Race and the Meso-Level Sources of Domination

Published date01 March 2018
AuthorAbraham Singer,Kiran Banerjee
Date01 March 2018
DOI10.1177/1065912917727370
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912917727370
Political Research Quarterly
2018, Vol. 71(1) 215 –227
© 2017 University of Utah
Reprints and permissions:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
DOI: 10.1177/1065912917727370
journals.sagepub.com/home/prq
Article
This paper contributes to our understanding of the prob-
lem that racial domination presents to liberal political
thought, and the work of John Rawls in particular. We
take as our point of departure the recent scholarly debate
over the place of race in the work of John Rawls, whose
thought has been so influential in shaping contemporary
political theory. Recent critiques and defenses of Rawls’s
approach to questions of racial injustice center on the
nature of Rawls’s commitment to “ideal theory,” and
whether that precludes his engagement with racial domi-
nation. We suggest that the problem of Rawls’s inability
to offer either a central place to racial injustice, or a via-
ble means of addressing such claims, lies elsewhere. The
underappreciated tension of Rawls’s thought we locate is
found not in his commitment to ideal theory, but in the
limits of the Rawlsian understanding of institutions and
their role in conditioning and perpetuating the sorts of
racialized forms of hierarchy and domination that charac-
terized both his age and ours. As studies in race and
American Political Development have shown, institu-
tions such as political parties and labor unions have his-
torically been key to the development and maintenance of
racial hierarchical order. Fully understanding the role of
these institutions in perpetuating racial injustice shows us
that the limitations of Rawls’s approach are his preoccu-
pation with the “basic structure” of society. By restricting
his political philosophy to this subject of justice, many
institutions and associations necessary for understanding
the nature of American racial domination invariably fall
outside the scope of his analysis. Rawls’s philosophical
architecture leaves him unable to either account for or
attend to the meso-level institutions that play such a cen-
tral role in sustaining racial injustice.
Rawls’s inability to adequately address racial injustice
speaks to a deeper problem with a broader tradition of
twentieth century, “welfare state liberalism,” character-
ized by an inability to focus on nonstatutory institutions
and organizations.1 With the historic rise of the welfare
state in the twentieth century, mainstream liberals such as
Rawls have become preoccupied with the state and its
role in creating and remedying injustice. The problem is
not that Rawlsian liberal theory is inherently racist. It is
rather that, because the questions it asks are so focused on
the question of what a state owes rights-bearing citizens,
727370PRQXXX10.1177/1065912917727370Political Research QuarterlyBanerjee and Singer
research-article2017
1University of Saskatchewan, SK, Canada
2Loyola University Chicago, IL, USA
Corresponding Author:
Abraham Singer, Management Department, Quinlan School of
Business Administration, Loyola University Chicago, 820 N. Michigan
Avenue, Chicago, IL 60611, USA.
Email: asinger2@luc.edu
Race and the Meso-Level Sources of
Domination
Kiran Banerjee1 and Abraham Singer2
Abstract
This paper contributes to recent debates over the place of race in liberal theory, and the work of John Rawls in
particular. Controversy has centered on whether Rawls’s broader philosophical approach is capable of addressing
racial injustice, and if not, precisely why the Rawlsian framework remains disconcertingly blind to such issues. Pace
scholars who focus on Rawls’s emphasis on “ideal theory,” and whether that precludes his engagement with racial
domination, we show that Rawls’s inability to account for, or address, racial injustice lies in his limited understanding
of the kinds of “associations” or institutions that condition and perpetuate racial oppression. As studies in race and
American Political Development have shown, nonstatutory institutions such as political parties, unions, and universities
were key to the development and maintenance of racial hierarchical order. Fully understanding the role of these
institutions in perpetuating racial injustice allows us to see that the limitations of Rawls are not his ideal theory, per
se, but his preoccupation with the “basic structure” of society, which rendered such institutions outside his analysis.
We conclude by drawing on thinkers in the Afro-Modern tradition who help us conceptualize how such institutions
are complicit in, and can be weaponized against, racial domination.
Keywords
race, liberalism, John Rawls, racial injustice, meso-level institutions, basic structure

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT