal courts decide summary judgment motions ultimately determines whether a claim continues to a jury or, perhaps, a lucrative settlement. Therefore, the legal community understandably takes notice when it appears that the summary judgment framework has changed.

In reading Scott, one thing becomes obvious: the majority relied heavily upon a videotape portraying a high-speed car chase in reversing the lower courts' denials of summary judgment. (7) The defendants' summary judgment motion concerned the plaintiffs argument that a police officer had used excessive force during the chase, (8) While both lower courts discussed other evidence, including testimony from the parties, (9) the Supreme Court needed only one short grainy tape to make its conclusion: the officer's actions, which resulted in severe and lasting injuries to the plaintiff, were reasonable under the circumstances and thus did not constitute excessive force. (10) In this decision, the Supreme Court did not make an express change to summary judgment rules. (11) However, many scholars are concerned that the Court's lenient attitude toward summary judgment will have a substantive effect on summary judgment decisions. (12)

In interpreting Scott, scholars have disagreed about the scope of the decision. Does it signal another large increase in the granting of all summary judgment motions? (13) Or is its impact limited to cases that are factually similar? (14) This Note seeks to answer these questions through an empirical study. The study analyzes how district courts--the initial decision makers confronted with summary judgment motions--have used Scott. The rates of district court decisions on 56(c) motions for summary judgment provide a useful first look at Scott's impact.

The results of this study suggest three conclusions. First, Scott has had little to no substantive impact on summary judgment rates overall. Second, there has been a significant decrease in denial rates in those cases that cite to Scott, suggesting that Scott does have an impact within a limited scope. Third, there has been a remarkable increase in the number of cases dealing with videotape evidence after Scott. (15) In exploring these results, this Note proceeds in four parts. Part I provides context for the study by examining the state of summary judgment before and after Scott as well as discussing the literature's response to Scott. Part II presents the methodology of the empirical study while Part III presents the results. Part IV offers several explanations for the results suggested by the study.

1. HISTORICAL AND ACADEMIC CONTEXT

   1. History and Development of Summary Judgment

      According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a court should grant a summary judgment motion if "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (16) Introduced in 1938, the purpose of Rule 56 was to provide speedy, cheap relief from dockets burdened by frivolous issues. (17) A 1963 amendment made it clear that summary judgment should "pierce the pleadings and ... assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial." (18) Before Rule 56, cases either settled or went to trial. (19) Now, "summary judgment stands alongside trial and settlement as a pillar of our system." (20)

      Until about a decade before the trilogy, the judiciary cautiously interpreted Rule 56 and rarely granted summary judgment motions. (21) Judges were primarily fearful of denying litigants the right to trial. (22) This practice provoked Judge Charles Clark, a member of the original federal rules advisory board, to come to summary judgment's defense. (23) In a fiery dissent, Judge Clark declared, "Of course it is error to deny trial when there is a genuine dispute of facts; but it is just as much error--perhaps more in cases of hardship, or where impetus is given to strike suits--to deny or postpone judgment where the ultimate legal result is clearly indicated." (24) Clark's concerns about underuse fell on deaf ears; judges continued to consider summary judgment the exception, not the rule. (25)

      In 1986, the Supreme Court signaled a shift in judicial attitude toward 56(c) summary judgment motions in the trilogy. (26) In the first trilogy decision, Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., (27) the Court rejected the common belief that the nonmoving party must prove only the slightest doubt in the evidence. (28) Instead, the party must prove a factual dispute that is reasonable. (29) In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., (30) the Court held that the standard for granting a motion for summary judgment is the same as that under a directed verdict and, in deciding whether that standard has been fulfilled at the summary judgment stage, courts should use the same burden of proof as they would at trial. (31) In the seminal trilogy decision, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, (32) the Court shifted its focus to the movant, reducing his burden by holding that the movant does not need to establish the absence of material fact. (33) By simultaneously lowering the burden on the movant and raising the burden on the nonmovant, these decisions suggested that the use of summary judgment would increase. (34)

      After the trilogy, many scholars stopped worrying about the underuse of summary judgment and focused instead on its overuse. (35) Decreased trial rates especially fueled the debate about summary judgment. (36) Many scholars have worried about the scope of summary judgment, fearing that it could cause judges to go beyond their traditional power. (37) Others have questioned the constitutional grounds of summary judgment itself. (38) In a recent article about the trilogy, Professor Miller concludes:

      One primary function of the jury has been to make commonsense determinations about human behavior, reasonableness, and state of mind based on objective standards, the paradigm being the reasonable person standard. Since the Supreme Court trilogy, there is evidence that these responsibilities have been taken away from juries.... Given the existing, convoluted jurisprudence, it is imperative that the Supreme Court provide some clarity rather than leaving the matter entirely to the genial anarchy of trial court discretion. (39) The recent Supreme Court decision in Scott v. Harris has renewed the discussion about the proper scope of summary judgment. (40) Instead of clarifying the proper place of summary judgment, the Supreme Court only muddied the water with its decision in Scott. (41) Scott dealt primarily with the proper role of the judge in determining whether a genuine issue of fact exists. (42) The Court had previously held that "at the summary judgment stage the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." (43) Furthermore, "[i]f reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence ... a verdict should not be directed." (44) The Court also held that a judge must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party and consider "evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses." (45) While Scott did not explicitly replace this standard, some have argued that its attitude broadened the scope of summary judgment motions. (46)

   2. Scott v. Harris

      On a dark Georgia night, Victor Harris sped down a two-lane road at seventy-three miles per hour. (46) A deputy caught Harris speeding in the fifty-five miles per hour zone and turned on his lights. (48) Instead of pulling over, Harris led a high-speed chase. (49) Deputy Timothy Scott heard the call for backup and joined the chase. (50) During the chase, Harris managed to escape a cruiser blockade in a parking lot, but collided with Scott's cruiser in the process. (51)

      Following this incident, Scott took over as the main police cruiser in the pursuit. (52) Scott obtained approval from his supervisor to come into contact with Harris through the Precision Intervention Technique (PIT) maneuver. (53) A PIT maneuver requires the officer to hit the fleeing car at a specific point, throwing the car into a spin. (54) Scott did not know the underlying offense for the chase (speeding), but he told his supervisor that he felt Harris was acting in a reckless and dangerous manner. (55) The supervisor responded, "Go ahead and take him out." (56) Deciding that Harris was traveling too fast, Scott hit Harris's car in a manner that was not a part of the PIT maneuver. (57) Harris lost control of the vehicle, which ran down an embankment and crashed. (58) As a result, Harris was rendered a quadriplegic. (59) A camera on Scott's cruiser captured the incident. (60)

      Harris sued under [section] 1983 (61) alleging, among other...