Putin and the Russian orthodox church: asymmetric symphonia.

AuthorAnderson, John
PositionVladimir Putin - Essay

Following his inauguration as Russian president in May 2000, Vladimir Putin walked the short distance across the Kremlin grounds to the Cathedral of the Annunciation for a thanksgiving service. At this brief service, Patriarch Aleksii II praised the new president for his "thoughtful and responsible style of leadership" and suggested that like never before Russia needed "the restoration of the spiritual powers of the nation and a rebirth of its commitment to genuine moral values ... Vladimir Vladimirovich, help us to disclose the soul of the nation." (1) If the leader of the Russian Orthodox Church was using this opportunity to present church and state in perfect harmony, one might also note that the president too was making a point in keeping separate the civil and religious celebrations of his electoral success.

In the immediate aftermath of Putin's appearance as heir apparent, there had been considerable speculation as to what this might mean for church-state relations. This resulted from the fact that he did little to hide his personal commitment to Orthodoxy and that his participation in religious services clearly went beyond the lip service paid by the first generation of post- and ex-communist politicians. Liberal critics feared the advent of a more religious based politics in which pre-Soviet church-state links were restored and the church hierarchy largely appointed during the Soviet era returned to a familiar role of subservience to the state. Though sometimes associated with the Byzantine era, it was Peter the Great who effectively turned the Orthodox Church into a department of state, abolishing the Patriarchate and placing a state appointed bureaucrat at the head of the church. In consequence the Orthodox Church came to be seen as a pillar of the state and, though it enjoyed a very limited political role, its bishops were important dignitaries who could use their position to pursue church ends, such as supporting tight restrictions on religious minorities until 1905. Yet this close association with the state, which included the obligation to report on any political matters heard in the confessional, along with the scandals associated with Rasputin, was to have bitter consequences for the Orthodox after 1917 despite the emergence of a significant reform movement within the church at the turn of the century. (2) If liberals were perhaps pessimistic about a revival of a state church, conservatives had more reasons to be optimistic that Putin's stated commitment to order and patriotism might lead to a renewed focus on Orthodox values in public life. Yet, as this article suggests, Putin's period in office has not been characterized by a serious state-led attempt to restore the political authority of the Russian Orthodox Church and religious matters are clearly very much secondary affairs for the Kremlin, except where they impinge on security or social harmony. Church leaders are treated with respect, clerics are present at public occasions and, where it does not conflict with other priorities, Putin is likely to favor the Orthodox Church's agenda. We illustrate this through discussion of four areas where there are what might be called shared orientations or affinities between the interests of church and state: the issue of liberalization and Westernization, the notion of "managed pluralism," security and religious education. In all of these areas, the policies of Putin largely suit the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, though in some there are differences of emphasis. But this is very much a matter of church preferences reinforcing, not determining, the policies of the president and even where there are differences, the church's preference for a close relationship with state power has meant that major church-state clashes have been avoided.

THE MAN AND THE INHERITANCE

Very much a child of the Soviet Union, Putin inherited a religion-politics relationship that had undergone significant changes during his lifetime. When the president was a boy, Khrushchev waged a militant campaign against religion; as he came to maturity, Brezhnev further developed a policy of low-level harassment combined with close state control of the few religious institutions permitted to exist. Towards the end of the Gorbachev years, the state effectively dropped its anti-religious commitment; in October 1990, the Russian Federation adopted a new law on freedom of conscience, removing the administrative and repressive restrictions of the past. This inaugurated the first phase of post-communist policy, which can be characterized as one of free-market romanticism, when existing religious communities enjoyed a certain institutional revitalization and newer domestic- and foreign-based groups were able to operate freely. Inevitably, this provoked a reaction, as nationalist politicians and leaders of the dominant Orthodox Church expressed concerns about the "invasion of the sects" and claims were made that Russia was not ready for an unregulated religious market where the ideologically disoriented population might fall prey to dubious religious groups. (3) In consequence the Orthodox Church started to campaign for a more restrictive law that would privilege traditional religious communities and make it harder for others to function in the new Russia. The details have been explored elsewhere but the outcome of this policy debate was that, in 1997, a new law on religion put in place some of the restrictions promoted by the Orthodox leadership and various political groups. (4)

The 1997 law ushered in the second phase of post-communist religious policy, characterized by some as "managed pluralism." (5) Under the new legal regime, "traditional" religious communities (Orthodox, Muslim, Buddhist and Jewish) enjoyed a range of rights that were not available to minority groups, which remained free to worship but lacked some of the legal privileges offered to the former groups. Whilst the fears that this might usher in a new era of Soviet-style repression of religious communities have not materialized, it has enabled local authorities hostile to particular communities to use the law to impose restrictions on religious activity. Particularly affected have been groups such as Roman Catholics, Pentecostals, independent evangelicals, Jehovah's Witnesses, some Adventists, members of various "new religious movements," and most notoriously, the Moscow branch of the Salvation Army, which faced the rather surreal charge of being a paramilitary organization. By the time that Putin came to power, the long-term effects of the law remained unclear, but the picture that emerged from around the country was of considerable variation in the implementation of the law, depending on the attitudes of individual leaders and administrations.

During the Yeltsin era, religion was not a major concern of the administration, though this did not stop the church seeking to influence the president, as in the passage of the 1997 law, or prevent critics from charging that religion enjoyed undue influence in a country whose constitution mandated separation of church and state. Certainly the Russian Orthodox Church enjoyed a public preeminence, evident in its representation at major state functions, the granting of certain economic concessions to the church, the tendency of Yeltsin to visit Patriarch Aleksii II on the eve of major foreign visits, and in the church's endorsement of Yeltsin during the 1996 presidential election. There was also a tendency on the part of many politicians to overestimate the political influence of Orthodoxy and thus make undue efforts to associate with church leaders or participate in religious rituals. (6) Yet, as Irina Papkova has pointed out, a study of party and election programs from the mid-1990s onwards demonstrates a certain overestimation of the significance of the religious constituency; but equally, a fairly utilitarian approach to winning religious votes--a seat in the state Duma might well be worth a mass, even for previously atheistic communists. (7)

With Putin we have a very different politician, one who seemed to have some sort of personal, if theologically vague, commitment to Orthodoxy and one who obviously knew how to behave in a church. As a child, Putin was taken to Leningrad's Preobrazhensky Cathedral for baptism by his mother, though it may be that his communist father was not aware of this. While it is said that he never takes off his baptismal cross--something confirmed by pictures of the vacationing president in the summer of 2007--and he has made regular visits to church services and pilgrimage sites during his period in office, the precise nature of his religious faith is less certain. In January 2000, he offered Christmas greetings to Orthodox believers, stressing that "Orthodoxy had played a special role in Russian history ... and largely determined the character of Russian civilization," and he went on to argue that its ideals "will make it possible to strengthen mutual understanding and consensus in our society, and contribute to the spiritual and moral rebirth of the Fatherland." (8) Church leaders increasingly spoke of him as a believing president, and in the early years of his rule it was suggested that he was particularly close to Archimandrite Tikhon, the head of Moscow's Presentation monastery, a vibrant religious community rebuilt since 1991 and often seen as the headquarters of the conservative nationalist wing of the church. (9) Whilst claims that Putin enjoyed connections to Tikhon appear to be exaggerated by those around this cleric who had been a staunch critic of Yeltsin, the point of making these claims was perhaps to suggest that Putin identified with a particular section of the church community. (10) Yet, for all his sympathies with the Orthodoxy, there is little evidence that Putin's thinking is fundamentally influenced by a theological perspective. Putin is essentially a...

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