Questionable uses of canons of statutory interpretation: why the Supreme Court erred when it decided "any" only means "some".

AuthorEngel, Anthony L.
  1. INTRODUCTION (1)

    In Small v. United States, (2) the United States Supreme Court held that the phrase "convicted in any court" in the United States Criminal Code's unlawful gun possession statute, 18 U.S.C. [section] 922(g), (3) includes only convictions handed down by domestic, and not foreign, courts. (4) With this decision, the Court resolved a circuit split over the question of whether a defendant's convictions from jurisdictions other than U.S. federal and state courts could apply under the statute.

    The Supreme Court's decision was incorrect because in statutory interpretation, a plain language reading, where possible, is preferable to a strained reading that may or may not lead to fairer results for criminal defendants. In the event of true ambiguity, legislative history and policy concerns can be considered, but unless the statutory language itself is obscure, courts should follow the language as written and permit Congress to change the result if it is not the one that it intended. The language of the statute in this case is clear as written. While the majority raises important concerns about potential dangers in the enforcement of the statute as written, they are likely overstated and do not warrant a departure from the usual approach to statutory interpretation. The dissent raises more significant concerns about future decisions based on questionable modes of statutory interpretation that are introduced by the Court in this decision.

    The Court's approach in this case is inconsistent with its approach in other cases--including one decided on the same day (5)--and will lead to confusion among citizens in understanding their rights and responsibilities, as well as for Congress in understanding how its statutes will be interpreted. Looking beyond the decision itself, the Court's methods of reasoning could have ripple effects in future cases.

  2. BACKGROUND

    1. THE "FELON-IN-POSSESSION" STATUTE

      The statute at issue in this case is 18 U.S.C. [section] 922, which enumerates unlawful acts with regard to firearms under federal law. The statute, in pertinent part, reads:

      (g) It shall be unlawful for any person--

      (1) who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. (6)

      The Supreme Court in Small, and lower courts before it, had to interpret the phrase "any court" to determine whether convictions that take place in a foreign country serve as predicate convictions for purposes of this statute. While the legislature could have clearly articulated this in the statute itself, there is no reference to domestic or foreign courts in [section] 922(g), where the plain language simply reads "any court." Section 921 provides definitions for the chapter, and does not define "any court." The only part that references language in [section] 922(g) is [section] 921 (a)(20), which exempts certain federal and state crimes from the reach of [section] 922(g) by slightly altering the definition of the predicate crime:

      (20) The term "crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" does not include--

      (A) any Federal or State offenses pertaining to antitrust violations, unfair trade practices, restraints of trade, or other similar offenses relating to the regulation of business practices, or

      (B) any State offense classified by the laws of the State as a misdemeanor and punishable by a term of imprisonment of two years or less. (7)

      There are two principal arguments that have been raised with regard to this language. First, the proponents of including foreign convictions note that the plain language excludes any specific mention of foreign convictions, and conclude that they should still be included. (8) Second, and in opposition to the first argument, some argue that the language excluding particular federal and state crimes from the reach of the larger statute indicates that Congress did not even consider foreign convictions when it drafted the felon-in-possession statute, and therefore they should not be included. (9)

      Section 922(g) also has implications for repeat offenders. Under the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"), (10) an individual convicted of a [section] 922(g) violation who has three or more previous convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses in any court defined in [section] 922(g)(1) will be fined and imprisoned for a minimum sentence of fifteen years. (11)

    2. PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF THE RELEVANT STATUTES

      Two relevant firearms statutes were passed in 1968, the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act ("Safe Streets Act") in June, and the Gun Control Act amending the Safe Streets Act in October. (12) While there had been little Congressional interest in gun control legislation between 1938 and 1965, (13) the assassinations of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Senator Robert Kennedy in 1968 altered the political landscape. (14) Title IV of the Safe Streets Act specifically addressed Congress's concern about firearms and firearm traffic. In the findings and declarations, Congress declared that "the case with which any person can acquire firearms other than a rifle or shotgun (including criminals [and other parties of concern]) is a significant factor in the prevalence of lawlessness and violent crime in the United States." (15) The Gun Control Act modestly revised Title IV of the Safe Streets Act. (16)

      In 1986, Congress passed the Firearm Owners' Protection Act ("FOPA"), which represented the first major revision of the firearm laws since the Safe Streets Act. (17) FOPA had great impact on the reach of state and federal gun laws. FOPA streamlined the law with regards to which classes of people would be prohibited from possessing or receiving firearms. (18) While these classes had been defined under the 1968 and subsequent law in two separate provisions in both Title IV and Title VII, FOPA repealed Title VII and incorporated its definitional categories into Title IV. (19) However, the relevant language of [section] 922(g)(1) pertaining to the current discussion remained essentially the same. (20)

    3. PRIOR COURTS REVIEWING THE STATUTE HAVE DIFFERED ON WHETHER "ANY COURT" INCLUDES OR EXCLUDES CONVICTIONS IN FOREIGN COURTS

      The Circuit Courts of Appeals have disagreed on whether a conviction occurring in "any court" includes foreign court convictions. Circuits that have permitted foreign convictions to stand as predicate offenses include the Third, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits. Circuits that have reviewed the same statute and have excluded foreign convictions include the Second and Tenth Circuits.

      1. The Fourth and Sixth Circuits Focus on a Plain Language Reading of the Statute and Include Foreign Convictions

        The first court of appeals to consider the issue of the meaning of "any court" with regard to foreign convictions was the Sixth Circuit in 1986 in United States v. Winson. (21) The defendant had been charged with unlawful receipt of two firearms pursuant to [section] 922(h)(1), (22) based upon two prior convictions he had received in Argentina and Switzerland for possession of counterfeit U.S. currency and fraud, respectively. (23) The district court reasoned that interpreting the statute to include foreign convictions would "require judicial recognition of military tribunal adjudications in Nicaragua, as well as condemnations of political prisoners in Poland," and Congress would not have intended such an unfair result. (24) Further, the court found ambiguity when it considered [section] 922 juxtaposed with a similar code section then in effect, [section] 1202, which by its terms only applied to domestic courts. (25) The district court concluded that the principle of lenity should control and dismissed the indictment. (26)

        While the Sixth Circuit agreed that the principle of lenity should govern when a criminal statute is ambiguous, it disagreed with the trial court about the ambiguity of [section] 922. (27) It found that the plain language of [section] 922 was clear, and that the statute only appeared ambiguous when viewed in light of the limits of [section] 1202. (28) However, following the Supreme Court's reasoning in United States v. Batchelder, (29) the Sixth Circuit identified clear "congressional intent to give each statute an independent construction and application, especially where, as here, the express language of the two Titles indicates different meanings." (30) Further, with regard to fairness considerations, the court found no evidence that the defendant's prior convictions in Argentina and Switzerland were counter to American principles of constitutional law or in violation of the defendant's civil rights. (31) The court also found it highly persuasive that mechanisms were in place for an individual to seek relief from foreign convictions with regard to the code sections at issue. (32) Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's decision and remanded with directions to reinstate the indictment. (33)

        Three years after Winson was decided, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Atkins. (34) The defendant in that case had received a conviction by a court in England for unlawful possession of a firearm with intent to endanger life, and had served three years of a five-year sentence. (35) After being found by military police with a handgun attached to his ankle, he was arrested under [section] 922(g). (36) He conditionally pleaded guilty, reserving the question of whether his English conviction was a conviction in "any court" under the statute. (37) In a short opinion, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Sixth Circuit's approach in Winson. (38) Based on their analysis of legislative history and cases construing the statute, they determined that Congress's intended meaning was...

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