A Quiet Revolution in State Lobbying: Government Growth and Interest Populations

• Author: James M. Strickland
• Published date: 01 December 2021
• Date: 01 December 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920975490
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912920975490

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Article

What explains contemporary numbers of interest groups

in America? Social scientists offer different accounts of

interest in government. Whereas political scientists tend to

attribute lobbying efforts to lawmaking activities or policy

change, several economists propose that interest groups

lobby in response to government spending. Moreover,

there are disagreements over whether lobbying by interest

groups responds to or precipitates lawmaking activities or

government spending. I use historical data from the

American states to gain insight into these conflicting nar-

ratives. The data are produced from archival and second-

ary sources and show that comparatively few groups

lobbied legislators prior to the 1960s or 1970s. During

those decades, as states developed economically and

Congress delegated the implementation of federal pro-

grams and standards to the states, legislatures increased

lawmaking productivity and spending. I find that changes

in lawmaking activities present inconsistent effects on

numbers of groups, but that increases in spending are

strongly correlated with growth in groups. While lobbying

grew in tandem with state budgets, the effects of spending

vary across states are not statistically discernible in most.

The transformation of state government was a “quiet

revolution” in American politics (Elazar 1974, 90), and

served as both an energizing and destabilizing event for

interest groups. In a contemporary context, Lowery and

Gray (1995) show that different numbers of interest

groups lobby different state legislatures. In their model,

numbers of interest groups are a function of energizing

factors and stable institutions. Lawmaking activities

serve to energize groups into lobbying, whereas large-

scale changes in government, including in the size of

government, destabilize communities of interest groups.

While I employ their model specification to predict inter-

est populations, I examine a dataset that includes the

years of the quiet revolution. Specifically, I examine

numbers of interest groups registered to lobby in thirty

states from the 1890s to the present. Similar analyses

have neglected the revolution because of limited datasets.

By examining cross-sections of states starting in 1975, or

yearly observations from the past decade, other studies

generally find no or conditional relationships between

lawmaking or government spending, and lobbying (e.g.,

Boehmke 2005; Holyoke and Cummins 2020; Lowery

and Gray 1998; Strickland 2019b). These studies miss a

pivotal time in the states, and their findings are at odds

with studies of congressional lobbying. Jones, Theriault,

and Whyman (2019, 227–42) find that the number of

associations based in the nation’s capital more than tri-

pled between 1961 and 1981, and that this growth is

975490PRQXXX10.1177/1065912920975490Political Research QuarterlyStrickland

research-article2020

1Arizona State University, Tempe, USA

Corresponding Author:

James M. Strickland, School of Politics and Global Studies, Arizona

State University, P.O. Box 873902, Tempe, AZ 85287-3902, USA.

Email: James.strickland@asu.edu

A Quiet Revolution in State Lobbying:

Government Growth and Interest

Populations

James M. Strickland1

Abstract

What explains contemporary numbers of interest groups in America? To answer this question and help address

conflicting narratives in research, I examine the rise of interest groups in the states. Assembling an original dataset

based on archival and secondary sources, I find that relatively few groups lobbied legislators prior to the 1960s or

1970s. During those decades, numbers of interest groups began to grow rapidly. I find that increases in lawmaking

activities present inconsistent effects on the political mobilization of groups but increases in spending are strongly

correlated with mobilization. In additional tests, I find that the effects of spending on group numbers vary by state and

are not discernible in most states. In general, a historic transformation of state governments helps to account for the

growth of state lobbying. Interest groups have remained active in state capitols ever since.

Keywords

lobbying, interest groups, state politics, government growth, public choice

2021, Vol. 74(4) 1181 –1196

1182 Political Research Quarterly 74(4)

2 Political Research Quarterly 00(0)

correlated with congressional lawmaking and spending.

Therefore, while my study helps to address conflicting

narratives of group mobilization in the states, it also

addresses inconsistent findings between studies of state

and federal lobbying.

America’s state capitols have not always been crowded

with hundreds of interest groups. Over time, state legisla-

tures have produced laws in more policy domains and

spent increasing amounts of money. Throughout much of

the twentieth century, the interest groups that lobbied

state legislators were small and stable in number. This

changed as states expanded their lawmaking activities

and budgets, thereby precipitating a quiet revolution in

state lobbying. I show that historic increases in group

numbers cannot be attributed entirely to improved lobby

laws, although such laws strengthened the relationships

between lawmaking, spending, and group numbers.

Of normative concern, as growth in lobbying mirrors

growth in government, growing governments may be

increasingly subject to interest group pressure, and

reforms may be needed to help insulate officials from

growing influence. Such reforms include limits on cam-

paign contributions or personal gifts. If interest groups

influence state policies or slow down the adoption of new

policies (a phenomenon coined “demosclerosis”), then

growing states may become increasingly unwieldy

Leviathans of interest coalitions and enact policies that

do not reflect the preferences of voters (Rauch 1994).

Alternatively, if lobbying activities respond to govern-

ment growth, then concerns over group influence on gov-

ernment are less warranted. I provide indirect insight into

these questions.

Government Growth and Interest

Populations

There are numerous institutions, associations, and mem-

bership-based groups in the United States, but not all

these organizations lobby legislators. Most of them never

or rarely lobby (Lowery 2007, 37–38). Organizations or

groups choose to lobby when their “wants and values”

intersect with public policy or legislative agendas (Bevan

2013, 547; Heinz et al. 1993, 24). Under this perspective,

political interests are created by government activity

(Leech et al. 2005, 20). While it is impossible to count all

the organizations within society, lobbyist registration

laws require disclosure of the organizations that lobby.

Such totals are known as “interest populations” (Gray

and Lowery 1996).1

Lowery (2007) argues that organizations lobby for dif-

ferent reasons in different contexts. Some lobby out of

instrumental, strategic considerations. Lowery highlights

the case of Microsoft, which did not hire lobbyists until the

U.S. Justice Department began to prosecute the company as

a monopolist in the late 1990s. Second, organizations some-

times lobby defensively to prevent the adoption of policies

they dislike. This is often the case if social or environmental

organizations advocate policy changes that businesses dis-

like. Most lobbying in Congress is defensive in nature

(Baumgartner et al. 2009). Lobbying might also be a nonra-

tional, purposive act for some groups, especially member-

ship-based groups. Finally, organizations may lobby to

achieve multiple goals concurrently. In addition to affecting

policy change, goals may include incentivizing member or

donor support and maintaining an organization’s reputation

as a major policy player.

Given that different groups lobby under different cir-

cumstances, the expansion of government activities (e.g.,

new laws or spending) can increase numbers of organiza-

tions that lobby in multiple ways. Studies of legislative

agendas and group mobilization suggest that more law-

making activity can energize groups into lobbying.

Legislative activity is seen as having the potential to cre-

ate both winners and losers, thereby affecting (and attract-

ing) the interests of more societal organizations. Studies

that link government activity with interest populations

include Baumgartner and Leech (1998), Gray et al.

(2005), and Leech et al. (2005). The prospect for policy

change encourages individuals into supporting groups.

Membership-based groups that engage in political advo-

cacy tend to last longer than those that do not (Bevan

2013). Groups may also mobilize to avoid potential

losses. Jones, Theriault, and Whyman (2019) argue that

the 1960s rise of citizen groups and expansion of policy

agendas in Congress led to a conservative backlash in

lobbying. New business interests mobilized in response

to higher taxes and more regulations. Hertel-Fernandez

(2019) documents similar processes in the states. During

the same decade, state taxes and spending on public edu-

cation increased. In response, business-supported, con-

servative groups began to form and pressure lawmakers

to roll back new spending. These groups were reacting

primarily to policy changes they disliked.

Separately, economists Buchanan and Tullock (1962,

285–87) argue that historic increases in lobbying are due

to new government spending. In their view, groups are

more likely to lobby as the perceived, potential benefits

from lobbying increase. Such benefits increase with state

spending, particularly spending on selective as opposed

to collective benefits. This is more akin to the instrumen-

tal lobbying Lowery (2007) mentions and implies that

government austerity curbs overall lobbying.

While the studies that link government growth with

interest populations offer different accounts of which

aspects of government (lawmaking or spending) are cor-

related with groups, narratives also differ over causal

directionality. Those who study legislative agendas tend

to argue that lawmaking attracts interests. Others argue