Race and the right to vote after Rice v. Cayetano.

Date01 December 2000
AuthorKatz, Ellen D.

INTRODUCTION

Four decades ago in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,(1) the Supreme Court struck down a racial gerrymander enacted by the Alabama legislature after African-American citizens in Tuskegee sought to participate in the city's political affairs.(2) The legislation redrew Tuskegee's boundaries "from a square to an uncouth ... strangely irregular twenty-eight sided figure," that removed virtually every African-American resident from the city without removing a single white voter.(3) Justice Frankfurter's decision for the Court explained that the legislation was "solely concerned with segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so as to deprive them of their preexisting municipal vote."(4) Such action, he concluded, denied the former African-American residents of Tuskegee the right to vote on account of their race in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment.(5)

Last Term, the Supreme Court relied on Gomillion to hold that Hawaii, like Alabama before it, had segregated voters by race in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. The state law at issue in Rice v. Cayetano(6) provided that only "Hawaiians" could vote for the trustees of the state's Office of Hawaiian Affairs ("OHA"), a public agency that oversees programs designed to benefit the State's native people.(7) Rice holds that restricting the OHA electorate to descendants of the 1778 inhabitants of the Hawaiian Islands embodied a racial classification that effectively "fenc[ed] out whole classes of ... citizens from decisionmaking in critical state affairs.(8)

In one sense, the majority's equation of the OHA's voting restriction with Tuskegee's racial gerrymander comes as no surprise. To be sure, the Hawaiian scheme differed on its facts from the Alabama law at issue in Gomillion. Instead of an empowered, white majority "singl[ing] out a readily isolated segment of a racial minority for special discriminatory treatment,"(9) and "depriv[ing] them of their preexisting ... vote,"(10) the non-native Hawaiian majority, through the adoption of a new state constitution, voluntarily opted to fence itself out of the electorate for a new state agency expressly created to benefit a historically disempowered minority population.(11) Yet, to a Court increasingly convinced that racial classifications never exist benignly,(12) Hawaii's ostensible absence of invidious intent simply did not pertain. Once the Court in Rice concluded that Hawaii had defined the OHA's electorate in racial terms, the Justices viewed Hawaii's motives for doing so as irrelevant to the constitutional inquiry. In this regard, Rice simply imports into Fifteenth Amendment review the rigorous scrutiny currently applied to seemingly well-intentioned race-based classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment.(13) While this holding may be nominally novel, the Court's decision to adopt this approach might easily have been predicted.

Quite startling and worthy of attention, however, is the path the Court took in reaching its holding. Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Rice accepts, at least for argument's sake,(14) Hawaii's claims that (1) the native people who compose the OHA's electorate hold a position similar to Native American Indian tribes, (2) the OHA itself resembles a special-purpose district and not a general governmental body, and (3) the OHA's electorate held a distinct property interest in OHA affairs.(15) Hawaii maintained that these factors removed the case from the ambit of the Fifteenth Amendment: the first factor established that the OHA's voting scheme employed a nonsuspect, political classification as opposed to a highly suspect or forbidden racial one; the second factor indicated that the OHA elections themselves did not implicate a constitutionally protected right to vote; and the third factor meant that the voting scheme involved neither race nor the right to vote at all.(16) On a conventional understanding of the jurisprudence in this area, Hawaii should have prevailed in light of the Court's acceptance of these premises. Without both a racial classification and a selection process involving the right to vote, the State argued, the OHA's electoral regime could not violate the Fifteenth Amendment.

The Court instead consciously refused to reject these three premises, but nevertheless insisted that these factors did not save the OHA voting regime from invalidation under the Fifteenth Amendment.(17) Rice holds that even if native Hawaiians resemble a Native American Indian tribe and thus qualify as a nonracial and therefore nonsuspect group for various purposes, they evolve into a highly suspect, indeed "forbidden," racial group when they compose the exclusive electorate for public officials serving on a public agency.(18) Similarly, Rice holds that even if the powers of the OHA were sufficiently circumscribed such that it would otherwise constitute a special-purpose district, the use of a racial classification to define its electorate transforms the process of selecting its officials from a simple administrative act subject to the most deferential review into one implicating the constitutionally protected right to vote.(19) Finally, Rice indicates that while the OHA electorate's common property interest might otherwise have legitimized the voting restriction, the coexistence of a racial classification with that interest fatally corrupts any legitimate basis for the voting regime.(20) In other words, Rice indicates that the use of a racial classification in an electoral process transforms that process into one involving the constitutionally protected right to vote, even if that process would not otherwise implicate such a right, and corrupts otherwise legitimate grounds for limiting the franchise. So too, where the process implicates the right to vote, a previously nonsuspect classification metamorphoses into one now deemed to be racial.

This Article traces the Court's reasoning, which appears puzzling on its face, to a deeper understanding of racial classifications, participation in the electoral process, and the relationship between the two. Rice suggests that the primary value of political participation through voting lies not in the policies implemented by those elected, but in two distinct and related intrinsic benefits the vote produces: namely, the constitutive benefit an individual derives from political engagement with others and the expressive benefit derived from full membership in the political community.(21) Rice posits, on the one hand, that a jurisdiction's use of race to define an electorate distorts these beneficial effects by imposing on voters a state-approved identity instead of leaving voters free to develop an identity on their own and by disseminating the message that racial identity represents a relevant criterion for entry into the political community. Rice presumes, on the other hand, that the constitutive and expressive aspects of voting provide a crucial element to a group identity that would otherwise not be viewed as "racial." This view of race confirms the idea that, at least within our constitutional practice, the concept of racial identity is a complex legal conclusion, not a pre-legal fact.

This conception of voting and the impact of race also has significant ramifications for future voting rights cases. At a minimum, it suggests that race-based districting plans actionable under Shaw v. Reno(22) and its progeny may also produce the distinct injury recognized in Rice. After Rice, the Court may view the predominance of race in districting as not only causing an expressive harm that violates the Equal Protection Clause, but also as distorting the intrinsic values that the Fifteenth Amendment protects. So understood, claims brought under Shaw and Rice may capture the same conduct, but conceive of the injury in somewhat different terms.(23) Rice accordingly reinforces Shaw within the legal landscape, solidifying its approach and demonstrating how deeply the Court's discomfort with race-based electoral rules has been woven into doctrinal analysis.

Read more broadly, Rice implies that many applications of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act(24) are unconstitutional. Under this reading, Rice works a dramatic change in voting rights jurisprudence by indicating that electoral rules that even partially rely on race undermine the intrinsic values of voting and thereby violate the Fifteenth Amendment. In other words, districting plans not even subject to strict scrutiny under Shaw might be struck down under Rice.(25) We can squarely confront these potentially far-reaching consequences of Rice, this Article suggests, only by recognizing the deeper conceptions of race and voting that underlie the case.

This Article begins in Part I by discussing the factual background that gave rise to the conflict in Rice v. Cayetano. Part II then addresses the Court's decision in Rice, emphasizing the puzzling doctrinal route the majority took to reach its conclusion that the OHA's voting system violates the Fifteenth Amendment. Part III explores why the Court might have chosen this path and suggests that the decision reflects the views that (1) the Constitution protects the vote primarily because of its intrinsic value to the individual and (2) the concept of race is a complex legal conclusion, not a pre-legal fact. It also explores the implications this conception may have in future cases brought under both section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and Shaw v. Reno. This Article concludes by discussing Rice's distinct understanding of voting's constitutive benefit and by assessing Rice's reliance on Gomillion in light of the decision's conception of voting's intrinsic values.

  1. BACKGROUND

    1. The OHA's Electorate

      The voting restriction struck down in Rice v. Cayetano constituted the latest manifestation of the century-old effort to address the condition of Hawaii's aboriginal peoples. In 1898, following the U.S.-led overthrow of the Hawaiian...

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