A Question of Costliness: Time Horizons and Interstate Signaling

• Published date: 01 September 2019
• Date: 01 September 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0022002718822719
• Author: Kyle Haynes
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

A Question of Costliness:

Time Horizons and

Interstate Signaling

Kyle Haynes

1

Abstract

This article examines how interstate signaling processes operate under multiple

dimensions of uncertainty. The existing signaling literature largely assumes that

states communicate and infer one another’s intentions in a simplified context where

they are only uncertain about one component of the other’s preferences. Relaxing

this unrealistic assumption, I develop a model of interstate reassurance in which the

receiver is uncertain of both the compatibility of the sender’s goals and its time

horizons. If a receiving state is unsure of the sending state’s time horizons, it is

more difficult to determine the costliness of a given signal, and thus how credible it is

as an indicator of the sender’s preferences. I show that under certain conditions,

shorter time horizons lead to more credible signaling as states become less willing to

incur the short-term costs of misrepresentation. Under other conditions, however,

shortened time horizons can incentivize hedging behavior, thus undermining a

benign state’s ability to credibly signal its intentions. Finally, the model reveals that

multidimensional uncertainty can actually facilitate cooperation across a wider range

of conditions than one-dimensional uncertainty. I present two brief case illustrations

and discuss the model’s implications for contemporary US–China relations.

Keywords

signaling, reassurance, power shift, credibility, game theory

1

Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

Corresponding Author:

Kyle Haynes, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, Beering Hall, 100 N University St., West

Lafayette, IN 47907, USA.

Email: kylehaynes@purdue.edu

Journal of Conflict Resolution

2019, Vol. 63(8) 1939-1964

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0022002718822719

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In 1890, less than two years after coming to power in Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II

decided that Germany would need to break with Otto von Bismarck’s alliance

policy and pursue a “New Course” that would secure its position in Europe, acquire

overseas colonies, and build a large fleet to challenge British naval hegemony. But

from 1890 to 1897, German foreign policy consciously concealed these ambitions

and prioritized keeping on good terms with Britain. Then, in 1897, Wilhelm’s

government shifted course, pursuing its colonial aims much more forcefully and

implementing an ambitious naval building program. These actions overtly

revealed that Wilhelm’s ambitions, which he had harbored since 1890, were

wholly incompatible with British preferences. This shift set in motion a massive

naval arms race and provoked the “encirclement” of Germany prior to World War I

(Fischer 1965, 4).

What explains the timing of this sudden change in German policy? The core

elements of Wilhelm’s Weltpolitik were formulated as early as 1890 but were effec-

tively concealed for nearly a decade in an effort to avoid alarming Britain. And

puzzlingly, Germany’s shift toward a more confrontational strategy coincided with

the outbreak of the Second Boer War, which accelerated and accentuated Britain’s

relative decline. Conventional thinking on power transitions would suggest that, in

light of Britain’s accelerating decline, German policy makers should seek to bide

their time and wait until the bilateral po wer shift had progressed further before

revealing their ambitions (Copela nd 2000). Why did Wilhelm initiate , and then

continue, Germany’s Weltpolitik strategy just as Great Britain was sinking into a

colonial quagmire that promised Germany more fruitful opportunities for expansion

in the future?

I argue that in part, domestic political forces shortened Wilhelm’s time horizons,

which in turn accelerated his foreign policy time line. Specifically, the rise of the

Social Democratic Party (SPD) required Wilhelm to act quickly to achieve imme-

diate foreign policy “successes” and assuage his domestic coalition through real

material gains (Kennedy 1980, 227). Far from a “diversionary” policy aimed only

at distracting the public or scapegoating foreign enemies, these actions sought to

achieve Wilhelm’s true, long-held foreign policy ambitions. The expansive goals of

this policy had been in place for years but were concealed in order to avoid British

containment. Then, in 1897, the rapidly emerging threat posed by the SPD required

Wilhelm to produce immediate payoffs in order to keep his core domestic coalition

happy. He therefore abandoned the far-sighted policy of strategic misrepresentation

and began immediately pursuing the Reich’s long-standing foreign policy ambitions.

This episode highlights an important oversight in the existing literature on

interstate signaling and reassurance. Prior signaling models uniformly assume that

states attempt to signal and infer one another’s preferences in a highly simplified

context, absent additional dimensions of uncertainty.

1

This unrealistic assumption

facilitates more parsimonious models that yield easily interpretable results but also

obscures the important ways in which different dimensions of uncertainty interact.

I demonstrate below that relaxing this assumption and allowing for additional

1940 Journal of Conflict Resolution 63(8)