Quiet Politics, Trade Unions, and the Political Elite Network: The Case of Denmark*

• Author: Christian Lyhne Ibsen,Anton Grau Larsen,Christoph Houman Ellersgaard
• Published date: 01 March 2021
• Date: 01 March 2021
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220985748
• Subject Matter: Special Issue Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329220985748

Politics & Society

2021, Vol. 49(1) 43 –73

© The Author(s) 2021

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DOI: 10.1177/0032329220985748

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Special Issue Article

Quiet Politics, Trade Unions,

and the Political Elite Network:

The Case of Denmark*

Christian Lyhne Ibsen

University of Copenhagen

Christoph Houman Ellersgaard

Copenhagen Business School

Anton Grau Larsen

Copenhagen Business School and Roskilde University

Abstract

Pepper Culpepper’s seminal Quiet Politics and Business Power has revitalized the study

of when business elites can shape policies away from public scrutiny. This article takes

the concept of quiet politics to a new, and surprising, set of actors: trade union leaders.

Focusing on the case of Denmark, it argues that quiet politics functions through

political elite networks and that this way of doing politics favors a particular kind of

corporatist coordination between the state, capital, and labor. Rather than showing

macrocorporatist coordination between the two classes and governments, it identifies

representatives of business and labor that hold privileged positions in political elite

networks. Representatives of segments are found in industries important for the

Danish economy, specifically, the exporting manufacturing sector. Being at the core

of the network requires not only a key position in the Danish economy but also an

understanding that politics is often done best without politicians and voters. The

analysis shows that trade union and business association representatives work closely

on a wide number of issues through quiet politics, using their extensive network to

broker and foster agreement between different stakeholders.

Keywords

quiet politics, corporatism, trade unions, social networks, elites, comparative political

economy

Corresponding Author:

Christian Lyhne Ibsen, FAOS/Department of Sociology, University of Copenhagen, Øster Farimagsgade

5, 1353 Copenhagen K, Denmark.

Email: cli@faos.dk

*This is one of six articles that constitute a special issue titled “Quiet Politics and the Power of Business:

New Perspectives in an Era of Noisy Politics.” Some of the articles in the issue were first presented at the

SASE annual meeting at the Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 in June 2017, organized by Glenn Morgan,

Christoph Houman Ellersgaard, Stéphanie Ginalski, and Christian Lyhne Ibsen, and at a workshop at the

University of Bristol funded by the School of Management and the Political Studies Association section on

Labour Movements in June 2018, organized by Glenn Morgan, Christian Lyhne Ibsen, and Magnus Feldmann.

985748PASXXX10.1177/0032329220985748Politics & SocietyIbsen et al.

research-article2021

44 Politics & Society 49(1)

In this article, we argue that it is not just business that gets what it wants through quiet

politics.1 In some countries with strong labor movements, corporatist elites of which

trade union leaders are a part can also exercise disproportionate influence over policy

through quiet politics. In Europe, corporatism and tripartism have come under severe

pressures from union decline, austerity policies, re-parliamentarization, and neoliber-

alism.2 Moreover, integration through the European Union has meant that the state

needs to focus on the European level rather than national political exchanges.3 These

pressures have also challenged the traditionally strongly corporatist Nordic countries.

In the comparative political economy and comparative politics literature, Denmark is

most often considered to be a coordinated market economy or social corporatist politi-

cal system, albeit with some liberal elements.4 The Danish political system affords

considerable inclusion of interest groups into policymaking across multiple policy

areas,5 and the social partners—trade unions and business associations—to a large

extent decide the terms and conditions of employment through collective bargaining.6

Recent scholarship on Denmark debunks the argument that Danish corporatism is

dead and finds strong and enduring corporatist policymaking due to strategic reorien-

tation on the part of trade unions and business associations to cope with the challenges

to corporatism.7

Going beyond these studies, we argue that the specific Danish version of corporat-

ism and its resilience is due to strong network interlocks of certain segments of the

labor movement and business associations, forming a so-called cross-class alliance.8

This alliance grew out of shared interests between the business association of export-

ing companies (the Confederation of Danish Industries, or Dansk Industri) and the

metalworkers’ union (Dansk Metal), and gradually took over from the peak-level con-

federations of capital and labor. Trade union leaders owe their membership in the elite

network to the cross-class alliance with the business association that represents com-

panies that are vital for the Danish economy. These businesses are primarily in export-

based manufacturing and employ skilled workers and engineers for high-value-added

products and services.

The power of this alliance depends on quiet politics in political elite networks.

Quiet politics—as defined by Pepper Culpepper9—often involves technical issues that

voters do not care about, and because voters do not care, there is little to gain for politi-

cians from intervening. Once an issue becomes highly salient, the cross-class alliance

will have a harder time pushing its preferences through because other unions, voters,

and politicians will push back. Elite networks are an ideal setting for quiet politics,

because they involve a small core of actors that can deliberate on complex issues with-

out the interference of the media, voters, and vote-seeking politicians.

We also argue that integration in the political elite network puts trade union leaders

in a particular dilemma. Inclusion in the network means unparalleled ties to not only

business association representations but also to corporate leaders, politicians, high-

ranking civil servants, university leaders, and cultural elites. Being in these networks

means being part of a political elite that sets the direction and pace of policy reforms.

However, the material interests of the alliance are often at odds with unions organizing

workers in sheltered sectors, most notably the public sector, construction, and parts of